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Abstract 
This thesis examines the way in which the concept of criminal law defences for individuals 
has been imported to international law and the consequences of doing so. The idea of 
defending one’s criminal act with a legally defined reason which removes criminal 
responsibility originates in national law. Self-defence is a good example of the ‘best’ kind of 
defence to plead: acquittal will result where serious assault, for example, was only committed 
against an attacker in order to save one’s life. Domestic law places restrictions on the 
availability of such defences, particularly where serious offences such as murder are 
concerned and more flexible defences, such as duress, tend to be limited in their application 
to more serious crimes against the person. For example, self-defence is accepted as a full 
defence for murder in most jurisdictions, but there is a far greater reluctance to allow duress 
as a full defence for murder. In some jurisdictions, duress is not even recognised as a 
defence in the first place.  
 
At the international level, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court has codified 
defences, directly importing a number of recognisable defences from domestic legal systems. 
However, the way in which this has been done is problematic: the Rome Statute was drafted 
to prosecute genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity, yet it does not restrict or 
limit the application of any of the defences for the most serious crimes, as domestic systems 
tend to do.  
 
The first part to this thesis demonstrates the way in which national law has been used as a 
source of principles for the concept of defences, leading to the conclusion that the defences 
have been imported in part from domestic law. This part to the argument looks at the 
influence of domestic law at the international level, acknowledging it as a source of and 
influence on international law and demonstrates the close connection between both. It then 
turns to the use of domestic defences before internationalised military tribunals and the 
International Military Tribunals at Tokyo and Nuremberg, concluding that defences have 
been available but were inapplicable, given the nature and seriousness of the crimes. The 
codification of defences in the Rome Statute is then explored, identifying the use of domestic 
law at the international level. However, this use is considered problematic where the crimes 
are so serious and the defence of duress is identified as a particularly flexible, and thus 
undesirable, defence for war crimes and crimes against humanity.  
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The second part builds on this argument by undertaking a comparative study of the defence 
of duress at the national level to demonstrate the lack of consensus in relation to the concept 
for even one charge of murder, before exploring the definition and inclusion of duress in the 
Rome Statute.  
 
The thesis concludes by identifying ways in which the structure of defences in the Rome 
Statute could be improved in order to further the aim of the creation of the International 
Criminal Court: the avoidance of impunity. 
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1. Introduction 
1.1 The route to Rome: international criminal law and the concept of a defence 
1.2 Defences in the Rome Statute: The problem of duress 
1.3 Duress and necessity in national and international criminal law 
1.4 Proposals for a fairer system 
 
A defence, in criminal law terms, functions as a legally approved explanation for an action 
which would otherwise be considered criminal and punished accordingly; defences are, in 
the words of Schabas, ‘answer(s) to a criminal charge.’1 A feature of most domestic legal 
systems, defences are available for a broad variety of crimes. At the international criminal law 
level, defences were only formally recognised in written law by the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court in 1998: unlike previous international criminal law charters, 
statutes and projects, the drafters have chosen to include the concept of defences. The 
inclusion of the defences, which have been grouped together under the heading of ‘grounds 
excluding criminal responsibility’, has been noted without extensive critical discussion in the 
legal literature written on the International Criminal Court.
2
  Indeed, few authors have 
investigated this seemingly unusual development on its own and tend to discuss defences 
when discussing other themes.
3
  At first blush, this would seem highly unusual given the 
previous silence in other international documents on the notion of a defence in international 
law and indeed, the area of defences to serious violations of international criminal law 
remains one which has not received much academic treatment, despite analyses of the 
subject of criminal defences at national level.
4
 Scaliotti has completed two notable studies on 
defences in the Rome Statute,
5
 but both were general critical analyses of the law and neither 
focused on any defence in particular. This thesis aims to make a contribution to knowledge 
by analysing the place of defences in the Rome Statute, building on existing work which 
                                                          
1
 W. Schabas, An introduction to the International Criminal Court, 4
th
 edn, Cambridge University Press, 2010, 
238. 
2
 See R. Lee (ed), The International Criminal Court: The making of the Rome Statute, Kluwer Law 
International, 1999; W. Schabas, The International Criminal Court: A Commentary on the Rome Statute, 
Oxford University Press, 2010; O. Triffterer, (ed) Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court, Beck Hart Nomos, 2008. 
3
 E. van Sliedregt, Criminal responsibility in international law, Oxford University Press, 2012 and M. E. Badar, 
The Concept of Mens Rea in International Criminal Law: The Case for a Unified Approach, Hart, 2013. 
4
 See P. Robinson, Criminal law defenses: A systematic analysis, Colum L R 82(2) 199-291 1982. 
5
 See M. Scaliotti, Defences before the International Criminal Court: Substantive grounds for excluding 
criminal responsibility, Part I, 1 Int’l Crim L Rev, 111-172, 2001 ; M. Scaliotti, Defences before the 
International Criminal Court: Substantive grounds for excluding criminal responsibility, Part II, 2 Int’l Crim L 
Rev, 1-46, 2002. 
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analyses them and focusing on the inherent problems with providing defences for serious 
violations of international criminal law. As a general study of defences would not add much 
to the existing discursive literature, this thesis focuses on the defence of duress, a contentious 
inclusion in the Rome Statute, to analyse the reasoning for the inclusion of defences and the 
way in which the International Criminal Court
6
 may now interpret international criminal law 
in light of these newly codified principles. 
 
The codification within the Rome Statute instigates the idea that a number of grounds, 
specifically mental incapacity,
7
 intoxication,
8
 self-defence,
9
 duress,
10
 following the orders of a 
superior
11
 or where a mistake is made, either in fact or law,
12
 will either ‘exclude’13 or ‘relieve’14 
the individual pleading the ground of criminal responsibility.  This mirrors the position at 
the national level: defences such as self-defence are recognisable as reasons for acquitting an 
individual who has committed a crime from individual criminal responsibility. However, 
other defences, such as duress, are less established and some, such as intoxication, are not 
recognised in some jurisdictions at all. Thus, an exploration of the place of defences in the 
Rome Statute, with a specific focus on duress as a particularly contentious defence, is 
proposed as an area worthy of further investigation. This thesis aims to understand the 
inclusion of defences in the Rome Statute. The focus on duress highlights the difficulties 
inherent in including so many diverse concepts under the one heading and explores these 
difficulties in light of their codification. 
 
1.1 The route to Rome: international criminal law and the concept of a defence 
 
The express inclusion of defences in an international criminal law statute is thus a recent 
development in international criminal law, which borrows heavily from domestic law in 
identifying the defences the drafters wished to extend to individuals before the ICC. 
Defences are an ordinary part of developed criminal legal systems
15
  and their existence 
demonstrates legal recognition of an individual’s right to explain their actions during the 
court process. The acceptance of a defence can lead to the removal of criminal responsibility 
                                                          
6
 Hereafter, ‘ICC’. 
7
 Article 31(a), Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (hereafter, ‘Rome Statute’). 
8
 Article 31(a), Rome Statute. 
9
 Article 31(a), Rome Statute. 
10
 Article 31(a), Rome Statute. 
11
 Article 33(1), Rome Statute. 
12
 Article 32, Rome Statute. 
13
 Article 31 and 32, Rome Statute. 
14
 See Article 33, Rome Statute. 
15
 See chapter 5 for a comparative study of necessity and duress, as well as chapter 3 which looks at the use  of 
‘recognised’ defences in domestic criminal law in international and internationalised criminal tribunals. 
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if the criteria outlined by the law are met; defences thus ‘allow’ individuals to commit crimes, 
where the action serves a purpose. This is accepted to varying degrees at the national level, 
but the broad approach at the international level for war crimes, crimes against humanity and 
genocide has generated little discussion of the fairness of such principles of such a 
development. It should also be noted that the main focus of this thesis is serious crimes 
against the person. The question is thus whether any serious crime against the person, and in 
particular those within the jurisdiction of the Rome Statute, can ever be ‘answered’ with 
reference to the defences codified in that same Statute. 
 
The primary concern of this thesis is the defence of duress as codified by the Rome Statute. 
However, it should be noted that the drafting of the Rome Statute has extended the defence 
of duress to include what would be considered, in many domestic jurisdictions, a defence of 
necessity. The defences have a theoretical connection, in that both concern action which is 
committed as the result of pressure applied to the accused. It is acknowledged that the 
relationship between duress and necessity is a complex one and a precise exploration of the 
relationship between the defences is outwith the bounds of this work.
16
 However, to explain 
the terminology used, the following general distinction is made. The source of that pressure 
in the case of duress tends to be another individual, who makes threats to harm the accused 
which compels the accused to act, whereas the defence of necessity tends to relate to 
situations in which the individual had to act as a result of a natural disaster or similar 
circumstances beyond his control. The Statute makes no distinction between the two and 
merging the defences in this way is not representative of the majority of domestic 
jurisdictions. As will be discussed later in this thesis, some separate the defences, some unify 
them and some jurisdictions will only recognise one or the other as applicable defences. At 
the international level, necessity and duress have been identified as separate defences. 
However, the Rome Statute characterises the provision in which both defences can be found 
as duress and so the defence referred to in this thesis will be that of duress. The exceptions 
to this will be where the related defence of necessity is referred to in the comparative study, 
in chapter five, and in chapter three, which deals with various forms of necessity and duress 
as defences to war crimes and crimes against humanity. There is also reference to necessity 
                                                          
16
 See the following for the discussion of the boundary between necessity and duress: J. D. Ohlin, The bounds 
of necessity, J.I.C.J. 6 (2008) 289-308; D. Varona Gomez., Duress and the antcolony’s ethic: reflections on the 
foundations of the defense and its limits, 11 New Crim. L. Rev. 615-644 2008; P. Robinson, Criminal law 
defenses: A systematic analysis, Colum L R 82(2) 199-291 1982; M Gur-Arye, Should a criminal code 
distinguish between justification and excuse? 5 Can. J.L & Jurisprudence 215-236 (1992); S. Coughlan, The rise 
and fall of duress: How duress changed necessity before being excluded by self-defence, 39 Queen’s L.J. 83-
126 (2013-2014); O. Olusanya, Excuse and mitigation under international criminal law: Redrawing conceptual 
boundaries, New Crim. L. Rev. 23-89 (2010). 
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where appropriate, for example when discussing the way in which the Rome Statute has 
conflated the theoretical concepts of duress and necessity.  
 
This thesis is divided into two parts. The first part examines the influence of domestic law on 
international law, then international criminal law in particular and the use of defences for 
charges of war crimes and crimes against humanity. The first part ends with a general 
exploration of defences in the Rome Statute, to determine which defences have been 
included and to understand the nature of the defences selected. The second part to the 
thesis then focuses directly on duress and begins with a comparative study of duress (and 
necessity in part, where relevant) at the domestic level. The drafting of duress in the Rome 
Statute is then discussed, exploring the reasoning behind its inclusion and the influence of 
the jurisprudence of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
17
 on the 
drafters’ choices. The final substantive chapter then looks at how the defence of duress may 
be interpreted and used by the judiciary at the ICC, as well as making suggestions for 
potential reform within the Rome Statute. 
 
The second chapter begins the substantive work of the thesis by looking at the sources of 
international law and international criminal law in particular, examining the influence of 
domestic law on custom, general principles and treaty law. The work conducted here 
explores how general principles and custom have been used in public international law in 
general and international criminal law in particular. The focus on this chapter is on the 
sources of law and how the sources link international criminal law and domestic law, with 
domestic law being used as a frequent source of inspiration for international criminal law. 
Primarily, this work examines the determination of custom and general principles of 
international criminal law, to develop an understanding of how domestic law influences 
international criminal law through its role in these sources. Following this, the relationship 
between domestic and treaty law is examined and the influence from domestic law on 
treaties, specifically the Rome Statute, concludes the discussion herein. 
 
The next chapter builds on the discussion of domestic law and examines how the domestic 
concept of a defence has been used in international criminal law, exploring the use thereof at 
national military tribunals, internationalised tribunals, the International Military Tribunals at 
Nuremberg and Tokyo and the later international criminal tribunals for Rwanda and the 
former Yugoslavia. Despite a lack of codification, the notion of defences was not disregarded 
                                                          
17
 Hereafter, ‘ICTY’. 
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by the tribunals established following the Second World War and a number of cases 
explored the potential application of self-defence and duress, and the related concept of 
necessity, to the crimes within their respective jurisdictions, although no international statutes 
or charters prior to the Rome Statute provided for the use of any defences, mentioning only 
the exclusion of superior orders. Prior to the Rome Statute, the admissibility of a defence 
was a matter of judicial discretion. Thus, the influence of prominent jurists and 
jurisprudence is also examined. In particular, the project for a draft statute of an 
international criminal court and international criminal code, carried out by Bassiouni, and 
the jurisprudence of the ICTY is discussed.  An analysis follows of the draft statute and 
criminal code, focusing on the provisions for defences and their reasoning. In terms of the 
ICTY jurisprudence, the focus of the analysis is on one case, Erdemovic.
18
 Here, the judges 
discuss extensively the application of the defence of duress to charges of war crimes and 
crimes against humanity. The joint and separate opinions are also examined, given the 
prominence of the case in international criminal law and its later, perceptible impact on the 
Rome Statute. Reflections on this work aim to lead on to the next chapter, an analysis of the 
defences outlined by the Rome Statute. 
 
 
Chapter four takes a look at each of the defences in the Rome Statute at present, analysing 
each as they are drafted to understand the problems inherent in each. The function of a 
defence as a legally approved explanation for an action which would otherwise be considered 
criminal and punished accordingly, is reflected in the grounds for excluding criminal 
responsibility in the Rome Statute are no different. From the outset, it is telling that the 
drafters of the Statute did not want to allude to the defensibility of war crimes, crimes against 
humanity and genocide in any way, and elected to group the defences as reasons for 
releasing the individual from criminal responsibility. However, the effect of the defences 
remains the same. For example, self-defence is the most notable and well-recognised 
example of this ‘permission’ in that an individual need not submit willingly to his own 
demise and may take proportionate action when attacked by an aggressor. Other defences 
are less widely accepted as part of the framework of both international and domestic criminal 
law. The defence of duress stands out as distinct: there is little convergence at the domestic 
level on how to define duress, if duress and necessity are distinct concepts or ought to be 
unified, and if, as one or two concepts, the successful pleading ought to lead to an acquittal, 
                                                          
18
 Prosecutor v Erdemovic IT-96-22- T/A 1996. 
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or simply mitigation of punishment. The issues inherent in the inclusion of duress are dealt 
with by the next part of the thesis. 
 
1.2 The defence of duress in the Rome Statute 
 
The second part of the thesis narrows its focus to the defence of duress in the Rome Statute. 
Building on work carried out in the first part, particularly the second chapter which examines 
the relevance of domestic law principles for international criminal law, the fifth chapter 
undertakes a comparative examination of duress (and necessity, where relevant) at the 
domestic level.  Duress and necessity are concepts which may be defined or left undefined at 
the national level; some jurisdictions divide them into separate concepts, others unify them 
into one. Generally duress relates to acts committed under pressure where the pressure 
emanates from a threat made by another, whereas necessity is usually the more objective 
pressure, created by a natural disaster or circumstances which are not the result of human 
hands. Even the definition can vary and the application of the defence is also contentious. 
The approach at the national level is a vital part of this discussion because it demonstrates 
the lack of general principles and uniform approach in relation to both defences. This also 
indicates the lack of customary principles in this area, identifying a clear issue with the 
codification of a broad version of duress / necessity for international crimes. Five separate 
jurisdictions from both the civil and common law traditions are explored to understand the 
meaning of duress and necessity at the domestic level, following the logic that domestic law is 
a key source of the principles of international criminal law. Five distinct jurisdictions are 
analysed: England and Wales,
19
 the United States of America, France, Germany and South 
Africa. The selection represents a broad geographical distribution as well as an even 
selection of common and civil law jurisdictions. The influence of the jurisdictions on other 
countries was also considered, with the inclusion of Germany and France of particular 
importance given their impact on the criminal codes of Latin American and African states. 
The comparative work undertaken here looks at the concept (or concepts, where separate, 
in domestic law) of duress (and often necessity as well) and their availability as defences to a 
charge of murder, given the focus of the thesis to serious crimes against the person. 
 
The crime of murder is the most serious crime against the person in domestic law. The use 
of this most serious crime as a prism through which defences can be examined is critical for 
the application of the idea of defences in the context of the Rome Statute, as the argument 
                                                          
19
 Hereafter abbreviated to ‘England’. 
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put forward in this thesis is the difficulty of permitting the defence of duress, and other 
defences within the Rome Statute, for the very serious crimes against the person within the 
jurisdiction of the ICC. A comparative study will illuminate the general principles, if any, 
relating to the concept of duress in relation to a charge of murder. A general limitations on 
this concept at the domestic level may indicate a disconnection between the general 
principles of law which ought to be heeded; it may be the case that such a disconnect 
indicates an incoherence of principle in the Statute, which will be further explored in this 
thesis. 
 
1.3 Duress in national and international criminal law 
 
Building on the comparative study, chapter six looks at the way in which duress has been 
included in the Rome Statute. The Rome Statute defines duress broadly as a defence, in a 
way that would also encompass the domestic law concept of necessity.  Duress and necessity 
are related concepts at the national level, and the distinction between the two tends to be the 
source of the pressure under which the individual is compelled: Duress relates to a threat is 
made by another person, which forces the person to act, whereas necessity is where an 
individual must act as a consequence of an urgent situation, such as a natural disaster. In the 
case of the Rome Statute, no distinction is made between the source of the pressure which 
compelled the individual to act, and there need only be a threat of ‘death or…serious bodily 
harm.’20 The decision of the drafters to unify the defence gives rise to further issues, as often 
one defence is accepted in national law and the other is rejected. Reflecting briefly on the 
previous part of the study, in chapter four, of the various defences in the Rome Statute, it is 
clear that there are specific problems which relate to the inclusion of duress in the Statute.  
 
In the Rome Statute, the defence of duress is broadly defined and appears to have been 
included despite lacking a customary basis, or one which finds support in the general 
principles of law. The definition the Rome Statute uses relates to pressure, subdividing the 
defence into pressure which is generated by a threat of serious bodily harm from another 
and that which results from ‘circumstances beyond that person’s control.’21 Interestingly, the 
idea that a threat made by another is also beyond the control of the person pleading the 
defence remains an issue to be resolved. The defence is defined rather broadly and this 
chapter analyses the breadth of the definition, as well as the effect this will have on the 
application of the defence. Duress has been included in the Statute as a full defence, leading 
                                                          
20
 Article 31(1)(d), Rome Statute. 
21
 Article 31(1)(d)(i), Rome Statute. 
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to the complete removal of criminal responsibility if it is pleaded successfully. This idea is 
also discussed further, in the context of the work and negotiations of the Preparatory 
Committee. 
 
The work of the Preparatory Committee is interesting insofar as it lacks a full discussion of 
the defences, and duress in particular. Given that prior international criminal statutes 
ignored the concept of defences and restricted the availability of superior orders, it is 
interesting that the idea should be accepted without much resistance. Indeed, it represented 
the least contentious inclusion in the Rome Statute, from the perspective of the negotiators. 
In this way, it seems that the dissenting opinion of Judge Cassese in Erdemovic
22
 at the ICTY 
was the main driver for its inclusion. The continuing influence of a difficult case such as 
Erdemovic is interesting given the oft-cited notion that ‘hard cases…make bad law’23 and in 
particular because of the frequently constrained circumstances of cases which arise during 
times of war or internal political upheaval. This chapter also examines the application of the 
defence of duress in the Rome Statute. Prior to its inception, duress was dealt with in detail 
by the ICTY in the Erdemovic case and the discussion here focuses on the judicial 
discussion in that case. Judge Antonio Cassese provides, in his dissenting opinion, a set of 
criteria which must be fulfilled in order to successfully plead the defence of duress. As with 
the definition in the Rome Statute, it includes the idea that the action was proportionate 
although Cassese does espouse the more generous ‘lesser of two evils’ forms of 
proportionality. The comparison between the two definitions of duress demonstrates the 
difficulty of applying the defence in a consistent manner: the analysis conducted examines 
whether the ICC definition of duress would have exonerated Erdemovic, and discusses the 
inclusion of proportionality. It is acknowledged in the discussion that proportionality is not a 
concept which can easily be used to judge actions which result in genocide, war crimes or 
crimes against humanity. The congruity of the inclusion of this concept with the 
development of international law is examined and it is questioned whether the treaty law in 
this case may be out of step with ideas in domestic law, custom and general principles. 
 
The following chapter, chapter six, then looks at the reasoning for including duress and its 
exonerating effect on the purpose and aims of the ICC. As discussed in chapter three, the 
draft statute for an international criminal court rejects that a test of proportionality could be 
used where the act commits results in a war crime against the person, or a crime against 
humanity, which places an automatic restriction on the use of the defence. This restriction is 
                                                          
22
 Prosecutor v Erdemovic IT-96-22- T/A 1996. 
23
 First noted in the English case Winterbottom v Wright (1842) 10 M & W 109, 114. 
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not mirrored in the drafting of the Rome Statute, broadening the defence to a greater extent 
than many of its domestic counterparts, as well as arriving at a different conclusion than 
customary international law. This chapter looks at the drafting of duress in the Rome Statute 
and examines the issues which arise as a consequence of its inclusion. 
 
1.4 Proposals for a fairer system 
 
The final substantive chapter in this work examines the ways in which the ICC may interpret 
defences in the Rome Statute and makes proposals for reform, as a result of the research 
conducted. The seventh chapter looks at the possibility of a differentiated approach among 
the defences. It argues that the theory of the Rome Statute, through the conceptualisation of 
defences and crimes, must be consistent with its aims of preventing impunity through its 
raison d’être as a criminal court of last resort.24 The current structure of the defences in the 
Statute is broader than the current customary position, and does not adopt any of the 
restrictions than many domestic jurisdictions have on defences for serious crimes against the 
person. The proposal attempts to connect the development of customary international law to 
the purpose of the Rome Statute, to maintain the rule of law internationally and to prevent 
impunity for serious violations of international criminal law. Each defence demands the 
same response from the Court, in the event of an acceptance: full criminal responsibility is 
removed from the individual and, consequently, the criminality of the act is negated. The 
Rome Statute requires that the accused be afforded the right to defend themselves,
25
 and 
offers the right to the accused to raise defences.
26
 
 
Chapter seven is the final substantive chapter in the thesis. It focuses on ways in which the 
deficiencies in the ‘Rome law’ defences which have been identified by the preceding 
chapters may be remedied. Following on from previous argumentation, it is not contested 
that defences have a place in the Rome Statute, but rather that there is an issue with the way 
in which they have been drafted. Using the prism of duress, it appears that this defence in 
particular could be improved through judicial interpretation at the ICC or, more 
ambitiously, reform of the Rome Statute. Article 31(2) notes that judicial discretion may be 
used in order to determine the ‘applicability’ of the ground excluding criminal responsibility 
before the Court, allowing the Court to restrict certain defences for certain crimes if it sees 
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fit. There are also provisions on sentencing
27
 which would allow the Court to distinguish 
between the different defences in terms of the punishment handed down. Finally, it is 
proposed that the Rome Statute could be reformed in order to distinguish formally between 
the defences, creating categories of defence rather than the current undifferentiated 
approach. 
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Part I  
Importing domestic concepts to international law: How defences operate at the international 
level  
International law is usually created by treaties, but customary international law and general 
principles of law may also constitute a source of law.  The influence of domestic law on 
custom, general principles and treaties in the context of international criminal law is dealt 
with by the first chapter in this part, a discussion relevant to this thesis because of the import 
of the domestic concept of a defence to the international level. The use of domestic law by 
the Nuremberg tribunals was particularly evident and it is clear that through identifying 
certain offences which are considered universally criminal, such as murder, the 
characterisation of murder as a crime in international law represented no great leap in 
theory. The following chapter examines the extent to which defences have been used before 
international and internationalised criminal tribunals, particularly those concerned with the 
prosecution of war crimes. It also examines the consideration of defences, primarily self-
defence and duress, by international criminal law jurists and the work of more recent 
international criminal tribunals, including the case of Erdemovic
28
 before the ICTY. 
Erdemovic was, prior to the Rome Statute, the classic authority for the inapplicability of the 
defence of duress to charges of war crimes and crimes against humanity. A brief reflection of 
the impact of the work of both the tribunals and the jurists writing in this area is then made 
before moving on to an analysis of the defences which have been selected for inclusion in 
the Rome Statute. This looks at the drafting of each defence in turn, focusing on both its 
inclusion and the form the defence takes. The defences in the Rome Statute bear a great 
resemblance to the domestic law concepts from which they are derived, although there are 
some differences. These differences will be explored in order to underline the problems 
inherent in importing domestic law concepts from national legal systems into a system of 
international criminal justice for more serious crimes often committed on a greater scale. 
The analysis from this part should also demonstrate the distinctive nature of the defence of 
duress in the Rome Statute: it is not a universally accepted defence, unlike self-defence, and 
appears to create difficulties by the way in which it has been drafted. It is for this reason that 
the focus of the second part to the thesis will be on duress, a contentious inclusion in the 
Rome Statute. 
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2. The use of domestic concepts in international law 
2.1 Customary international law and international criminal law 
2.2 General principles and international criminal law 
2.3 The relationship between general principles, custom and treaty law in the ICL context 
2.4 The effect on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 
 
International criminal law is part of public international law generally, and its norms are 
derived from the same sources as norms within other areas of public international law. The 
doctrine of sources of public international law is outlined by Article 38 of the Statute of the 
International Court of Justice, wherein the main sources of public international law are 
conventions, customs and general principles of law.
29
 There is a further source mentioned in 
the article, the writings and ‘judicial decisions and teachings of highly qualified publicists,’30 
which, it is noted in the article, should be considered a subsidiary means for distinguishing 
between legal and non-legal rules, as well as to identify the content of legal rules. 
Oppenheim’s International Law31 highlights a further distinction to be made between formal 
and material sources, in that formal source gives the rule its validity, whereas the material 
source expresses the origin of the rule. From this perspective, treaties are one formal source, 
custom is another
32
 and general principles a third, but there does not appear to be a 
hierarchical structure between the sources. In other words, custom may be the formal source 
of the rule even where it is further expressed in a treaty.
33
 This means that where the rule of 
formed by custom, custom will be the source of that rule. This would even be in the case of 
codified rules in treaties: the formal source of the law will always be the original source of the 
rule. 
 
Thus, customary rules are international legal rules: custom is international law and 
customary rules in the area of international criminal law form as much part of the law as 
treaties and Statutes in this area do. The limitation, however, which is placed on international 
criminal law, distinct from other areas of public international law, is the requirement to 
respect the rights of the accused. At earlier international criminal tribunals, those of 
Nuremberg and Tokyo, the main source of law was custom: the law could not be created by 
treaty and then applied retroactively, thus existing custom was the only valid source which 
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could be applied to prosecute those accused of the crimes libelled. General principles and 
custom were used to determine the laws under which the individuals before the tribunals 
could be prosecuted, as the creation of norms via a treaty was not possible if the rights of the 
accused were to be considered. The law was divined from general principles and customary 
international law, both of which are rooted in the practice and opinions of States. Indeed 
domestic law and opinion has long influenced customary international law and so domestic 
practice has had a long and fruitful relationship with international law, and international 
criminal law in particular. 
 
The Rome Statute, however, differs from previous international criminal law statutes and 
charters because it codifies the law which may be applied by the International Criminal 
Court. The conception of the Rome Statute as an international criminal code is important, 
because of the way in which it affects the principles of international criminal law. The main 
source of international criminal law in the context of the Rome Statute is now a treaty, 
deriving its authority as law from the role of ‘interstate consensus’34 in which States must 
agree on the concepts therein. This marks a significant difference from domestic law, and 
also custom in the area of international criminal law, because States have expressly agreed 
upon the concepts to be applied by the Court. Through codifying much of the law, it is 
evident that the drafters of the Rome Statute wished for the bounds of the law to be clearer 
at the International Criminal Court, although this has not always worked in practice.
35
 
 
The current state of affairs gives the impression of a far more straightforward approach: 
custom and general principles remain sources of international criminal law, and the Rome 
Statute may not be ‘interpreted as limiting or prejudicing in any way existing or developing 
rules of international law,’36 but the Rome Statute is the source of law which the ICC shall 
apply primarily. However, this perspective disregards the notion that international criminal 
law is a ‘fusion’37 of domestic law principles and international law. The Rome Statute itself 
recognises this fusion in article 21 of the Statute, wherein general principles rooted in 
domestic law may be used as a source of law
38
 and there is potential for the link between 
domestic and international criminal law to continue. The role of domestic law as an 
influence on and inspiration for international criminal law will thus be explored in the 
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context of this thesis, to develop an understanding of how domestic law may still influence 
international criminal law, now that the Rome Statute has been signed. 
 
The focus of this chapter is on the sources of law and the way in which these sources link 
international criminal law and domestic criminal law, drawing on the latter as a persuasive 
fount of legal inspiration. The initial focus of this chapter is on how custom and the general 
principles of law are determined in the area of international criminal law, which will help to 
develop an understanding of domestic law may influence international criminal law through 
these sources. The relationship between domestic law and treaty law is also relevant, 
particularly where the Rome Statute has imported concepts from domestic law, specifically 
duress, and adapted such without adhering to the limitations and restrictions placed thereon 
by domestic law. 
 
2.1 Customary international law and international criminal law 
 
Treaties, general principles and custom are formal sources of international law. The norms 
of customary international law are created through reference to two particular criteria: opinio 
juris and State practice. The definition of custom provided by the Statute of the International 
Court of Justice notes that there should be ‘evidence of a general practice accepted as law,’39 
with proof the above criteria adduced to support this general practice. State practice reflects 
the first part and is broadly construed, including inaction on the part of the State.
40
 No 
definitive list is sought, or offered. The International Law Commission
41
 recommends that 
custom ought to be ‘a general practice which is accepted as law,’42 and identifies that these 
practices include legislative acts and decisions of national courts.
43
 The ILC Special 
Rapporteur, Sir Michael Wood, further identifies the impossibility of listing all of the 
potential forms that State practice may take. In light of this, he notes that all forms of 
legislation, ‘from constitutions to draft bills’ may be held as evidence of State practice and 
furthermore, that ‘no form of regulatory disposition effected by a public authority is 
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excluded,’44 meaning that all forms of domestic legislation may be considered evidence of 
State practice. Judgments of national courts are ‘value(d) as evidence of State practice’45 even 
where they may not directly evidence the customary rule. Precise problems with the direct 
use of domestic court judgments stem from the inadequate use of sources or a ‘narrow’ 
outlook are identified by Crawford,
46
 as quote by Wood,
47
 and thus Wood holds that 
judgments of the higher courts will be afforded more weight.
48
 
 
The latter part of the definition is opinio juris, which is the demonstration of acceptance and 
respect for a certain rule which is treated as law. Baker has argued that opinio juris by itself 
ought to constitute the basis of custom in international law,
49
 however this conception ignores 
the idea that State practice may simply reflect opinio juris tacitly acknowledged by States, 
confirmed as  ‘axiomatic’50 by the International Court of Justice in a previous case. An 
expression of the State’s recognition of a rule requires evidence, which could be provided by 
the State’s conduct and respect for certain principles at the international level, but both parts 
of the definition must be evidenced in order to determine that the customary rule exists. 
This point was made by the International Court of Justice in the Nicaragua case
51
, in which it 
was held that, 
 
“The shared view of the parties as to the content or what they regarded as the rule is not 
enough. The Court must satisfy itself that the existence of the rule in opinio juris of States is 
confirmed by practice.”52 
 
Customary international law may thus be evidenced by a range of State behaviour, but the 
net effect must be that the rule is enforced by the State, tacitly or expressly through 
legislation, domestic decisions or inaction, and it must be considered a legal norm. It is clear 
that domestic law and practice is of the utmost significance to customary international law, 
and that recognition by other States of that rule as law confirms its place as custom. From the 
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perspective of the International Court of Justice, the customary norm must be evidenced 
from the behaviour of the State at the international level or its domestic practice and the 
recognition of the rule as law. The International Law Commission affirms the practice of 
States as the ‘primar(y)’ method of forming and expressing custom,53 although there is limited 
acceptance that other international organisations may contribute to the same formation and 
expression.
54
 This is usually viewed in a conservative manner, in that some ‘judicial creativity’ 
may be warranted in order to fill gaps in customary international law, but perceived attempts 
at creating the law have been poorly received.
55
 There is thus a connection between 
customary international law and domestic rules, that domestic rules influence the way in 
which the State conducts itself and the law which it applies in the domestic setting. This 
reflects the way in which the ICJ has operated for a number of years: as one notable 
example, the Lotus
56
 case before the Permanent Court of International Justice examined, as 
part of the French’s government’s pleadings, municipal law to determine a rule in the area of 
contention. This practice has also been carried out in a number of other cases before the 
International Court of Justice.
57
 In the Lotus case, the ICJ considered it possible to look to 
municipal law for proof of the existence of a legal rule but that the rule must be reflective of 
general practice. In that particular instance, the rule espoused by only a few States could not 
be taken as ‘an indication of the existence of the restrictive rule of international law which 
alone could serve as a basis for the contention of the French government.’58 This notion is 
affirmed by the ILC, maintaining the significance of domestic law but requiring that the 
practice itself must be ‘sufficiently widespread and representative, as well as consistent.’59 
 
For the rule to have an impact at the international level, it must represent the approach of a 
number of States across the world, and not the approach of a specific region. The 
International Court of Justice has rejected that which is practised in a particular region from 
influencing the content of customary international law.
60
  A slightly stricter approach was 
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taken by the International Court of Justice in the North Sea Continental Shelf case, in which 
the State practice evidencing the existence of the rule had to be ‘virtually uniform.’61 From 
this, it is clear that domestic practice has the potential to influence and create customary 
international law through the rules applied by States through domestic legislation and 
judgments as well as their behaviour at the national. Thus, in the area of public international 
law generally, the law and practice of States has guided the development of international law 
through the establishment of customary international legal rules. 
 
Turning now to international criminal law in particular, custom was the source of substantive 
international criminal law before the inception of the Rome Statute, from which the content 
all of the previous international criminal tribunals originates. Indeed the International 
Criminal Court is the only international criminal tribunal which makes explicit reference to 
the application of customary international law norms in its Statute
62
 despite previous tribunals 
having used customary international law as the basis for their decisions in a number of 
particularly difficult cases. The Tadic
63
 and Furundzija
64
 cases before the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia demonstrate the application of customary 
international law by reference to the Geneva Conventions
65
 as an expression of customary 
international law
66
 and case law of war crimes tribunals at the national and international 
levels.
67
 Given their widespread acceptance as the general law of war, the Geneva 
Conventions also represent a statement of custom, formed by the agreement and consistent 
practice of a vast number of States, who have then chosen to codify the norms they share in 
the domestic, and often military, setting. 
 
Given the application by national military tribunals of such laws, the national laws applied by 
the domestic tribunals, which reflects the provisions of the Geneva Convention, thus has an 
impact on the shape of customary international law. In Tadic it was noted that English law 
was to be considered ‘instructive’ and showed some support for the idea that municipal law 
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could be referred to in such tribunals ‘provided that they are recognized to be amplification 
of, and not in substitution for, rules of International Law.’68 Interesting, a similarly 
comparative study that would be taken to demonstrate general principles was considered in 
the Tadic case to be a required part of establishing a customary rule.
69
 The main distinction 
at this juncture between customary rules and general principles is the specificity of the 
former; comparative studies are undertaken to find evidence of and consensus on a 
particular rule, rather than to evidence a general practice. 
 
In Furundzija, it was found that there was no definition of rape at the international level and 
thus reliance on national law was ‘justified’, subject to certain conditions,70 to uncover the 
customary rule. However, given the lack of consensus at the domestic level on the gender of 
the victim and the border between sexual assault and rape,
71
 it fell to the Chamber to 
consider whether a rule existed in the general principles of criminal as opposed to customary 
international law. General principles may thus be used as a source in a similar manner to 
custom, but with greater focus on the comparison of domestic practice than the generalised 
recognition of a rule combined with evidence of domestic practice. 
 
As shown above, customary international law is both inspired by and derived from domestic 
law and practice. The connection remains between the two areas of law and although custom 
stands alone as a source of law, it is not removed entirely from national law. Rather it can be 
influenced and supported by national laws which demonstrate the generalised acceptance of 
a particular rule. The line separating customary international law and general principles can 
blur, and so it is now to the notion of general principles and international criminal law that 
we now turn. 
 
2.2  General principles and international criminal law 
General principles are the third source noted in the Statute of the International Court of 
Justice, in which the Court may apply ‘general principles of law recognized by civilized 
nations.’72 Bassiouni identifies general principles as ‘first, expressions of national legal 
systems, and, second, expressions of other unperfected sources of international law…such as 
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when a custom is not evidenced by sufficient or consistent practice.’73 Friedmann notes the 
importance of comparative work in discerning general principles
74
, a form of uncovering the 
rules which exist by analysing the way in which individual State practice and law converges in 
certain areas, although other authors disagree on the importance of comparative work, a 
notion reinforced by the jurisprudence of the ICJ.
75
 However, this ‘discinclination’ is 
problematic with criminal courts and thus in certain areas, there has been less focus on an 
intuitive approach
76
 and more on ensuring that legal reasoning in international law is lead to a 
conclusion which is, as Ellis terms it, ‘anchor(ed)…in posited rules.’77 
 
Quite apart from custom in method, general principles are the legal rules shared by domestic 
legal systems across the world. Here, a distinction must be drawn between general notions in 
domestic law, overarching principles in domestic law and general principles. An example of 
the first would be defences in criminal law, which most States have in one form or another. 
An example of the second would be the idea of the nullum crimen sine lege, recognised and 
respected by most domestic legal systems, but more of an underpinning concept than a rule. 
An example of the third would be the principle of self-defence: comparative work uncovers 
that most jurisdictions support the idea of self-defence and have such a defence within their 
domestic law. Only the latter category would be considered a general principle under article 
38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. Fletcher and Ohlin equally support 
this proposition, holding that general principles evidence that which is ‘normatively correct, 
not conventionally accepted.’78 Individually, Fletcher’s notion of general principles as ‘the 
product of interpretation, elaboration and debate’79 appears to have greater relevance to the 
approach taken by international and internationalised criminal tribunals in uncovering the 
existence of a general principle of criminal law. General principles, unlike custom, draw 
directly on domestic law for both their validity and content, as opposed to simply verifying 
the existence of the rule. It is clear that the principle must be legal, rather than simply an 
expression of the social morality of a group of States,
80
 and generally the rules are discerned 
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following a thorough comparative examination of a number of systems which participate in 
international law-making. Thus general principles reflect a general approach taken to a 
common problem by a number of jurisdictions, finding their content directly from the 
domestic law.  
 
A number of international, internationalised and military tribunals have made reference to 
domestic laws in order to identify the existence of a rule, with the International Tribunal for 
the former Yugoslavia confirming that general principles of international criminal law as an 
authoritative source of law.
81
 The latter can be seen in the Delalic case before the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, although there is little evidence 
of robust comparative work in the statement by the Trial Chamber that ‘it is undeniable that 
acts such as murder, torture, rape and inhuman treatment are criminal according to “general 
principles of law” recognised by all legal systems.’82 However, as it can be said that the 
criminalisation of such acts is not limited to a particular region or culture and as such, fulfils 
the criterion of a general practice.  
 
Equally, the Tadic case held that the idea of referring to general principles in criminal cases 
was to ‘show that the notion of common purpose upheld in international criminal law has an 
underpinning in many national systems….for this reliance to be permissible it would be 
necessary to show that most, if not all, countries adopt the same notion of common 
purpose.’83 Interestingly, in the same paragraph, it refers to the ‘major’ legal systems of the 
world demonstrating the same approach as being sufficient to establish a general principle. 
This demonstrates the paradox that exists within general principles: Delmas-Marty speaks of 
norms created outside the treaty regime which is vulnerable to ‘power politics’84 and yet 
judges may negate, or promote, this advantage through ‘giving precedence to their own or 
similar legal regimes…in a language they understand.’85 Although this is a criticism which may 
also be aimed at custom, general principles are more vulnerable to such politics because 
their content is directly connected to domestic law. However, another case before the ICTY, 
Erdemovic,
86
 demonstrated an attempt to prevent the preference of any one legal system or 
tradition, with a total of 27 different countries from both common law and civil law traditions 
surveyed to determine if a general principle existed. The aim in this case was to conduct ‘a 
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survey of those jurisdictions whose jurisprudence is, as a practical matter, accessible to us in 
an effort to discern a general trend, policy or principle underlying the concrete rules of (the) 
jurisdiction which comports with the object and purpose’87 of the ICTY.  The idea of also 
supporting the reasoning
88
 of international criminal law is clear in this case, again returning to 
the idea that general principles in the context of international criminal law rely on domestic 
law to ensure that the rules emerge from a source which is congruous with the aims of the 
system. 
 
This reliance on domestic legal norms to fill in gaps as the basis of customary international 
law and general principles demonstrates the importance of domestic norms in the system of 
international criminal justice. However, it is not clear how this affects a system such as the 
International Criminal Court in which many parts of the law have been codified. The issue 
of the interaction between general principles and customary international law, and treaty is 
thus the next line of inquiry. 
 
2.3 The relationship between general principles, custom and treaty law in the ICL context 
 
The interaction between general principles, customary international law and treaty law is of 
particular relevance to international criminal law, because of its foundations in customary 
law. As demonstrated above, the substantive content of international criminal law was 
customary prior to the inception of the Rome Statute. The written law for the tribunals of 
Nuremberg, Tokyo, the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda was created in order to establish the 
tribunals and create procedural rules for their operation. The substantive legal content was 
not created by such Statutes, but rather emanated from custom and was then placed in the 
Statutes and Charters governing the operation of the tribunals. Thus custom could have been 
said to be, and may remain, the formal source of international criminal law, while the above 
agreements are the material source. Equally, general principles have their place in 
international criminal law because of the way in which these have been used to complete the 
legal picture of certain issues, such as duress, which have arrived before international 
criminal courts and tribunals. The creation of the Rome Statute thus raises questions about 
the possible hierarchy of sources and the way in which custom and general principles 
impacts upon treaty norms and their interpretation. Sands highlighted and supported a 
recent proposal by the Institut de Droit International which noted that ‘[t]reaty and custom 
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form distinct, interrelated sources of international law…(and) norm(s) deriving from one of 
these two sources may have an impact upon the content and interpretation of norms deriving 
from the other source.’89 This part of the work will deal with how general principles, 
customary international law and treaty law interact in the area of international criminal law, to 
determine if there is a continuing link between domestic law and international criminal law. 
 
In international law generally, there is no hierarchy of sources; indeed custom and treaty are 
envisaged to be on an equal footing with one another. Indeed, Sands notes that when the two 
are at odds, preference should be for the customary norm over the treaty norm, unless such 
an application would undermine the ‘object and purpose’ of the treaty.90 He further notes 
that the aim should be to unify the international order, rather than to split it, and that the 
idea of one norm prevailing ‘assumes conflict when conciliation could be achieved.’91 
Although an optimistic view, of reconciling the norms by preferring similarity over 
difference, it may be possible to interpret codified conventions in this way, viewing 
codification as an illumination of current customary practices rather than the final word on 
how the norm ought to be applied. However, a preference for treaty law is evident in the 
practice of the ICJ, particularly, as Pellet notes, where such norms may reflect ‘lex 
specialis’’92Thus the question arises whether treaty norms may be influenced by custom or 
general principles. 
 
The relationship between treaties and custom has been recognised as ‘multiple and 
intricate.’93 Tunkin identifies the two sources as being separate systems: one system of 
conventional law and the other customary.
94
 His discussion accepts that general international 
law comprises both treaty and custom, but he also notes that treaty norms can be changed by 
customary practice. Indeed, he highlights that the International Law Commission attempted 
to make this part of the Vienna Convention,
95
 but that it was not accepted and the problem 
remains unresolved.
96
 The idea that customary practices may not simply be used for 
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interpretation, but may alter the legal rules created by treaties, has been discussed by other 
authors as well.  Weisburd engages with a discussion of whether treaties represent the 
ultimate State practice – an agreement on what the law is and belief in the rule as law.97 
However, he posits that even where there is a treaty in place specifying a particular rule, the 
continued practice contrary to that rule may develop the law differently, using the examples 
of navigational rights and the law of sea to demonstrate where this has happened.
98
 His 
argument is that the breach of the treaty rule does not merely destroy the rule, but 
demonstrates the lack of faith in the rule as law, and consequently that custom can develop 
divergently from treaties even where a treaty has been signed.
99
 D’Amato similarly agrees that 
the ‘weight’ of State practice may overrule a specific treaty rule, given that States clearly 
demonstrate, through their behaviour and laws, that they recognise a rule other than the one 
which is laid down by the treaty.
100
 Prior to the Rome Statute, international criminal law has 
always relied on custom for its substance, using treaties and agreements for specific ends 
such as establishing courts. Customary norms have also been enshrined in agreements, such 
as the Convention against Torture.
101
 And customary international law continues to be 
recognised under the Rome Statute as a separate system: article 10 notes that the Statute will 
not limit or prejudice ‘in any way existing or developing rules of international law for 
purposes other than this Statute.’102 Sadat neatly expresses that this makes the Statute a ‘floor, 
not a ceiling’103 and that States may continue to develop customary international law through 
practice and opinio juris. It remains to be seen whether customary norms may develop 
divergently from the law applied by the Rome Statute in the area of defence, leading to 
separate approaches by States and the ICC as to which defences an individual may raise 
when accused of a serious violation of international criminal law. 
 
The relationship between general principles and treaties is not as significant as that between 
custom and treaties, as shown above. However, general principles are still considered a 
source of law and referenced regularly by international criminal tribunals and courts.
104
 The 
effect of general principles on treaties is quite different from that of custom, in that a 
generalised legal rule would not have the same effect as an evidenced customary rule on the 
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validity and enforcement of a treaty norm, as demonstrated above by Weisburd. Fletcher 
and Ohlin maintain the distinction of the effect on treaties by, respectively, custom and 
general principles, but highlight that general principles can be used as a direct source where 
the legal rule is ‘normatively correct.’105 The, admittedly dangerous, notion of ‘normative 
correctness’ is one which would support the greater inclusion of general principles in general 
international law to support the interpretation of treaty norms. The idea of normative 
correctness could be considered dangerous because of the way in which it could prefer one 
domestic system, or systems, over others. At the same time, a robust comparative 
methodology could undermine such criticism by ensuring that there is, as Ellis notes, 
sufficient anchorage in posited rules.
106
 Further to this, the comparative method may also 
uncover the reasoning behind the rules, possibly highlighting common ground which was not 
initially apparent. In this way, the generalised approach of the law is similar and the inclusion 
of general principles, side-by-side with treaty law appears to be more appropriate than 
custom. It can also be used to interpret treaties more effectively because general principles 
can be used to guide the court to a decision, rather than laying down a particular rule which 
ought to be followed. Thus general principles can be used more appropriately to assist in the 
interpretation of treaties, rather than to replace the rules enshrined therein. This marks a 
significant difference from the way in which custom may affect treaties. 
 
At first glance, treaties would appear to be the most important source of international law, 
but it is clear that there is no distinct hierarchy and, in fact, that custom is equally as 
important as a treaty rule. These sources sit side by side and can not only be equally applied 
by international courts, but it is clear that custom can influence treaty norms. Custom may 
even create further norms where the practice conflicts, but continues in spite of, a specific 
treaty norm. General principles can further be used as an interpretative tool for treaty norms, 
marking a distinction between international and domestic law. This avoids what Robinson 
terms the ‘unreflecting mimicry’107 of domestic principles in the international system, in that 
norms are not simply reproduced, but rather used as part of the international system. 
Custom and general principles do not have the same effect on treaty norms, but rather 
supplement and develop the law with, and sometimes beyond, treaties. The Rome Statute 
acknowledges this role for custom and it is now fitting to examine the impact of these sources 
on the Rome Statute. 
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2.4  The effect on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 
 
The system of ‘Rome law’ thus extends beyond the treaty itself, primarily because of the 
ICC’s role as the main enforcement mechanism for international criminal law. Tunkin’s 
distinction of two systems of international law, one being conventional, the other 
customary,
108
 appears to be more blurred in the area of international criminal law given the 
importance of customary norms even where a treaty codifies the law. General principles, in 
their role as an assistant interpreter for treaty norms, may further confuse rather than clarify 
the matter. Nerlich’s idea that the ‘density of regulation’109 by the Rome Statute may create a 
separate system is correct, which mirrors the idea that custom may develop concurrently with 
‘Rome law,’ as countenanced by the drafters through Article 10. Thus, international criminal 
law and ‘Rome law’ may develop divergently as a consequence of the continued significance 
of customary international law. In this part of the work, an examination of the impact of the 
above discussion on the Rome Statute will be carried out to determine how customary 
international law and general principles will interact with the Rome Statute as a treaty. This 
discussion will conclude in an understanding of the position of domestic law and its 
purported influence on the law of the International Criminal Court. 
 
Reference is made to custom and general principles in different parts of the Rome Statute, 
further separating custom into its own system, while considering general principles as a 
source of law to be applied. In article 21 of the Rome Statute, the law of the Statute is to be 
applied prior to other sources. This includes the Statute itself and the rules of procedure and 
of evidence which ought to be applied ‘in the first place.’110 The subsequent priorities are any 
other ‘applicable treaties, and established rules’ in international law,111 which could be viewed 
as a veiled reference to customary international law, and general principles,
112
 the latter of 
which can only be applied if there has been no rule or principle divined from either of the 
prior sources. This allows general principles, and thus domestic law, to be used and to 
influence the development of the Rome Statute. Equally, there is nothing to say that general 
principles could not be used to influence the interpretation of the law by the Courts; no such 
exclusion is specified. Indeed certain areas of the Statute, such as defences, may require 
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reference to general principles of law, given the position as an area lacking in development.
113
 
Ambos opines that international criminal law ‘must be based on comparative criminal law 
and not on one legal tradition alone’114 and the Statute would appear to support this through 
the inclusion of general principles, which are given a more significant role in the Rome 
Statute than in that of the ICJ. Although no method is specified, ‘deriving’ the principles may 
indicate a preference for the comparative method, particular given the current thoughts on 
the matter by scholars such as Ambos and Ellis. The development of the law via general 
principles may stand yet as a useful tool for the further development of international criminal 
law, exerting its influence because of, rather than despite, codification.  
 
The provisions on defences under the Rome Statute highlight where this has been 
anticipated by the drafters, with article 31 stating that: 
‘At trial, the Court may consider a ground for excluding criminal responsibility other than 
those referred to in paragraph 1 where such a ground is derived from applicable law as set 
forth in article 21.’115 
 
This cross-reference to general principles, to a greater extent than the ‘applicable’ treaties of 
international law and international armed conflict, demonstrates the consideration of the 
drafters as to the use of general principles of law, and also to the separateness of custom as a 
system. The Rome Statute thus provides for the further use of domestic law to further the 
development of the ‘Rome law’ system, through the interplay between general principles and 
international law. This is not to say that the invention of general principles of law is 
supported by the Statute;
116
 an interpretation open to finding a genuine principle would 
prevent this from happening.  
 
It appears that the border between conventional and customary international law, which may 
shift depending on the area concerned, has been maintained by the drafters of the Rome 
Statute. This leaves open the possibility for custom to develop concurrently with the Statute 
and for general principles, rooted in domestic law, to influence the Statute. It appears that 
there are now two systems of international criminal law: ICC law and customary international 
law, the latter of which can develop without effect on the ICC. Indeed, by following its own 
precedents, the ICC is being established as a system of international criminal justice which 
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stands alone.
117
 It will take time to determine the extent to which this is possible, however, as 
the ICC has already relied on a decision from the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
former Yugoslavia
118
 in one of its judgments.
119
 Given the strong reliance on customary 
international law at the ICTY, it may yet be the case that the influence of custom pervades 
the system of ICC law. 
 
It is evident that general principles will exert a greater formal influence on the system of 
international criminal law at the ICC. Custom’s influence may be through the use of previous 
precedent from other criminal tribunals, something not explicitly expressed in the Rome 
Statute, but not excluded either. The issue arising from the use of these sources is to ensure 
that there is a degree of harmonisation in their application; as Delmas-Marty states, it is 
necessary for ‘a certain level of interaction which both preserves a national margin and limits 
its ambit, notably based on comparative analysis.’120 She further notes that there ought to be a 
systematised approach to using comparative law
121
 to avoid fragmenting the same area of law 
within different systems. The reach of comparative law, the content of which is domestic law, 
demonstrates the influence that domestic norms have on this system of international criminal 
law. This reach, however, is contingent on the use of general principles by the ICC, rather 
than recourse to the decisions of previous international criminal tribunals. Indeed, it may be 
the case that customary international law may form the basis of the practice of the ICC if the 
Court continues to reach back to the ICTY and ICTR for inspiration. In any event, domestic 
norms will continue to be used as inspiration for decisions and interpretation of the Rome 
Statute, notably through the use of custom and general principles. The difficulty may arise, 
however, in areas such as defences where general principles and customary international law 
lack a decisive position or where they are incongruous with the law as stated in the Rome 
Statute. It may be the case that general principles and customary international law could be 
used to mould an alternative interpretation, possibly more or less restrictive, of the 
provisions, but it shines a light on the difficulty of straying rather far from domestic norms in 
one particular area. The influence of domestic norms in this instance serves to demonstrate 
a lack of substantive development in the area of defences, which could give rise to further 
issues. 
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The Rome Statute has created a new system of international criminal law by codifying many 
concepts in international criminal law and limiting the sources which the Court may 
applying, creating primacy in the Statute itself as a source of international criminal law. 
However, the value of domestic law remains through the reference to general principles in 
the Statute as a subsidiary form of law and potentially a means of interpretation for the 
Statute. The reliance of the ICC on cases from the ICTY also demonstrates the way in which 
customary law can continue to influence the regime of international criminal law before the 
ICC. The roots of customary international law and general principle are both in domestic 
law. As a consequence, domestic law continues to influence international law, and 
international criminal law as a specific branch, through customary international law and 
general principles of law. The roots of customary international law are inherently domestic: 
both State practice, a demonstrable and recurrent application of the law, and opinio juris are 
required in order to prove the existence of a customary norm. Thus the State must respect, 
apply and consider the norm law before it would be considered customary.  This approval 
must be almost global in its reach; a European or American customary norm, as 
demonstrated above in the Columbia v Peru case, would be insufficient to create a rule in 
international law, regardless of how many countries in that particular region respected the 
norm. Indeed, customary law has had a significant influence on international criminal law in 
particular, with the ICTY frequently referencing customs and exploring domestic systems for 
consensus on a particular area. General principles were also utilised by the ICTY, and have 
equally had a strong influence on the development in international law. Despite the overlap 
that exists between the two areas, general principles rely less on consensus and more on a 
common approach uncovered through comparative work.  
 
The specific influence of domestic norms on international criminal law is significant because 
of the continued reference to general principles derived from domestic criminal law in the 
Rome Statute. Thus, domestic law interacts with the Rome Statute through the use of 
customary international law and general principles. This interaction may allow different 
interpretations of the Rome Statute to be influenced by comparative law. This is a 
progressive idea, to meet the demands of a system of law that must respond to the needs of 
the international community, but the issue remains that there may be significant differences 
between domestic criminal law and international criminal law. Thus, the tools of general 
principles and customary international law may not be of great use in areas such as defences, 
which lack sufficient development. This gap, between general principles, custom and treaty 
law is not one which has been remedied by the Rome Statute in the area of defences, which 
37 
 
demonstrates the need for revision and possibly a new interpretation of this part of the 
Rome Statute. 
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3. The availability of defences for war crimes and crimes against humanity: The general 
position in international criminal law 
3.1 Defences to war crimes from a national perspective 
3.2 The paradigm shifts: Nuremberg and Tokyo 
3.3 The influence of prominent literature and international criminal tribunals  
3.3.1 A draft code for an international criminal court 
3.3.2 Erdemovic at the ICTY 
3.4 The impact of their work on the discussions during the Rome Conference and the 
drafting of the Rome Statute 
 
Although the Rome Statute is the first piece of written international law to specify defences 
which may be used before the ICC, previous international and domestic legal measures to 
prosecute these crimes did allow defences to be pleaded at the discretion of the judiciary. 
Defendants before the international military tribunals argued that their actions were in self-
defence
122
 and the absence of provisions on defences allowed the courts to use its discretion 
in such cases. The unique mention, in the charters and statutes, of any pleas available to the 
defendant was the provision ubiquitous to twentieth century international criminal tribunals, 
which excluded superior orders
123
 as a full defence and instead allowed it to be used as a plea 
in mitigation. Thus the explicit codification of defences within the Rome Statute for the relief 
of individual criminal responsibility is a novel step in international criminal law. The Rome 
Statute offers a more permissive form of judicial freedom, by which its applicable law
124
 
provisions allow the use of other sources of international criminal law to be used as a basis 
for considering other defences which are not enumerated in the Statute. This would allow 
the judges of the International Criminal Court to look beyond the Statute to other sources of 
‘applicable law’125 to apply or interpret these rules, as was discussed in the preceding 
chapter.
126
 Judges are also free to decide the admissibility of any defence pleaded.
127
 The 
Rome Statute has thus gone further than any previous international criminal law Statute and 
any previously elucidated customary norms by extending the number of sources from which 
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international criminal law, as applied by the International Criminal Court, may derive a 
defence.  
 
Based on this broad approach to incorporating the concept of a defence, the way in which 
defences have been discussed and dealt with for crimes at the international level shall be 
explored in order to better understand the approach taken by the drafters of the Rome 
Statute. Using the sources of applicable law enumerated in article 21 of the Rome Statute as 
a guide, this chapter will examine available defences to war crimes and crimes against 
humanity from a national legal perspective. The purpose of this is to understand which 
defences are available at the national level for such serious crimes. This will involve using 
national military laws as a source as well as cases which were heard before national military 
tribunals, particularly those emanating from accusations of illegal conduct during the Second 
World War, as these provide rich discussion of the notion of defences for war crimes and 
crimes against humanity. The defence of superior orders is one in particular which can be 
found in a number of sources relating to international humanitarian law, as will be discussed, 
although it was later excluded by the International Military Tribunals following the Second 
World War. Thus, particular care will be taken to examine the argument that the defence of 
superior orders was ‘removed’ by Nuremberg and that the Rome Statute ‘restores’ it to 
international law,
128
 as was always intended. The law of the tribunals at Nuremberg and 
Tokyo will also be scrutinised to understand from where the exclusion of superior orders 
arises and whether it did, in fact represent a departure from existing practice in this area.  
 
The writings and opinions of prominent jurists exert a strong influence on international 
criminal law, and so the thoughts of international criminal law jurists on the concept of 
defences will be explored. This will also involve an examination of the discussions and 
preceding draft statutes for an international criminal court. In particular, there will be a 
certain focus on the work of M. Cherif Bassiouni and the work of Antonio Cassese, both of 
whom have written extensively on the ideas relating to and operation of international 
criminal law, with a degree of convergence in certain areas. Bassiouni’s influence, in 
particular, on the final draft of the Rome Statute is clear when the ideas are closely examined 
in tandem with his draft international criminal code. Cassese’s writings and dissenting 
opinion in the Erdemovic
129
 case, heard before the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
former Yugoslavia, will also be explored to determine his influence on the inclusion of 
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defences in the Rome Statute. Particularly, it is worthwhile exploring the extent to which 
such jurists have influenced the Rome Statute and whether this has affected the Statute’s 
congruence with established norms in international criminal law. This is of particular 
relevance because of the exclusion of the work of jurists as a source of law which can be 
applied by the Court under article 21, straying slightly from the accepted sources of public 
international law,
130
 the latter of which does not countenance the use of judicial precedent. 
When these issues have been fully discussed, the Rome Statute’s current position will be 
analysed. An analysis of the decision to include defences in the Rome Statute shall be 
undertaken, based on an exploration of the discussion of defences in the travaux 
preparatoires for the Statute. The literature which discusses the Rome Statute does not often 
make reference to defences or their place within the Statute, and less so the discussions 
which took place before the treaty was signed. This chapter aims to remedy this gap. 
 
3.1 Defences to war crimes from a national perspective 
 
From the national perspective, serious violations of international criminal law are most likely 
to be committed by the armed forces, the conduct of which is restrained by a number of 
different sources of law and policy. Military manuals, international humanitarian law and 
domestic law, particularly human rights norms, create established legal parameters within 
which the armed forces may act. This established system may also recognise the provision of 
defences, although the admissibility of such defences is contentious. In particular, the 
defence of superior orders is acknowledged as one which has special application, and 
controversy, in military situations as a consequence of the command structure which exists in 
the military context and on which the armed forces rely for operational efficiency. Noting 
Cassese’s warning that prudence ought to be exercised where domestic legal concepts are 
being transferred or used in international criminal law,
131
 it is worthwhile to look at the law 
and practice of both national and internationalised
132
 military tribunals which have prosecuted 
serious violations through the application of, in the first instance, international humanitarian 
law. This part will look at the way in which national tribunals have interpreted the idea of a 
defence in international humanitarian law when prosecuting serious violations thereof. The 
military law discussed below often enumerates the defences available, but discussion in the 
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cases features two notably recurrent concepts: superior orders and duress. Cases concerning 
war crimes as tried by national military tribunals will also form part of the discussion, given 
their relevance to the law of the International Criminal Court and the way in which the law 
such tribunals have applied constitutes an expression of customary norms.  
 
The defences of superior orders and duress may recur frequently in the law and practice of 
the tribunals discussed below, but there is evidence to suggest that other defences are 
available. The Manual for Courts-Martial of the United States,
133
 which was used as a source 
in the US case of Lieutenant Calley
134
 states that a number of special defences are admissible 
in respect of crimes committed by the armed forces, which may or may not take place during 
times of war. This is a good example of the emanation of customary norms from domestic 
sources. As there is no distinction between times of peace or war in the Manual and a 
defence was used in the Calley case, these defences are presumed to extend to the 
commission of war crimes when committed by members of the armed forces. Under 
Chapter XXIX of the Manual,
135
 these are ‘excuse because of accident, self-defense, 
entrapment, coercion or duress, physical or financial inability, and obedience to apparently 
lawful orders.’136 This has now been expanded by the 2012 Manual137 to include justification, 
obedience to orders, mistake of fact and lack of mental responsibility.
138
 The manual also 
excludes intoxication and mistake of law as defences, in general.
139
 It is the defence of 
obedience to orders which was discussed extensively in the Calley case. 
 
 
Obedience to orders, or the defence of superior orders, is generally recognised in military 
law, usually with the caveat that the order did not appear to be unlawful when followed. In 
the Calley case, which concerned the court martial of a lieutenant in the United States army, 
it was held that obedience to orders could not remove responsibility for war crimes where 
the acts committed were so clearly illegal. In this instance, the Court held that ‘an order to 
kill infants and unarmed civilians who were so demonstrably incapable of resistance’ was ‘so 
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palpably illegal that’140 no soldier ought to have followed it. Thus the defence rests on the 
legality of the order being followed, rather than the fact that the order was complied with. 
This is further supported by the notion put forth by McCoubrey
141
 that the doctrine of 
superior orders was available as defence prior to the Second World War. He discusses the 
notion of an ‘ought to know’142 doctrine in which soldiers may rely on the defence unless they 
were aware of the illegality of the order and uses the British Manual of Military Law from 
1944
143
 to demonstrate the acceptability of the defence in national legal systems prior to the 
Second World War. The British Manual uses a test of ‘obvious illegality’144 which is reflected 
by the inclusion of the defence in customary international law, which excludes superior 
orders where the act itself was ‘manifestly unlawful’145 but remains otherwise silent as to its 
use. A more recent study by the International Committee of the Red Cross equally notes that 
some States do not allow superior orders to mitigate punishment.
146
 Interestingly, the study 
focuses only on the defences of superior orders and its corollary, command responsibility 
while noting that other defences, such as duress
147
 may be present in customary international 
law.  
 
There is also some discussion in the law and practice of national military tribunals to suggest 
that the pressure created by superior orders may be sufficient to remove criminal liability, 
and thus count as a defence of duress. The Priebke
148
 case discussed the concept of 
extenuating circumstances where criminal liability for the massacre of civilians was the crime 
libelled. In this instance, both defendants had pleaded the existence of extenuating 
circumstances, which the tribunal acknowledged may constitute a defence. It held that the 
presence of superior orders and of military necessity may create extenuating circumstances 
for which the accused may be relieved of responsibility and that both are applicable during 
times of war.
149
 The Court noted, however, that a strict interpretation of the doctrines would 
apply in such a case and only where the participation of the individual in question was not 
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critical to the execution of the task:
150
 in other words, pressure from a superior which 
amounts to duress may only be pled as a defence where the individual is a lower ranking 
officer. The responsibility, and particularly the planning and organisational role which 
Priebke had undertaken, meant that the defence was unavailable in the circumstances.
151
 The 
carefully circumscribed nature of the defence means that the defence of duress can relate to 
superior orders, but that the pressure which constitutes duress in law must be evidenced 
separately from the issue of orders from a superior. Thus the unique situations in which war 
crimes are committed may make it difficult for a defence to be applied, even where it may be 
legally admissible. Comment in this area supports the assertion that duress may be available 
as a complete defence,
152
 but its application has been elusive thus far. 
 
The duty of the courts to consider defences was held by the Flick case
153
 and affirmed by the 
Ohlendorf case, which held that it was ‘the privilege of a defendant to put forth mutually 
exclusive defenses, and it is the duty of the court to consider them all.’154 The defence of 
duress, coercion or necessity, used interchangeably by the tribunals as these terms have been 
was considered by a number of military tribunals following the Second World War. The 
tribunal in Flick in particular examined the availability of a defence of coercion in situations 
of war.
155
 In this case, the defendants pleaded coercion, or duress, as a defence to the war 
crimes, crimes against humanity and crimes against property of which they were accused 
during the Second World War. In applying the law, the tribunal examined the Nuremberg 
tribunal’s exclusion of the defence of superior orders when assessing the application of 
duress and concluded that it  
 
‘might be reproached for wreaking vengeance rather than administering justice if it were to 
declare as unavailable to defendants the defense of necessity
156
 here urged in their behalf. 
This principle has had wide acceptance in American and English courts and is recognized 
elsewhere.’157  
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As such, the tribunal relied on domestic law to guide its path where there was no expression 
of legislative intention and did not interpret the exclusion of superior orders as the rule for 
defences in international criminal law. Rather, it was to be regarded as a specific exception, 
created to avoid undermining the grave nature of the offences libelled. Thus the tribunal 
accepted that the defence of duress may be raised, but that it had not to be applied in this 
instance as the necessary ‘compulsion and fear’158 were not found to have been motives for 
their actions. 
 
The Ohlendorf
159
 case also considered the defence of duress and stated that it could be 
considered separately from the defence of superior orders.
160
 As such, it was accepted that a 
defence of duress would be admissible before the tribunals, but that the defendant would 
need to provide evidence to substantiate the duress under which they had acted. The use of 
duress in this context was particularly interesting as the defendants attempted to argue that 
they had been subjected to duress as a form of pressure to submit to superior orders. This 
argument was rejected: superior orders should not be considered a form of duress
161
 in law as 
duress should be held as a separate defence and thus superior orders could not be 
considered in this context.
162
 The attempted use of duress to admit superior orders 
surreptitiously was recognised and rejected by the tribunal in this instance, which paid 
particular regard to the Fuhrerprinzip
163
 and explained that although certain individuals may 
have felt pressure to conform during Hitler’s reign in Germany, that this pressure was 
insufficient to constitute duress as each case had to be considered individually and no 
individual had been compelled to commit the war crimes and crimes against humanity of 
which they had been accused. 
 
 
Interestingly this supports the assertion that the exclusion of superior orders was unique in 
terms of the way in which defences were treated by international criminal law after the 
Second World War. As such, drawing on national law from the United States and England, 
the acceptance of defences at the national level could be held to have persuasive value at the 
international level, regardless of the gravity of the crime. The tribunals in Flick and 
Ohlendorf discussed above operated in an internationalised manner, drawing on 
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international criminal law and domestic criminal law which was the applied by military 
criminal tribunals, leading to a natural development in customary international principles 
and which could also be considered an expression of general principles. However, these 
tribunals represent a less renowned expression of the body of international criminal law 
which arose following the Second World War. The law and practice of the international 
criminal tribunals at Nuremberg and Tokyo, will be examined to understand their approach 
to the notion of defences, which appears to be rather different from the position established 
by national military courts and tribunals.  
 
3.2 The paradigm shifts: Nuremberg and Tokyo 
 
The tribunals at Nuremberg and Tokyo heralded the beginning of the trend of reaction to 
crises in international criminal law.  Both were temporary, specialised and instigated in 
response to the events which had taken place during the Second World War. Both operated 
under their own Charters, which were drafted for ‘the prompt and just trial and punishment 
of the major war criminals’ from both the Far East164 and the ‘European Axis.’165 Their 
jurisdiction was outlined by their Charters which enumerated three specific groups of crimes 
– against peace, of war and against humanity – and neither Charter made reference to 
defences which were available to those indicted before it. The tribunals, particularly 
Nuremberg, have become infamous for their purported ‘removal’ of the defence of superior 
orders from international criminal law.
166
 As discussed above, in the Ohlendorf
167
 case, the 
issue of the leadership principle made it imperative that individuals indicted by either 
tribunal were not able to rely on either immunity due to an official position or the defence of 
obedience to orders. The specific nature of the exclusion meant that the only other 
reference to defence in the Charters relates to the right of the individual to a fair trial. 
However, defences were not ignored by the tribunals at Nuremberg and Tokyo, as a number 
of cases discussed the idea of superior orders, duress and self-defence. A closer look at the 
way in which defences were admitted and rejected by the tribunals is required in order to 
understand the availability of a defence at this critical point in the development of 
international criminal law, to ascertain the impact, if any, these trials had on the drafting of 
the Rome Statute. 
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The tribunals at Nuremberg and Tokyo did not explicitly discuss which defences may be 
available to defendants, focusing instead of the rights of the accused to a fair trial.
168
 Both 
Charters reference only the concepts of head of state immunity and the defence of superior 
orders, both of which are expressly excluded from application. The statute acknowledges 
that mitigation of punishment may be available for superior orders only and cannot be used 
as a means of removing responsibility. Despite the lack of black letter law, however, 
reference was made in the judgment of the tribunal to the idea of defences. In preference to 
duress, which featured in the national military tribunals discussed above, the notion of self-
defence was argued by the defendants. In particular, self-defence in the context of protecting 
a State
169
 and the potential application of military excuse or justification, also known as 
military necessity
170
 was raised. Both military necessity and self-defence were used as part of 
the wider argument on the part of the defendants of protecting the State from other powers 
which may have invaded.
171
  However, this line of argument was not successfully pleaded as 
the Nuremberg judgment concluded that the invasions of Denmark and Norway were 
conducted in order to create a better base from which to attack the Allied powers. The 
tribunal made the distinction between self-defence and aggression, the latter of which 
characterised the actions of the defendants before the Nuremberg tribunal as a result of the 
disproportionate methods they had undertaken to arguably protect themselves. In the view 
of the tribunal, invading two countries in order to protect one’s own could not be considered 
self-defence. The invasions were characterised as ‘acts of aggressive war’172 rather than acts of 
self-defence. In the same vein, the Tribunal at Tokyo listened to the submission that Japan 
had acted in self-defence in attacking a number of other States and the submission was 
rejected again, on the basis that those making decisions on behalf of the State had not acted 
proportionately and had planned these attacks as aggressive wars in order to further its own 
interests at that time.
173
 
 
The idea of self-defence was therefore rather difficult to plead at both Tokyo and 
Nuremberg, largely because of the way in which the crimes against peace under both 
Charters were defined and the ease through which the prosecution could prove that the acts 
were thereby aggressive, rather than defensive. As the leaders and decision-makers of both 
countries were accused of crimes against peace, defined as ‘planning, preparation, initiation 
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or waging of a war of aggression, or a war in violation of international treaties, agreements or 
assurances, or participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any 
of the foregoing.’174 Thus self-defence was completely precluded in respect of such a charge; 
one cannot act in self-defence as the aggressor as it is counterintuitive to the very idea of self-
defence in the first place. As Schabas
175
 has noted, these tribunals encouraged the 
development of a link between the rest of the crimes under the Charters and the concept of 
an aggressive war, to reinforce the criminality of the actions as an extension of crimes against 
peace. Because of this, the scope of self-defence as pleaded before either Tribunal would be 
completely rejected by dint of the nature of the crimes and their link to an aggressive war.  
 
The customary rule that Heads of State cannot be charged with criminal acts was rebuffed by 
the Nuremberg Charter
176
  and was critical to the operation of the tribunals because of the 
context in which the crimes had been committed. All of the crimes alleged were committed 
on behalf of the States of which those indicted were nationals and by the governments of 
which they were employed. An ability to rely on the protection of the cloak of the State 
would have rendered an automatic acquittal for each of the accused. A more recent analysis 
of head of state immunity by Gaeta noted that this rule has been affirmed by customary 
international law which removes such immunity in the case of war crimes and crimes against 
humanity.
177
 Domestic law further supports this position.
178
 However, the rules used to 
demonstrate this are equally recent and it appears that the focus at the international military 
tribunals was more on personal responsibility than the official position. Indeed, the doctrine 
of individual criminal responsibility is that on which the post-war tribunals rested and the fact 
of its existence negated any possibility of head of state immunity. Much like the previous 
discussion of self-defence, the ‘head of state’ defence was precluded by the tribunals as a 
result of the way in which the charges were brought. 
 
The Charters of both the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals expressly rejected the notion of 
superior orders as a full defence, which was held as unavailable to ‘free (an individual before 
the Tribunal) from responsibility...but may be considered in mitigation of punishment if the 
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Tribunal determines that justice so requires.’179 Thus no individual could plead superior 
orders in order to exonerate themselves entirely, but could use it to reduce the punishment 
meted out. The Ohlendorf
180
 case noted that an absence of this exclusion may have 
generated what McCoubrey quantified as ‘a system of infinite regression in which all 
responsibility would be placed upon Hitler, who was by then conveniently dead.’181 The 
Fuhrerprinzip meant that every order which was issued by the Nazi regime could be formally 
traced back to Hitler, thus explaining McCoubrey’s characterisation of responsibility as an 
infinite regression in such a case. This rejects the previous acceptance of the defence of 
superior orders for lower-ranking soldiers at national military tribunals, where it could 
function as a full defence subject to certain strictures. The discussion above, on the subject of 
superior orders, indicated that the only restriction on the defence was an early incarnation of 
the ‘manifest illegality’ test: the idea that the soldier ‘ought to know’ that the order should not 
be followed
182
 and thus creates a narrow area in which the defence might be accepted. Thus 
the defence was accepted prior to Nuremberg and Tokyo, but rejected as all but a plea in 
mitigation following the war.  
 
The Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals had simply altered the defence to meet the 
requirements of a highly specific situation wherein it was necessary to avoid McCoubrey’s 
identified system of ‘infinite regression’. It cannot be said that it would be a desirable 
outcome for any of those indicted by either Nuremberg or Tokyo to escape responsibility 
for their contribution to the atrocities during the Second World War, but it cannot also be 
said that the law should be redacted in order to fit situations as they arise. The customary 
principles in this respect ought to have been properly entertained. However, it is equally 
difficult to argue that the maxim nullum crimen sine lege ought to apply to the concept of 
defences either. Defences are a conceptual element of criminal law, but their relationship 
with responsibility can have an effect on the criminality of an act. There is thus a link which 
ought to have been respected by the tribunals, even if it is not a direct expression of the 
nullum crimen principle. The use of the defence would most likely have fallen as a result of 
the way in which the charges were raised, in very much the same as way as the application of 
self-defence, and there was thus no need to expressly exclude it in this manner. 
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Much like the modern-day International Criminal Court, the tribunals at Tokyo and 
Nuremberg did not elect to indict individual soldiers who may have been coerced into 
complicity by overbearing superiors. Those prosecuted by the tribunals were high-ranking 
officials who were capable of making decisions which affected millions of lives. This 
demonstrates the irrelevance, in this case, of the defence of superior orders; in most cases, 
the accused were the superiors and in a position to take such decisions. Because of this, the 
limitation on the defence was perfectly appropriate and creates a useful parallel for the 
International Criminal Court. The policy of the International Criminal Court similarly 
targets those who occupy high ranking positions within governments and organisations and 
who are able to take the same life-changing decisions on the part of whole populations. 
Identifying the targets of the prosecutorial policy, the decision and policy makers, 
demonstrates that there is a general difficulty with defences in international criminal law, 
whether applied by international, internationalised or domestic criminal tribunals, such as 
those for the military. The way in which the crimes have been drafted and are applied offer 
little scope for any kind of defence, particularly superior orders. It is difficult to see, even 
now, a situation before the International Criminal Court in which superior orders could 
apply. 
 
3.3 The influence of prominent jurists in literature and international criminal tribunals  
3.3.1 Bassiouni and the draft code for an international criminal court 
3.3.2 Cassese’s dissent in Erdemovic 
 
The Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals were not isolated examples of the removal of the 
defence of superior orders and rejection of the immunity of heads of State for serious 
violations of international criminal law. Indeed the jurisprudence from the international 
criminal tribunals which followed them, along with the debate generated and sustained by 
jurists, helped to develop and expound the discussion of responsibility at the international 
level for individuals accused of crimes against humanity, war crimes and genocide. However, 
the field had not been extensively discussed and there remain two particular jurists who have 
discussed the notion of defences at the international level: Bassiouni and Cassese.  
 
Bassiouni has been active for a number of decades in the field of international criminal 
justice and discussed the idea of an international criminal court
183
 long after the UN General 
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Assembly had capitulated to the difficulty of drafting the crime of aggression.
184
 Bassiouni’s 
contribution to the concept of defences at the international level extends to drafting a Statute 
for an international criminal court, as well as an international criminal code;
185
 the code 
explicitly includes defences for serious violations of international criminal law. The work of 
Judge Antonio Cassese at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 
similarly countenanced the availability of defences for serious violations of international 
criminal law. His dissenting opinion in the Erdemovic
186
 case went directly against the 
opinion of the majority in the Appeals Chamber judgment. He discussed extensively the 
principle of the defence of duress to war crimes and to crimes against humanity, as distinct 
from the former. The contribution of both jurists to the development of the idea of defences 
will be discussed here, as well as discussion of the work of jurists which has been stimulated 
by the initial proposition of their ideas. 
 
3.3.1 Bassiouni and the draft code for an international criminal 
court 
 
The notion of an international criminal court was one which was tabled following the Second 
World War by the United Nations.
 187
 However the project stalled as a result of the failure to 
agree on the definition of aggression
188
 and it was not until 1976 that a study was 
commissioned by the Conseil de Direction of the International Association of Penal Law
189
 in 
order to further the understanding of international criminal law. Previous projects 
commissioned by the Association had discussed the idea of an international criminal court 
and this work was considered a motivation for the UN’s decision to instruct the International 
Law Commission to work on the idea of an international criminal court.
190
 However his work 
was the first attempt at a comprehensive international criminal code, which hints at his own 
aim of formalising a system of international criminal justice. Bassiouni chose to include 
defences in his code and thus entitled one article ‘exoneration, justification and 
excusability.’191 This was the attempt at codifying defences for serious violations in 
international criminal law, supporting the idea that the aim of creating a system of 
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international criminal justice would require the system to undertake features common to 
domestic legal systems. The previous silence on the issue was not due to oversight. Indeed, 
the International Law Commission’s draft code192 (on which work began in 1982) 
acknowledged that defences may be raised but preferred to remit the idea to judicial 
discretion depending on the crime libelled.
193
 The subsequent work completed by the ad hoc 
international criminal tribunals for Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, following the in the 
footsteps of the tribunals at Nuremberg and Tokyo, make no reference to the idea of 
defences, other than to exclude superior orders as a full defence.
194
 There are duties of 
disclosure on the defence team to inform the Court if they intend to submit an alibi or 
reason of mental defect
195
 but there is no other reference to the idea of a defence in terms of 
giving a ‘reason’ for the acts committed.  
 
Bassiouni’s code notes six separate defences: ‘individual’ self-defence, necessity, coercion, 
superior orders, mistake and insanity.
196
 The closeness of Bassiouni’s code, in terms of the 
defences he has chosen to include, to the current incarnation of the Rome Statute is 
particularly interesting; it would appear that his work has been influential in guiding the 
drafters of the Rome Statute. The other distinction between the criminal code written by 
Bassiouni and the Rome Statute and the statutes of the tribunals established during the last 
decade of the twentieth century is the reactive nature of the latter grouping. Both the ICTY 
and the ICTR were established in response to atrocities, whereas the draft international 
criminal code and the Rome Statute were written to further the idea of an international 
system. It is possible that in the aftermath of an atrocity that it is difficult to consider that the 
crimes committed were defensible and accordingly, it may be judged more appropriate when 
the memory of the crimes is not so raw. 
 
Although there are similarities between Bassiouni’s code and the Rome Statute, he takes a 
more nuanced and developed approach to the defences, in contrast to the approach of the 
Rome Statute. Similarly, he avoids the common law term ‘defences’ and steers towards the 
reasoning for the removal of responsibility by heading the section ‘exoneration, justification 
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and excusability.’197 The distinctions between the defences in the Rome Statute and those in 
his draft criminal code tend to be seen more clearly in the detail; self-defence is narrowed to 
‘individual’ self-defence, rather than the extended version of defence of others and of 
property in the Rome Statute. He also rejects the availability of duress and necessity where 
the act constituting criminal conduct was ‘likely to produce death.’198  He notes that it has 
been deliberately drafted in this manner, to function as a restraint on individual behaviour.
199
 
In this way, the defences are carefully circumscribed to prevent their wide application, either 
in relation to the type of conduct or groups of individuals to whom the defences may be 
available. He also states in later work that his approach is pragmatic and that he has sought to 
‘combine, rather than reconcile’200 the world legal systems that contribute to the general 
principles of criminal law which are part of international criminal law. However, the reliance 
on the American Model Penal Code
201
 to formulate the construction of the defences 
indicates that it bears more relation to the defences available in common law systems, rather 
than a true combination of international legal systems. Given the differences between the 
American system and other systems, shown by undertaking a comparative analysis of the 
defence (and sometimes defences) of duress and necessity in chapter five, it is clear that the 
use of the American Model Penal Code may have obliterated the influence of other 
domestic legal systems. The extent to which domestic legal systems are combined by this 
source is questionable. 
 
3.3.2 Cassese’s dissent in Erdemovic 
 
The failure of the statutes of the international criminal tribunals to explicitly mention 
defences did not mean that the notion of defences was not discussed by the tribunals. 
Indeed, the availability of one defence in particular was raised in the first judgment handed 
down by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. The dissenting 
opinion of Antonio Cassese in the Erdemovic
202
 case was particularly interesting because it 
rejected the majority position that duress was not available to a charge of crimes against 
humanity. Although Erdemovic’s case was eventually remitted to a new trial chamber and he 
was tried for war crimes for his part in the Srebrenica massacre, his initial appeal was on the 
basis that he was not given sufficient appreciation of the nature of his guilty plea and wished 
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the reasons for his decision to participate in the atrocity to be taken into account when his 
case was being heard. A more detailed analysis of the case will be undertaken in chapter five, 
when the notion of duress will be explored, but it seems inevitable that the release of 
Cassese’s opinion in 1997 prior to the negotiations for the Rome Statute had an effect on the 
final draft of the Rome Statute. Upon further reflection and research, as discussed below, it 
is clear that Cassese captured the zeitgeist of the theory of defences in international criminal 
law at that point in time. Thus his powerful argument for duress as a full defence is argued 
here to have had some influence over those who included the defence of duress in the Rome 
Statute. The Rome Statute’s definition supplants, in international criminal law, the majority 
judgment of the Appeals Chamber in Erdemovic, which held that duress is not available in 
customary international law as a defence to a charge of war crimes. 
 
Cassese’s opinion in Erdemovic concluded, based on a number of authorities from domestic 
law and military tribunals, that duress ought to be available to a charge of crimes against 
humanity in restricted circumstances. In particular, he noted that the pleading of duress 
which required the satisfaction of the criteria of a severe threat to life or limb, 
proportionality, no means of escape and that the situation was not self-inflicted
203
 would be 
too difficult to fully meet in cases of crimes against humanity or war crimes. As a result, he 
held that the proportionality requirement should be removed where the killing of innocents 
was concerned and where the individual’s refusal to comply would not prevent any further 
killing.
204
 In this way, he held that the defence of duress was both ‘realistic and flexible’ and 
thus ought to be included.  
 
It is interesting that Cassese’s formulation, based on domestic and customary international 
law, has been incorporated into the Statute more closely than the previous work of the 
International Law Commission and the draft criminal code written by Bassiouni. In 
particular, his caution that ‘the war in the former Yugoslavia furnishes us with so many 
examples of…atrocities that (we) ought not to dismiss any possible scenario as fanciful or far-
fetched’205 appears to have been heeded by the drafters of the Rome Statute. One of the few 
criticisms of Cassese’s opinion is by Keller, who argued that it overstates the importance of 
the Nuremberg judgment,
206
 rather than focusing on all of the military tribunals held 
                                                          
203
 Prosecutor v Erdemovic IT-96-22- A 7 October 1997 dissenting opinion of Judge Cassese at 41. 
204
 Ibid., 42. 
205
 Ibid., 47. 
206
 K.J. Heller, The Nuremberg Military Tribunals and the origins of international criminal law, Oxford 
University Press, 2011, 377. 
54 
 
following the Second World War. However this criticism does not take account of the fact 
that the tribunals, as demonstrated above, did consider the concept of duress and coercion 
and simply found it to be inapplicable based on the facts. The facts in this case, of a junior 
conscript being threatened with death if he did not comply, relate more to Bassiouni’s 
exclusion than that of the international military tribunals which prosecuted war crimes 
following the Second World War. The substance of Cassese’s argument remains and it does 
appear that the Rome Statute built upon his ‘realistic and flexible’ doctrine of duress. 
Indeed, it is difficult to ignore the timing of the Erdemovic case and the inclusion of duress, 
rather than necessity, in the Rome Statute. It is clear the Cassese’s recognition of the current 
thinking and the expounding of his views in a forum as public as the ICTY, had an impact 
on the question of defences which may be available at the international level for war crimes.  
 
3.4 The impact of their work on the discussions during the Rome Conference and the 
drafting of the Rome Statute 
 
Based on the analysis prior to this section, it is evident that there is some support in the work 
of international criminal law jurists and jurisprudence for the recognition of defences by the 
Rome Statute. The treaty’s contribution lies in the fact that it is the first agreement which 
reflects a broad international consensus on the subject of defences which ought to be made 
available to defendants before the Court. As much as this step may appear to have been a 
bolt from the blue, it is evident based on the foregoing discussion that the idea of defences 
for individuals who have committed serious violations of international criminal law was 
tabled far in advance of the beginning of the negotiations in 1998. The way in which each of 
the above has affected the drafting of the Rome Statute will now be discussed. 
 
The effect of the national military tribunals on the Rome Statute is evident, particularly the 
way in which these dealt with defences. There was no formal barrier to defences in any of 
the national military tribunals and a number, mentioned above, entertained and discuss the 
concept of defences, even where the crime involved the killing of innocents or serious 
violations of international criminal law. However, the previous tribunals were not so explicit 
as to inform the defendants of the availability of a defence or of the potential to use any 
reasons to defend their actions. There appears to have been a reliance on domestic law, 
relating to both military and criminal law, in such tribunals wherein the availability of the 
defence was dictated by the country of origin of the military tribunal. In this way, defences 
such as superior orders and duress were discussed by the courts. Indeed, the defences could 
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be applied and the reason for their lack of application was not the seriousness of the offence 
committed, but rather the lack of evidence to support a claim of, for example, superior 
orders.
207
  
 
McCoubrey’s assertion that a defence of superior orders was available208 prior to Nuremberg 
is well-founded and it is clear that the ‘manifest illegality’ test of the order represented the 
watermark for the admission of such a defence. The military tribunals, international and 
otherwise, equally felt unable to reject defences such as duress out of hand where these were 
available in domestic law, despite the charges of war crimes creating a more controversial 
context that a typical domestic crime. In this way, the tribunals drew on the existing domestic 
laws in order to apply accepted defences and acknowledged the role that such defences may 
play. The pragmatic effect, however, of this application was that none who pleaded the 
defences could provide sufficient evidence in order to succeed. It could be argued that, 
although defences may be available in this context, they are precluded because of the type of 
criminal conduct within the jurisdiction of international criminal law. This is not a 
proposition which has been accepted by the drafters of the Rome Statute and it may be 
possible that the desire to create a full ‘system’ of international criminal law has blinded the 
drafters to this consideration. The influence of previous military tribunals can be seen in the 
Statute, but their experience is not reflected: the jurisprudence demonstrates the difficulty of 
the defences ever being successfully pleaded by a defendant. 
  
The influence of the tribunals at Nuremberg and Tokyo is not particularly evident in the 
Rome Statute. The tribunals referred only briefly to the concept of defences, and then by 
exclusion: both Charters noted that superior orders and the official position of the defendant 
could not be used as defences for any of the crimes within their jurisdictions. The Rome 
Statute appears to have replaced the principle that the defence of superior orders is 
unavailable and sets out a number of defences which are available. However the approach of 
the tribunals to the idea of self-defence, where its applicability was discussed, could indicate 
that the deliberate exclusion of superior orders and the defence of occupying an official 
position was an idea confined to these defences alone. It is not evident as to why defences 
were not dealt with by the Statutes of both tribunals, and it is clear that neither were viewed 
as a suitable model for the Rome Statute.  
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Following on from this, the preparations that preceded the signing of the Rome Statute 
demonstrate the more open approach that the drafters wished to take to the idea of 
defences. The draft Code discussed by the International Law Commission in the years 
following the establishment of the tribunals, and its updated version in 1996, indicated that it 
would be within the remit of the Tribunals to accept defences if there was sufficient evidence 
to support their application, but that any defence would only be admitted at the discretion of 
the Court.
209
 Although the Code does not refer specifically to any defence, the commentary 
notes that duress should be considered one such defence
210
 but espouses a limitation similar 
to that of Bassiouni in his own draft criminal code.
211
 The reason for exclusion may relate to 
the same idea put forward above in respect of the tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and 
Rwanda: in the aftermath of an atrocity and war crimes committed against civilians, in any 
context which involves the brutal killing of innocents, it is difficult to argue for justifications 
and excuses on the part of the accused. Such discussion is possibly only open during times of 
peace rather than immediately following acts of barbarity. 
 
This idea is well supported by the discussions held prior to the signing of the Rome Statute 
in 1998, as Schabas highlights in his commentary.
212
 The International Law Commission’s 
draft in 1995 was met with a simultaneous draft written by experts, referred to as the updated 
Siracusa draft
213
 and, as noted by Ambos,
214
 duress was not available in this draft where the act 
was likely to cause death. Ambos notes elsewhere that the lack of differentiation, or heed 
paid to the distinction between justifications and excuses, was a structural issue which 
persisted throughout the drafting, and remained unaddressed by the International Law 
Commission.
215
 This would appear to demonstrate that the drafters were keen to include 
defences, but that less attention than necessary was paid to their inclusion. Eser’s 
contribution to Triffterer’s commentary further supports this, in particular viewing duress in 
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the Rome Statute as ‘ill-guided’216 and highlighting the lack of attention paid to issues such as 
the proportionality test therein for war crimes and crimes against humanity.
217
  
 
Indeed, the discussions of the Preparatory Committee on the notion of defences have not 
been greatly covered in academic literature
218
 demonstrably because it appears that little of a 
substantive nature was included in the formal proposals. Saland’s sole piece219 on the subject 
of defences indicates that the discussions on the topic of defences were the most difficult, 
given the distinctions between the domestic legal systems on the topic of defences.
220
 Indeed, 
the report on the work of the Preparatory Committee
221
 appears to adopt the articles 
wholesale and there is no substantive discussion on the defences, with the original proposal 
remaining in place for the signing of the Rome Statute.
222
 
 
The impact of jurists, who demonstrated a more developed understanding of international 
criminal law than drafters of prior statutes for international criminal tribunals, on the 
preparations Rome Statute is evident, given the work conducted prior to the negotiations and 
the similarities between such work and the Statute. The two most influential jurists on the 
topic of defences before the International Criminal Court are arguably Bassiouni and 
Cassese. Bassiouni’s draft code clearly set the tone for the Rome Statute: a comprehensive 
examination of the concepts required for an international criminal code, from the 
perspective of creating a system of international criminal justice rather than a stand-alone 
tribunal. This perspective encouraged the inclusion and codification of defences for 
international crimes, under the heading of ‘exoneration, justification and excusability.’ This 
indicated a differentiation between the defences, but there was no further differentiation 
provided, as all were to be placed in the same article to achieve cohesion.
223
 The defences in 
Bassiouni’s draft code have all been included in the Rome Statute, however, this hint of 
difference between the defences was not replicated. Cassese’s dissenting opinion in the 
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Erdemovic case has had more of a direct impact on the drafting of the Rome Statute, in that 
the defence of duress which he advocated has now been included. Bassiouni’s draft code 
sought to divide the defence into necessity and coercion, but Cassese’s definition of duress 
which did not specify the source of the threat was adopted directly by the drafters of the 
Rome Statute. Bassiouni’s idea that the defence should not be available where the harm 
which the individual seeks to defend may cause death, in the case of both duress and 
necessity, was also rejected by the drafters. Thus Cassese’s idea of the ‘realistic and flexible’ 
duress appears to have resonated to a greater degree with the drafters, who sought to 
incorporate a broader form of duress which may be applicable to the crimes within the 
jurisdiction of the Rome Statute, with the caveat that judicial discretion may be exercised in 
the admission of such defences.
224
 
 
It is clear that the work of both jurists affected the drafting of the Rome Statute and that the 
work of both played a role in drawing the attention of the drafters to specific issues, 
particularly where the drafting of the  Rome Statute took place. Bassiouni’s domestic law 
pedigree dictated that a system without defined defences would appear incomplete and it is 
his desire to introduce them which can be clearly seen in the final version of the Rome 
Statute. However, the dissenting opinion of Antonio Cassese
225
 has also affected the direction 
of the Rome Statute, in that the defence of duress is now accepted as part of the international 
system of criminal law propagated by the International Criminal Court. Cassese’s judgment 
reflected the understanding of defences in international criminal law at that time, 
demonstrated by the research outlined above on the work of the Preparatory Committee. 
However, his exposure of the defence was much more rigorous than the work of the 
PrepCom. His study of the military tribunals which had discussed defences, as well as the 
judgments at Nuremberg and Tokyo, reflect a growing change in the approach to defences in 
international law.. However, the larger question of how defences may be available for such 
heinous crimes, while satisfying the tests which restrict them in customary international law 
and general principles thereof, remains unanswered. By incorporating Cassese’s defence 
without any of the restraints tabled by Bassiouni, the Statute creates a broad notion of duress. 
There appears to be a high degree of acceptance around this issue at the level of the Rome 
Statute, with little critical comment of the impact this change in international criminal law 
may have. 
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In conclusion, it can be seen that the idea of defences did not begin with the Rome Statute 
and that previous works, including tribunals and the writings of jurists, supported this 
development in international criminal law. The confidence of the drafters of the Rome 
Statute to include defences, where previous treaties and charters remained silent or 
mentioned the concept only by exclusion, is notable and reflects a change in international 
criminal law. Previous tribunals and trials took place in response to atrocities which had 
occurred in the recent past, whereas the writings of jurists and the drafting of the Rome 
Statute would have taken place in a relatively peaceful setting. As a result, the Rome Statute 
differs from every previous expression of international criminal law in codifying the defences 
to serious violations of international criminal law. The national perspective on defences as 
derived from military tribunals was to accept defences which were available to serious crimes 
against the person in national law. The tribunals then determined, using the tests available in 
national law, whether the defence would be available on the basis of the evidence provided. 
There was no evidence that a rule persisted which precluded the availability of a defence in 
relation to the seriousness of the crime, particularly as many of the military tribunals drew on 
codified law which provided for such defences without restriction as to the type of case in 
which they could be used. The failure to accept defences at this level related more to the 
lack of evidence used to support their application, rather than a general rule of exclusion. 
This was particularly so in relation to the defence of superior orders. 
 
It was therefore unusual that the drafters of the Charters for the tribunals at Nuremberg and 
Tokyo opted to exclude the defence of superior orders to prevent the relief of responsibility 
on the basis of following orders by those indicted. The exclusion of superior orders was 
clearly to avoid constant recourse to superior responsibility, which would have collapsed 
both tribunals by preventing the attribution of any individual other than the most senior in 
each regime and contradicted entirely the doctrine of individual criminal responsibility.  A 
closer analysis, and indeed a comparison with the work of national tribunals, indicates that 
such exclusion was an overcautious provision in the Charters: those indicted were in 
positions of control and it would be unlikely that such an individual would be hewn to the 
complete command of his or her superior. Additionally, the manifest illegality test would 
have prevented the success of the defence in most cases, given the nature of the orders 
dictated by the regimes in Germany and Japan at that time. However, it is also possible that 
the exclusion of defences was more in reaction to the type of crime which was committed 
during the Second World War: the trend appears to be distaste for defences in respect of 
serious violations of international criminal law in the immediate aftermath of an atrocity. 
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This question, of why defences have been ignored in this way where reactive tribunals have 
been established is given further prominence by the work of Bassiouni, who included an 
explicit expression of defences which has been replicated by the Rome Statute. However his 
proposed restriction on the defence for any crimes which may result in death has not been 
retained. Interestingly Cassese’s concept of duress, as propagated in his dissenting opinion, 
appears to find greater favour with the drafters than Bassiouni’s separate defences of 
coercion and necessity. In general, the contribution of the jurists to this area is evident in the 
final draft of the Rome Statute. 
 
The Rome Statute thus does not introduce the concept of defences at the international level 
and its instigation as a ‘peacetime’ institution equally breaks with the recent history of 
international criminal law tribunals. Consequently, its drafters were in a better position to 
consider questions of international criminal law theory and to refine concepts in a way which 
was not pressured by time or political circumstance of a recently committed atrocity. 
However this does not explain the inclusion of such broad defences or the idea that defences 
for certain crimes may not be acceptable. In fact, it throws the issue into greater prominence. 
There appears to be a lack of consensus on the issue of defences for certain crimes and thus 
it remains curious that the drafters of the Rome Statute have chosen to make such a bold 
statement in this way. The effect of different influences can be felt, but it is not clear as to 
what the aim of including defences has been. The next step in this study is to explore the 
defences which the Rome Statute has codified in order to determine the role of the Rome 
Statute in enshrining the place of defences in the system of international criminal law. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
61 
 
4. Moving forward: Defences codified by the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court  
4.1 Mental incapacity and removal of criminal responsibility 
4.2 Intoxication 
4.3 Self-defence 
4.4 Duress 
4.5 Mistake 
4.6 Superior Orders 
 
The Rome Statute’s codification of defences represents a novel step at the international level, 
and the choice of defences appears to create certain provisions which do not marry up with 
the development of customary international law. To further investigate the novelty of these 
provisions, an examination of the defences which have been included in the Rome Statute 
shall be undertaken. The content of the grounds which may be pleaded for removal of 
criminal responsibility
226
 when charged with an offence will now be analysed. 
 
In domestic criminal law, the word generally used to denote the negation of criminal liability 
is a ‘defence,’ defined by Schabas as effectively being an ‘answer to a criminal charge.’227 
However the Rome Statute prefers the use of the wording ‘excluding’228 and ‘reliev(ing)’229 
criminal responsibility, setting it apart from both civilian and common law systems. Using 
Schabas’ definition, it is evident that the grounds fit into the paradigm of defences, whether 
as complete ‘answers’ or grounds which could act to mitigate responsibility and 
consequently, punishment.  The potential for the latter possibility will also be explored, given 
the use of different terms in the grounds for excluding criminal responsibility in Article 31 of 
the Rome Statute, and defence of superior orders, which purports to ‘relieve’230 criminal 
responsibility.  
 
Although the Rome Statute does not refer to the grounds as defences, the word ‘defences’ 
will be used interchangeably with ‘grounds for excluding criminal responsibility’ with good 
reason. The function of a defence is to remove criminal responsibility, and a defence is 
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therefore identical in operation to such grounds,
231
 from a pragmatic perspective. From a 
theoretical perspective, the defences, or grounds, may be further subdivided into 
justifications and excuses. At present, however, the Statute makes no such distinction. The 
purpose of this initial part of the thesis is to explore the grounds, firstly, on which the Rome 
Statute permits the removal of criminal responsibility. These will each be discussed in turn, 
with the culmination of the discussion highlighting the differences in terms of reference used 
within the Rome Statute.  
 
The Rome Statute provides ‘grounds for excluding criminal responsibility’232 in two articles, 
and article 33 further identifies a set of circumstances in which an individual might be 
‘relieve(d)’ of criminal responsibility. The focus of these provisions is firmly on the removal 
of criminal responsibility.  Under Articles 31, there are four specific grounds for the 
exclusion of criminal responsibility. These are mental incapacity,
233
 intoxication,
234
 self-
defence,
235
 or duress.
236
 Article 32 further identifies that where a mistake has been made, 
either in fact or law,
237
 it shall be a ground for excluding criminal responsibility, as long as the 
mistake does not relate to whether the act committed was ‘a crime within the jurisdiction of 
the court.’238 Finally, article 33 represents the greatest break with the tradition of international 
criminal tribunals thus far and entertains the possibility of a defence of superior orders, 
indicating such a situation will ‘relieve’239 the individual pleading the ground of criminal 
responsibility. 
 
The grounds are familiar reasons for removing criminal responsibility at national level, which 
can be seen in most jurisdictions. As this chapter will demonstrate, self-defence is a common 
defence present in most domestic jurisdictions and is even recognised in international law as 
a defence for States. Mental incapacity, equally, is often used as a defence where the 
individual lacked the requisite intent to commit the crime as a result of a defect in his 
reasoning by way of a psychiatric illness, for example. However the other defences are 
somewhat controversial in their inclusion, as many of these do not qualify as full defences in 
domestic law and thus represent neither customary international law nor an expression of 
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general principles. The defence of duress is particularly interesting, as its form in the Rome 
Statute appears to meld duress, in which an individual chooses the lesser of two evils, and 
necessity, which usually relates to a physical threat, such as a natural disaster. In some 
jurisdictions, neither would be available as a full defence, entirely removing criminal 
responsibility. The Rome Statute, however, makes no distinction between the defences and 
places each one, from self-defence to superior orders, on an equal footing. To determine if 
the scope of reasons for justifying criminal conduct has been expanded by the inclusion of 
these defences within the Rome Statute, the contents of each defence shall be analysed in 
turn. 
 
4.1 Mental incapacity and the removal of criminal responsibility 
 
The first ground available in the Rome Statute as a defence is that of mental incapacity, on 
the basis that he or she may suffer from a mental disease or defect.
240
 The wording is very 
clear in that the disease or defect cannot simply be a condition which affects the individual’s 
perception, but should be sufficient to ‘destroy…that person’s capacity to appreciate the 
unlawfulness or nature of his or her conduct, or capacity to control his or her conduct to 
conform to the requirements of law.’241 The distinction here is made quite clearly between 
mental incapacity, where the individual’s ability to understand the consequences of his or her 
actions is ‘destroyed’ and diminished responsibility, where an individual’s lack of perception 
may make him or her less culpable, and therefore lessen the requirement to punish him or 
her. Darcy identified that that, in the latter case, he or she ‘might not evade conviction, but 
could receive a mitigated sentence.’242 The issue with such a distinction, however, is whether 
such an individual ought to stand trial in the first place if the understanding he or she exhibits 
is so impaired as to constitute a barrier to the trial. An examination of the jurisprudence 
from the ICTY in this area may prove fruitful in understanding the distinction. 
 
 
The ICTY encountered several cases where the individual accused of crimes within the 
jurisdiction stated that he (invariably) was unable to stand trial. In Prosecutor v Pavel 
Struger,
243
 the Tribunal held that there was no specific provision in relation to declaring an 
individual unfit for trial but that both the prosecution and defence had set out their 
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respective cases on the basis that, if unfitness were to be proved, the trial should be 
terminated.
244
 The court also held that the principle of mental incapacity barring trial was one 
which ‘enjoy(ed) general acceptance’ throughout national legal systems,245 although there was 
nothing to suggest that a mental condition was a ‘prerequisite’246 for finding an individual 
unable to stand trial. The central concern for the tribunal was whether the individual could 
participate properly in the trial in order to access his right to a fair trial in international law.
247
 
In this particular instance, the accused sought to rely on psychiatric damage incurred during 
his participation in the war and therefore, that he was not suffering from such injury at the 
time of the commission of the alleged crimes. The tribunal in this case examined his ability 
to discuss his case with the counsel representing him, his ability to understand the 
proceedings and whether he could adequately give evidence in his own cause.
248
 His ability to 
do so lead the Trial Chamber to conclude that he was fit to stand trial; the central distinction 
here is between a pleading of mental incapacity at the time of committing the crimes and a 
pleading which resulted from later or contemporaneous injury or illness. The connection, 
however, is the wording within the Rome Statute, of the ‘destruction’ of such capacity. This 
indicates a permanent situation, which arguably would preclude the use of a defence which 
required evidence that the individual’s capacity to understand had been ‘destroyed’ at the 
time of committing the offence. 
 
A more relevant case, which relied on the tests developed by Struger, is that of Kovacevic
249
 
where the individual was alleged to be unfit to stand trial as the result of a mental disorder 
which was undisclosed.
250
 The case undertook a similar approach to understanding the 
accused’s mental state in respect of professional medical and psychiatric opinions. The 
Tribunal also added that it was not necessary for the functions outlined in Struger to be 
present to ‘their highest level,’251 but rather that the individual had to understand the 
proceedings, charges, evidence and be able to testify
252
 as a baseline for comprehension.  
 
Although not directly linked to the defence of mental defect or disease itself, the legal tests 
enunciated by the Tribunal above give an indication of the way in which a ‘destruction’ of 
mental capacity might be understood at the International Criminal Court. The difficulty 
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here, however, is how the test might be applied. The above cases demonstrate that the 
accused must demonstrate some understanding in order to stand trial. If he or she is fit to 
stand trial, how could he or she have perceived the unlawfulness of their actions? The 
former requirement of understanding requires arguably less perception than the latter, which 
would require, among other faculties, an ability to distinguish right from wrong. This 
argument demonstrates the impropriety of ‘transplanting’ a defence which has a ‘counterpart 
in domestic criminal law’253 to international criminal law, where the requirements of 
attribution of legal responsibility, and effectively mens rea, are different. The high threshold 
of the defence, to demonstrate the ‘destruction’ of mental faculties, reflects the seriousness 
of the crimes to which it may be admitted. However, this threshold also makes it 
incongruous with the ICTY jurisprudence on fitness to stand trial and it is clear that the 
Rome Statute has not followed the ICTY’s lead in this respect. 
 
The idea that the defence has been ‘transplanted’ from the domestic domain to the 
international is further supported by the lack of provision for assisting those who are 
mentally ill.
254
 At the national level, an individual who is unable to stand trial or who cannot 
be found guilty on the basis of mental incapacity will usually be remanded by the authorities; 
he would not be held responsible for his actions on account of the mental incapacity, but 
equally could not be released on the grounds of public safety. The issue raised by the 
provision of such a defence in the Rome Statute is that the individual could not be punished 
by the International Criminal Court, but there is equally no facility to treat mental illnesses in 
such a way. Transferring the individual to national authorities appears moot if the trial was 
dealt with at the international level. The issue here appears to be that of direct transposition 
from national law to international law: this defence does not appear to fit congruously within 
international criminal law nor does its addition appear to have any merit within the Rome 
Statute. The higher threshold for the use of the defence renders its application unlikely, 
given that an individual with a capacity so destroyed would be unlikely to be rendered fit to 
stand trial in the first instance. 
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4.2 Intoxication 
 
Intoxication as a defence to a criminal charge is recognisable from a number of domestic 
jurisdictions, and Darcy has argued that the role intoxicating agents has played in recent 
conflicts, such as that in Sierra Leone, lead to the inclusion of such a defence.
255
 Yet this has 
created difficulties at the international level owing to the differences in perception regarding 
the effect on criminal responsibility had by the ingestion of drugs or alcohol. The defence in 
the Rome Statute refers to ‘a state of intoxication that destroys (a) person’s capacity to 
appreciate the unlawfulness or nature or his or her conduct, or capacity to control his or her 
conduct…to the requirements of the law.’256 It does not require that the individual has been 
drugged against his or her will, but does provide the caveat that the defence cannot be used if 
‘the person knew, or disregarded the risk, that, as a result of the intoxication, he or she was 
likely to engage’257 in the crime arraigned by the court.  This avoids the situation where an 
individual required ‘Dutch courage’ in order to act, but then seeks to rely on the use of such 
substances to exonerate his conduct. There are therefore two issues in particular in relation 
to this defence which ought to be explored. The first is the issue of the difference in 
perception that the consumption of drugs and alcohol has. Through the prism of 
intoxication as a defence, it is reasonable to perceive that it would be a mitigating factor. 
However it has, in some cases, been viewed as an aggravating influence on the behaviour of 
the accused. The second issue is that of the use of intoxicating agents to encourage 
individuals to commit certain acts. This will be examined in the case of child soldiers and a 
particular case from Rwanda, which was remitted to the Gacaca courts. 
 
During the drafting of the Rome Statute, the inclusion of intoxication as a defence proved 
controversial on account of its different perceptions of the effect that alcohol or drugs ought 
to have on the criminal responsibility of the individual. There is undoubtedly no broad 
consensus on intoxication as a defence; the distinction is often made between Islamic 
countries and Western countries, with the former group of countries considering the 
consumption of alcohol or drugs to aggravate responsibility, rather than to mitigate it. 
However this perception is false as there are some Western countries which equally reject 
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some forms of intoxication as a defence to a criminal charge.
258
 However the jurisprudence of 
the ICTY reflected a different understanding of the reasoning underlying a defence of 
intoxication. It held that diminished mental capacity can operate as a mitigating factor in 
many jurisdictions and that intoxication can cause mental impairment.
259
 However, the Trial 
Chamber in Kvocka
260
 noted that the most relevant aspect of the analysis was whether the 
individual was voluntarily or involuntarily intoxicated. It further noted that involuntary 
intoxication was to be considered, of the two types of intoxication, the only valid ground for 
mitigation of sentence and concluded that ‘in contexts where violence is the norm and 
weapons are carried,’261 the consumption of drugs and alcohol is to be identified as an 
‘aggravating rather than mitigating’ factor.262 This is arguably reflected in the Rome Statute’s 
codified version of the defence, in which the most important aspect is whether the individual 
took proper responsibility for his actions in the context in which he found himself. However 
the Rome Statute appears to augment the ground for mitigation to a full defence, fully 
removing criminal responsibility from the actor. The inclusion of this defence is slightly 
confused, particularly when reflecting upon its execution. Technically it would only be 
available where the intoxication is forced or coerced, but the wording is not clear.  
 
Arguably the reason for including such a defence was the experience borne out of the liberal 
use of intoxicating agents in various conflicts to coerce children and other vulnerable 
individuals to become complicit in war crimes. In such situations, alcohol and drugs were 
viewed as one of the main ‘highly coercive elements at play.’263 A case before the Gacaca 
courts, a domestic court in Rwanda established to prosecute those accused of serious 
violations of international criminal law, primarily genocide and crimes against humanity
264
 
provides a useful example. Although such courts were domestic, their authority stemmed 
from the responsibilities the State had to protect, prosecute and punish under international 
law.
265
 The rulings of these courts thus have a degree of relevance to the present point, 
particularly the case of François Minani, who was convicted of genocide
266
 at the age of 16. 
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The facts of this case
267
 are relevant to the issue of intoxication, as these provide a useful 
example of the way in which intoxicating agents can be used in the context of war. Minani 
was instructed by members of the Interhamwe to kill his four young Tutsi nephews. After 
initially refusing, he was severely beaten. He continued to refuse until he was sedated, as 
which point he then submitted and carried out the orders. Following trial before a Gacaca 
court, he was convicted of genocide in respect of his nephews, despite his age and the 
circumstances in which he found himself. A plea of duress, rather than intoxication, was 
found to be grounds for mitigation and the punishment was reduced accordingly. However 
the court declined to view the intoxication as a defence in isolation; rather it was to be viewed 
as a contributing factor which should lessen his guilt overall. The court therefore 
acknowledged intoxication, and concurrently duress, as mitigating circumstances rather than 
full defences, or grounds for the exclusion of criminal responsibility. 
 
This case is particularly important in its demonstration of the way in which the ‘defence’ of 
intoxication ought to be viewed. If ever there were to be an appropriate subject for the relief 
of responsibility, it would be an individual who was heavily coerced through the use of 
intoxicants into murdering his young nephews. The fact that the intoxication marked the 
‘tipping point’ prior to the commission of the offence demonstrates the relevance of 
intoxication; the situation itself was highly coercive but the link between the act and 
intoxication is stronger. The Gacaca court, however, still refused to grant full relief from 
responsibility, in light of the fact that it held that genocide had been committed.
268
 This 
particular case demonstrates the difficulty of removing criminal responsibility at the 
international level: it is a tragedy for all involved, but the removal of responsibility would 
indicate that the action was appropriate in the circumstance. The accused’s behaviour and 
circumstance may make a lesser punishment appropriate in the circumstances, but it should 
not permit the full removal of criminal responsibility. In the case of international crimes, as 
recognised by the Gacaca courts, there are some issues too serious to merit the removal of 
criminal responsibility. The aims of the court, to maintain the rule of law and to offer justice 
for the victim,
269
 would be undermined should the offender be completely exonerated, 
ignoring the harm done to international society through the commission of such crimes in 
these cases as well as to domestic society and the individual victim. 
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4.3 Self-defence 
 
The doctrine of self-defence is well-established in international law at State level and the 
Rome Statute officially extends that protection to individuals by stating that criminal 
responsibility will be excluded for an individual who commits any of the crimes under the 
Rome Statute in order to defend himself, ‘reasonably’270 in the first instance. Typically the 
requirements for self-defence at State level are those of ‘proportionality’271 and imminence,272 
and this has been retained by the Rome Statute, as the ‘reasonable’ reaction must also be ‘in 
a manner proportionate to the degree of danger to the person or the other person or 
property protected.’273 The third requirement is that the danger itself must emanate from ‘an 
imminent and unlawful use of force,’274 for the defence to be available to the accused. The 
second part of the defence is more controversial, in that it allows the use of the defence for 
the protection of property. It functions in respect of war crimes only, and allows the 
commission thereof in defence of ‘property which is essential for the survival of the person 
or another person or property which is essential for accomplishing a military mission.’275 The 
only caveat applied to the second part to the defence is that simply being part of an 
operation mounted to defend a particular area or property would not automatically require 
the admission of the defence, therefore the grounds on which self-defence was pleaded 
would need to be evidenced, rather than the defence simply be available to all armed units 
acting in defence of, for example, a village.  
 
There are a number of issues that ought to be explored in respect of this defence. The first is 
the fact that the threshold for admission of the defence has, arguably, been raised through 
the requirement of the individual acting reasonably, as well as in response to an immediate 
threat in a proportionate fashion. This will be examined in the first instance. The second is 
the extension of self-defence to include the protection of property in the context of war 
crimes, which is predicated on a utilitarian calculation of the least suffering for individuals. 
An examination of the caveats in relation to the defence will be undertaken, including a view 
of the crimes that may be committed in the defence of property as permitted by the Statute.  
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The idea that self-defence is a right of both the individual
276
 and the State
277
 is a concept which 
has been fully established in international law. An individual is not expected to lay down his 
life when confronted by an aggressor, nor is the State expected to sacrifice the lives of its 
population when directly confronted.
278
 In international criminal law, the recognition of this 
particular defence appears congruous with the development of international criminal law and 
the Trial Chamber at the ICTY
279
 referred to this particular article of the Rome Statute when 
debating the admissibility of self-defence to war crimes in noting that self-defence was a rule 
of customary international law.
280
 It is this context that possibly the defence is of the most 
relevance, as its application appears implausible in the context of crimes against humanity 
and genocide. The requirement of acting in order to protection populations of certain areas 
where those actions may constitute war crimes does, however, raise different questions of a 
utilitarian nature.  
 
The important legal aspects to the defence are that the threat to which the individual is 
responding is imminent and that the response is proportionate. The first requirement, that 
the attack threatened is immediate in nature, can be referred to as the ‘imminence rule’281 
and is something of an inherent requirement for self-defence, as ‘absent imminent threat, the 
anticipated danger may never take place, nor be serious enough to justify lethal force in 
response.’282 Indeed, the overwhelming requirement to respond must be that which leaves 
‘no moment for deliberation.’283 The response itself must then be proportionate in relation to 
the attack; the force used must not be vastly greater than that deployed in the attack against 
the individual pleading self-defence. However, the tests in tandem appear to be 
anachronistic: if there is no time for deliberation, it is difficult to understand how the force 
used can be identified as proportionate. Indeed, it is arguable that the force used in most 
cases of self-defence would be greater than that of the attacker in order to ensure repulsion. 
                                                          
276
 M. Scaliotti, Defences before the International Criminal Court: substantive law – part 1, 1. Int’l. Crim. L. Rev 
(2001) 111-172, 162, quoting Stefan Glaser in this regard, who holds that it may be the prerogative of both the 
State and the individual to employ self-defence. 
277
 J. Kittrich, The right of individual self-defense in public international law, Logos Verlag, 2008. 
278
 Article 51, Charter of the United Nations 1945. 
279
 Prosecutor v Kordic and Cerkez, IT-95-14/2-T, 26 February 2001, paras 448-452. 
280
 Ibid., para 451. 
281
 O. Bakircioglu, Self-defence in international and criminal law: The doctrine of imminence, Routledge, 2011, 
specifically 58. 
282
 Ibid., 58. 
283
 Secretary of State Webster, in 1841, wrote to the British Lord Ashburton in reference to the Caroline case 
involving the deployment of force in anticipation of a situation requiring self-defence. This test was outlined as 
a requirement for self-defence in a note dated 24 April 1841, enclosed with a letter to Lord Ashburton dated 
27 July 1842. 
71 
 
The Trial Chamber in Kordic
284
acknowledged that each case of self-defence ought to be 
‘assessed on its own facts and in the specific circumstances relating to each charge.’285 It is in 
particularly difficult situations that the idea that the individual acted ‘reasonably’ would 
function as an expansive provision of the defence, rather than one which narrows its 
application and creates a higher threshold for its application. 
 
The introduction of the concept of self-defence extending to the protection of property 
created ‘something of a novel concept,’286 as self-defence has traditionally been limited to the 
protection of the person, using the tests outlined above. As demonstrated in Kordic,
287
 mere 
membership of a military unit is insufficient to allow the individual to access the defence and 
rather, it ought to be demonstrated that the actions committed were ‘essential,’ either for the 
survival of another or for the accomplishment of a military mission. This new and expanded 
ground creates difficulties as it is permits the commission of war crimes in order to advance 
the objectives of a particular war. The list of war crimes in the Rome Statute
288
 is a long and 
extensive list of the various atrocities that are illegal under the Rome Statute and reflects 
international humanitarian law provisions in other instruments through reference to the 
Geneva Convention,
289
 effectively prohibiting criminal conduct against civilians. Although the 
premise of allowing self-defence in the context of war may be appropriate, to expand it in 
this manner is not necessarily beneficial. It also appears to be incongruous with the 
customary provisions on international humanitarian law which prevent the abuse of civilians 
regardless of military objective. This particular aspect of article 31 has contributed to the 
broadening of the concept of self-defence, much further away from the concept of 
‘individual’ self-defence propagated by Bassiouni, although it ought to be noted that the 
application of self-defence varies depending on whether the crime is one under international 
humanitarian law or international criminal law. The limits placed on behaviour by each form 
of law differ, primarily because of the different contexts in which both may apply; 
international humanitarian law is a lex specialis extending to situations of armed conflict 
alone. 
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4.4 Duress 
 
Duress is an unorthodox inclusion in the Rome Statute given the dubiety over its existence 
and application in customary international law and the lack of general principles on the 
matter. The argument has been made
290
 that the defence as drafted in the Rome Statute 
conflates the concepts of duress and necessity, combining elements of both defences into a 
unified defence of compulsion to act. The crux of the defence is that the individual 
succumbed to a force greater than he could withstand and thereby committed the crime. 
The origin of the threat of force then delineates whether the defence ought to be considered 
duress or necessity: necessity is where the threat tends to be as a result of circumstance, or a 
natural threat, whereas duress is created a result of a threat made by another individual. The 
defence of duress within the Rome Statute constitutes a ground for the exclusion of criminal 
responsibility where the act was ‘caused by duress resulting from a threat of imminent death 
or of continuing or imminent serious bodily harm against that person or another person,’291 
thereby including that which threatens other individuals as well as the actor directly. The 
limitations on such threats are that the avoidance of the threat must be necessary and 
reasonable,
292
 and that of proportionality: that the harm caused must not be greater than that 
which is avoided. The last aspect is the unification of duress and necessity, in that the threat 
can be ‘made by other persons’293 or ‘constituted by other circumstances beyond that 
person’s control.’294 The inclusion of the defence of duress within the Rome Statute is 
thought to be reaction against the majority judgment in the ICTY case of Erdemovic,
295
 which 
rejected the admissibility of a full defence of duress in respect of murder as a war crime, 
citing the lack of a customary rule stating that duress is a full defence to murder in 
international law.
296
 
 
There are a few difficulties with the inclusion of this defence in particular, not least of all 
Scaliotti’s criticism stemming from ‘several writers, including Bassiouni and Eser…stress(ing) 
that necessity occasioned by natural factors is hardly conceivable as a defence to international 
crimes, and it is difficult to foresee under what circumstances it could justify or excuse 
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international crimes.’297 The implausibility as to the circumstances which may give rise to the 
duress in the context of war crimes or crimes against humanity is not of central concern, but 
rather the reasoning underlying the removal of criminal responsibility on such a basis. There 
is firstly the issue that this part of the Rome Statute has sought to merge the different 
concepts of duress and necessity, thus creating a broader defence for serious violations of 
international criminal law. The separation of the defence into two categories, duress and 
necessity, becomes more significant when the second issue is tackled, that being the 
argument put forward by Dinstein. He notes that ‘the correct approach (in international law) 
is that no degree of duress can justify murder, let alone genocide’298 and therefore the argued 
conflation of this defence creates further issues for the Rome Statute in that war crimes and 
crimes against humanity may now be justified because of the pressure under which the 
accused acted. Two issues thus arise. The first issue is that the defence apparently conflates 
duress and necessity
299
 as concepts, failing to distinguish the former as an excuse and the 
latter as a justification.
300
 The issue of classifying duress and necessity as justifications or 
excuses will be dealt with in this work at a later stage, in chapter six, where it is of greater 
relevance.  For this purpose, it is the fact that both concepts have been included as full 
defences, completely excluding criminal responsibility if accepted, is problematic. This 
article has been much criticised as a result, indicating that the resulting provision ‘was mainly 
an effort to combine duress and necessity.’301 Scaliotti notes that, in the opinion of Albert 
Eser, it is ‘one of least convincing provisions (of the Rome Statute), as it tried to combine the 
concepts of justifying necessity and merely excusing duress in an ill-guided and lastly failed 
attempt.’302 The distinction here is made between the fully exonerating effect of necessity, 
which tends to be characterised as an unavoidable set of circumstances beyond the actor’s 
control, and the relief provided for the actor in the case of duress, where he took the 
decision to commit a criminal act in extremely constrained circumstances. It is also relevant 
that other constrained circumstances, such as being issued with illegal orders, did not 
previously offer any relief from criminality for the actor, as was the case with the Charter of 
the International Military Tribunal, which expressly prohibited the use of the defence of 
superior orders.
303
 
 
                                                          
297
 M. Scaliotti, Defences before the International Criminal Court: substantive law – part 1, 1. Int’l. Crim. L. Rev 
(2001) 111-172, 146. 
298
 Y. Dinstein and M. Tabory (ed.) War crimes in international law, Kluwer Law International, 1996 at 11. 
299
 J. D. Ohlin, The bounds of necessity, J.I.C.J. 6 (2008) 289-308. 
300
 Ibid. at 292. 
301
 M. Scaliotti, Defences before the International Criminal Court: substantive law – part 1, 1. Int’l. Crim. L. Rev 
(2001) 111-172, 155. 
302
 Ibid., 155. 
303
 Article 8, Charter of the IMT at Nuremberg 1945. 
74 
 
 
The second issue is whether any such defence may justify the crimes within the jurisdiction 
of the International Criminal Court, answered in the negative by Dinstein.
304
 Given the 
previous disinclination in customary international criminal law for the transfer of criminal 
responsibility as a result of circumstance, it is striking that the Rome Statute has chosen to 
include such defences in its purview. However, as noted above the majority decision in 
Erdemovic
305
may have precipitated the proposed change. Indeed Antonio Cassese’s 
dissenting opinion in that case is often cited as the reason for the adoption of this particular 
provision. Cassese, when delivering his dissent from the majority on the predicament of the 
young soldier who had complied with the direction to murder civilians when threatened with 
death and harm to his family, provided the compelling argument that the law ‘should not set 
intractable standards of behaviour which require mankind to perform acts of martyrdom, 
and brand as criminal any behaviour falling below those standards.’306 His reasoning was 
largely based on German cases following the Second World War, which had applied 
international law by and large,
307
 and Italian cases, again following the Second World War, 
concerning those who had followed instructions to shoot partisan fighters.
308
 The precedent 
set by these cases indicated that duress be allowed if a refusal to fight would be tantamount to 
martyrdom, where the victims would still be killed regardless. The compelling nature of the 
argument, however, does not answer the question of whether serious crimes can ever be 
legally committed under compulsion. It also does not separate a finding of guilt from 
punishment; in the case of duress or necessity, a finding of guilt may be of the utmost 
importance in terms of recognising the harm committed to the victim, to society and in 
recognising the importance of maintaining the rule of law even under pressure. This 
provisions does not countenance that it may not be necessary to punish an individual who 
lacked the requisite intention to cause the harm which resulted from his actions, but may be 
appropriate to find him guilty. 
 
4.5 Mistake 
 
Mistake is included in the Rome Statute under a separate article from the four defences 
outlined in Article 31, but the reference to an exclusion of responsibility remains. Article 32 
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holds that both mistakes of fact
309
 and law
310
 may exclude criminal responsibility. A mistake of 
fact made by an individual seeking to rely on the defence will only exonerate his conduct 
should it ‘negate(s) the mental element required by the crime.’311 A mistake of law, however, 
is more narrowly construed and an individual cannot rely on his ignorance as whether the 
conduct committed was a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court. Rather, it must also 
nullify ‘the mental element required by such a crime’312 in order to be grounds for excluding 
criminal responsibility. The inclusion of both has been attributed by Scaliotti on ‘similarity of 
the result’313 rather than any theoretical position and that if one should be included, an 
individual should not be punished in either case for not intentionally committing the crime. 
Therefore the similarity between the defences is the fact that the individual did not intend to 
commit the crime, and accordingly lacked the requisite mens rea to incur full criminal 
responsibility for the act. 
 
Prima facie the inclusion of such a defence in the Rome Statute appears appropriate, 
providing such orders are not manifestly illegal. Indeed, where orders are manifestly illegal, 
Dinstein quoting Lauterpacht noted that ‘there is no room for mistake’314; that an obviously 
illegal order is not one which should find relief in the shade of the defence of mistake of law, 
as codified. The idea of the defence of mistake, of both fact and law, is therefore inextricably 
linked to the intention to commit a criminal act. In the context of the Rome Statute, this is to 
be found in the mental element provisions of Article 30. The first issue to be explored, 
therefore, is whether mistake as a defence is an unnecessary addition to the Rome Statute in 
light of the requirement for intent. Another relevant point to be discussed is the potential 
confusion between the ‘mistake’ in relation to the law or facts, and the illegality of the order. 
This shall be discussed in reference to a potential case, as well as whether it actually adds 
anything given the requirements for the mental elements of crimes within the Rome Statute. 
 
Under Article 30, in order for an individual to be guilty of a crime under the jurisdiction of 
the Rome Statute, it is necessary for that individual to have both ‘intent and knowledge.’315 
Intent is then defined by the Article where the person ‘means to engage in the conduct’316 and 
has awareness that the action committed will ‘cause that consequence, or is aware that it will 
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occur in the ordinary course of events.’317 Knowledge is then further defined as ‘awareness 
that a circumstance exists of that the consequence will occur in the ordinary course of 
events.’318 This sets, as Schabas indicates, ‘the highest standard for fault’319 on the part of the 
actor, as the two requirements appear to create a high threshold for the commission of a 
crime under the Statute. It is also clear to see that there is significant overlap between the two 
concepts,
320
 but ensures that the Rome Statute is reasonably limited in its application, by 
focusing the Prosecutor’s attention on those who are truly blameworthy in the conflict. The 
height of this threshold almost appears to make the defence of mistake appear superfluous, 
as it is difficult to imagine an individual who makes a mistake, either in fact or in law, guilty 
of an offence under the Statute in light of the extensive provisions on mens rea. Intent in this 
context is watertight; it does not appear to be possible to make a mistake and still incur 
criminal responsibility under the Statute, as the individual would either lack the requisite 
knowledge regarding the effect of his actions, or fail to meet the requirements of intention in 
‘meaning to cause’ the crime in question.  
 
This argument is better explained in the context of a problem which illustrates the issues 
relating to the inclusion of mistake as a defence. Heller
321
 has noted three cases
322
 in which 
Article 32 may apply, one being a mistake of fact, where civilians are misidentified as soldiers 
and attacked as legitimate targets. The second is that of a mistake of law, where the accused 
believed that civilians could be legitimately attacked during war, and the third being a mixed 
situation, identified as a ‘mistake of legal element.’323 In the example for the third situation, 
the soldier attacks a civilian group on the basis of a mistaken notion that a group must be 
‘purely’ civilian to receive protection and the presence of some soldiers makes it a legitimate 
target. The work notes that Article 32 appears to extend to some situations in which mistake 
of legal element plays a role
324
 and that this therefore extends the scope of the exclusion of 
criminal responsibility, in an unjustifiable way in the opinion of Heller.
325
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Returning to the original link between the mental elements required by the Rome Statute 
and the defence of mistake, it is difficult to see that any of the above cases would require or 
allow the admission of the defence itself. The requirement in the Rome Statute of ‘intent and 
knowledge’326 means that both must be proved in order for an individual to be guilty. In this 
first instance, the individual lacks the requisite knowledge, in that he is not aware that ‘the 
circumstance exists.’327 It cannot be said that he intends to kill civilians as he does not know 
that the group identified are civilians in the first instance. The crime is therefore not 
committed under Article 30 before any relevant defences are involved. In reference to the 
second scenario, it is scarcely conceivable that an individual in this instance would not be 
committing a war crime nor entitled to any relief from responsibility in any case.  A soldier 
who does not know that civilians are to be protected in time of war is one who should not 
have carefully constructed provisions to shield him from the law; he is not expected to be a 
‘scholar of international law’328 but the law that prohibit soldiers from deliberately targeting 
civilians is not one which is particularly difficult to identify. The role of the soldier is to 
protect; the situation above demonstrates ignorance of the law rather than a mistake. In the 
case of the third situation, again the situation is one of ignorance of the law rather than 
mistake. Although these examples are hypothetical, there must be a degree of realism 
applied.  Soldiers operating in the environment of a conflict are not to be considered simple 
or immature across the board. Part of the duty of the operative is to understand the bounds 
of his authority to act, with no excuse for ignorance. As ignorance is no defence, it is difficult 
to envisage the context in which the full defence of mistake could be utilised. 
 
4.6 Superior orders 
 
The inclusion of a defence of superior orders has been viewed variously by jurists, with some 
noting it as a break with the Nuremberg tradition of excluding superior orders as a defence
329
 
and others citing it as the proper ‘restoration’330 of a previously accepted doctrine in 
international military law. The defence itself is not simply ‘restored’ however in a general 
fashion to all crimes under the State, but is carefully circumscribed to apply singularly to war 
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crimes.
331
 A three-part test must be met in order for the defence to be admissible, that being 
the legal requirement of the individual to follow orders of a superior,
332
 that the individual 
was unaware of the illegality of the instructions
333
 and that the order itself was not ‘manifestly 
unlawful.’334 The Article then restricts the application of the defence to charges of war crimes, 
on the grounds that ‘orders to commit genocide or crimes against humanity are manifestly 
unlawful.’335 At Nuremberg, the defence was reduced to a plea in mitigation, indicating that 
an individual who followed orders may plead mitigating circumstances in order to lessen the 
punishment for the crime. However the argument has been made that Nuremberg had 
redacted the defence to such a plea, and that the Rome Statute has now arguably been 
‘restored’ it to fully relieve criminal responsibility from the individual. 
 
There are a number of issues inherent in creating a full defence of superior orders, not least 
of all the concern enunciated by the drafters of the Charter of the International Military 
Tribunal for Nuremberg of a ‘system of infinite regression’336 in relation to responsibility. 
This criticism is no less pertinent now, despite the absence of Hitler’s doctrine of absolute 
obedience,
337
 as the military ultimately functions on the basis of obedience to orders. There 
are therefore a number of contentious issues to be explored in relation to the inclusion of 
this defence, which for reasons of time and space will not be discussed here. The most 
pertinent is the discussion of whether the defence truly has been ‘restored’ as argued above, 
or whether it has been augmented from a plea in mitigation to a defence. The consequences 
of this perceived augmentation for criminal responsibility will also be discussed. 
 
The idea of superior orders as a full defence was removed by the Charter for the 
International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg as part of an ancillary support to the doctrine 
of individual criminal responsibility and in a bid to avoid the mass release of Nazi war 
criminals, able to rely on the Fuhrerprinzip to escape responsibility
338
 for their contribution to 
the atrocities committed. Instead, the Charter permitted superior orders to be used as a plea 
in mitigation,
339
 which allowed the Tribunal to reduce the sentence accordingly. Prior to this, 
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it has been acknowledged that the concept of refuting full responsibility on the grounds of 
superior orders was recognised as a customary rule in international law, evidenced by 
reference to military manuals.
340
 Two approaches were acknowledged to exist in national 
military laws: conditional liability and absolute liability. Cryer
341
 identifies the former as being 
the British approach, while the latter is that of the United States. He also argues that the 
customary rule was that a soldier cannot rely on the defence where he was aware of the 
illegality; where he was argued to have ‘known or should have known’342 that the order was 
illegal. The latter doctrine was espoused by the Tribunals following the Second World War 
and the former can be seen in the Rome Statute. Absolute liability dictates that the individual 
will be held responsible for his conduct regardless of the existence of superior orders which 
he was bound to follow, whereas conditional liability relies on the ‘manifest illegality’ test, 
offering the individual relief from criminal responsibility where it was not clear that the order 
followed violated the laws of war. 
 
Dinstein’s metaphor of superior orders as a ‘shield’343 which a soldier might use as protection 
against the law is useful in demonstrating the problem of superior orders as a defence, while 
equally demonstrating its value as a plea in mitigation.
344
 Soldiers cannot be expected to 
question every order, but are not robotic and ought to be aware of the illegality of certain 
orders. It is not to place soldiers in an impossible situation, but rather to ensure that proper 
accountability is achieved for the commission of any international crimes. The Rome Statute 
has not therefore ‘restored’ the defence of superior orders as such, but created a full defence 
where a plea in mitigation existed previously. The usefulness of superior orders as a plea in 
mitigation is undermined, as the rejection of a full defence leaves the individual unable to 
seek any relief for the difficult situation in which they may have been placed. It also leaves 
open the possibility of directly undermining the doctrine of individual criminal responsibility 
more than any of the other defences in the Rome Statute, as it permits the direct transfer of 
responsibility on the basis of rank. The use of the manifest illegality test and the limitation of 
the use of the defence to war crimes further demonstrate the attempt to make the defence 
more circumspect when it may be more appropriate, and more humane in its application, as 
a plea in mitigation. 
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It is worth noting that the Rome Statute does not appear entirely comfortable with the 
concept of superior orders as a defence: the idea is set apart in its own article from the other 
grounds excluding responsibility,
345
 and different language is used, that being the ‘relie(f)’346 of 
criminal responsibility. This points to a possible chasm between the justifying effects of the 
exclusionary defences and that which relieves criminal responsibility, and overall 
demonstrates the incongruity between the defences and the crimes under the jurisdiction of 
the Rome Statute. It is clear that the idea of superior orders being restored is an interesting 
concept, but for true restoration to the customary position, it ought to have been included as 
a plea in mitigation, rather than a full defence to exonerate the accused.  
 
The purpose of this part of the study was to avoid a repetitive restatement of the literature
347
 
on the defences within the Rome Statute and to outline the issues with supplying the 
defences in such terms within the Statute. More than anything, the aim was to demonstrate 
that the Rome Statute, in this area, has attempted to create law by fashioning defences with a 
narrower definition than previously existed. In doing so, the drafters have relied upon 
defences which are arguably ‘unique’ to international criminal law, such as superior orders, 
and those which can be said to have a ‘counterpart’ in domestic criminal law, such as duress 
and mistake. Overall, it can be seen that some systems of domestic law, through custom and 
general principles, have played a decisive role in the selection of defences which were 
identified for inclusion within the Statute. 
 
The defence of mental incapacity, as outlined by the Statute, indicates that an impairment 
which destroys an individual’s capacity to understand the unlawfulness of their conduct will 
constitute grounds for the exclusion of criminal responsibility. The inclusion of this defence 
implies a direct transposition from domestic to international law which is not entirely 
appropriate and this tension is reflected in the idea that the high threshold may necessarily 
preclude the defence, as an individual with such a serious mental impairment may not be fit 
to stand trial. The defence also makes no allowances for diminished responsibility as a 
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ground for mitigation of punishment, leaving a wide gap between the full defence and full 
attribution of criminal responsibility.  
 
Intoxication appears to be equally transplanted from domestic law, although in a 
controversial fashion as many jurisdictions do not admit voluntary intoxication as a full 
defence. The jurisprudence from the ICTY appears to have been followed in this instance, 
holding that involuntary intoxication ought to function as a ground for excluding criminal 
responsibility. However the gap between intoxication as a ground for mitigation and a 
defence again may create problems, as the intoxication must ‘destroy’ the individual’s 
capacity to understand the unlawfulness of their conduct. It also conflicts with rulings of the 
Gacaca courts on the defences available for a charge of genocide, which are persuasive in 
their contribution to the development of international criminal law in the context of 
defences. 
 
Self-defence is recognised in international and national law, as a full defence whereby an 
individual may commit a crime to prevent unlawful force being used against him to his 
severe injury or death. This defence is well-established in international law and provides the 
only true balance between the rights of the victim and the rights of the accused in the context 
of defences; in other words, it represents the only situation in which there is no choice but to 
act. The expansive nature of this defence also reflects its legitimacy in national and 
international law. 
 
Duress, and its objective counterpart, necessity, are included within the Statute in a slightly 
controversial fashion, given the lack of a customary rule in this area. However the ICTY 
ruling which arguably influenced the inclusion demonstrates more the appropriateness of 
including such grounds as pleas in mitigation to reduce the punishment, rather than full 
defences. A lack of consensus at the ICTY reflected the lack of consensus among States and 
the admission of a highly subjective ground such as duress as a full defence simply cannot be 
argued to be compatible with the seriousness of the crimes covered by the Rome Statute. 
 
The inclusion of mistake as a defence within the Statute again gives rise to issues in relation 
to its admission as a defence. It is clear that mistakes can be made during operations in time 
of war, but it is not clear that such mistakes should automatically remove criminal 
responsibility. The three situations outlined above indicate that the defence would not be 
required in situations of factual mistake, as the mental element of the crime under Article 30 
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could not be proved. In other situations, it is difficult to see how these would not constitute 
ignorance of the laws of war rather than mistakes, given the burden placed on soldiers to 
protect civilians. 
 
Finally, the defence of superior orders was held to have been ‘restored’ by the Rome Statute 
to its customary position. However, the defence applies only to war crimes and is so 
narrowly defined that its availability as a full defence is questionable. The use of superior 
orders as a plea in mitigation would have been a more humane ‘restoration’ of the defence, 
and more in keeping with customary principles. It is difficult to reconcile a full defence of 
superior orders with the liability tests present in national legal systems and the opportunity to 
codify superior orders as a plea in mitigation here was unfortunately missed. 
 
The tension between the provision of these defences and the crimes within the jurisdiction 
of the Rome Statute is evident, given the high thresholds set by the wording in Articles 31-33. 
The confidence demonstrated by the expansive wording of the provisions of self-defence 
indicate that it may be the only true justification within the Statute, with the rest reflecting 
some provisions from national law that have been transplanted, and that do not fit 
congruously with the purpose, requirements and, often, the context of international criminal 
law. 
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Part II 
Using duress to exclude criminal responsibility for war crimes and crimes against humanity 
Following on from the conclusion of the previous part with the problems inherent in the 
defences in the Rome Statute, the second part to the argument begins by isolating the 
defence of duress in the Rome Statute as the most problematic ground on which to exclude 
criminal responsibility. There are particular problems associated with permitting a defence 
of duress in relation to serious violations of international criminal law. Specifically the 
defence is too flexible and broad, the idea of internal or external pressure too vague and 
immeasurable to permit the release from criminal responsibility. The case is amply 
demonstrated by the first chapter in this part, which takes a look at the defence of duress to a 
charge of murder in a number of different jurisdictions. Although the defences are closely 
related, many jurisdictions separate the concepts: duress is where a threat is made, usually by 
a third party, and the criminal act is a consequence of acting under pressure: the individual 
acts, literally, with a gun to his or her head. However, necessity is where the individual 
judged the situation to require his or her criminal action, usually where the situation was 
beyond his or her control. This usually relates to natural disasters or accidents; being lost at 
sea and seeking to murder a companion in order to eat him and survive is one example of a 
situation in which one may argue ‘necessity’. The comparative nature of the study uncovers a 
lack of general principles in this area, as well as demonstrating a general reluctance on part of 
a number of national jurisdictions to permit the killing of another while under pressure, from 
unusual and pressured circumstances or due to a threat.  
 
The next part explores duress as a defence in the Rome Statute. The drafters have chosen to 
unite the concepts of duress and necessity, often viewed as separate defences at the domestic 
level and install it in the Statute as a full defence, leading to a complete acquittal for those 
who successfully plead it. The idea of duress is explored and the problems associated with 
classifying duress as a full defence for such serious crimes is discussed, against the backdrop 
of the comparative study. It also deals in detail with the case of Erdemovic before the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, which dealt with the idea of 
duress as a defence to war crimes and crimes against humanity in detail. The Appeals 
Chamber in that case rejected, by a narrow majority, the applicability of the defence for such 
serious offences but a compelling and influential dissent by Judge Antonio Cassese was 
made, which appears to have had a greater influence than the majority verdict. This part also 
deals with the idea of duress as a means of completely exonerating the individual from 
responsibility, arguing that the continued influence of a ‘hard case’ such as that of Erdemovic 
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on the law is not conducive to the central aim of international criminal law: the avoidance of 
impunity. As such, the final part to this thesis discusses the ways in which the inclusion of 
defences may be interpreted by the Court, or even reformed.  
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5. Killing under pressure: A study of the availability of the defence of duress to a charge of 
murder in a number of national jurisdictions  
5.1 England and Wales 
5.2 United States 
5.3 France 
5.4 Germany 
5.5 South Africa 
5.6 Is there a general principle of duress as a defence? 
  
The relevance of national law to international criminal law, as demonstrated in chapters two 
and three, clearly explains the characterisation of the discipline as a ‘fusion’348  between 
international law and domestic criminal law. The problem of duress at the international 
level, as dealt with by the previous chapter, should thus be explored by reference to domestic 
law. The purpose of this chapter is to undertake a comparative analysis of the availability of 
the defence of duress to a charge of murder. The defence of necessity may also be discussed, 
as the defences have been unified by the Rome Statute, and it can sometimes be the case 
that necessity is available as a defence to murder where duress is unavailable. In general, 
however, the focus will be on duress.  
 
The jurisdictions have been selected in order to represent a number of the systems which 
have exerted influence at the international level. These jurisdictions have influenced the 
codified provisions in others, or may have influenced the adoption of a common law system, 
making them the most relevant to study for the purpose of identifying a general principle in 
international law. The idea behind this chapter is not to argue that domestic and 
international provisions ought to be directly analogous, which is not the case. Rather it is put 
forward that international criminal law ought to represent standards which are not lesser than 
those applicable at a national level for serious crimes against the person, particularly murder, 
in the context of serious violations of international criminal law.  
 
To make the study relevant in the context of serious violations of international criminal law, 
the use of the defence, or defences, will be examined in relation to the most serious crime 
against the person: responsibility for the death of another individual. This means that the 
defence, or defences, will only be discussed where they are available for murder, or killing. It 
is acknowledged that the defence of duress may be available in these jurisdictions for other 
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crimes, but its application will only be discussed insofar as it is available for murder or the 
domestic equivalent to manslaughter or culpable homicide. This part of the discussion aims 
to support the argument that it may not be compatible to permit a defence of duress or 
necessity at an international level if there is a lack of a general principle at the national level 
for a similarly serious type of crime against the person, on presumably a smaller scale. By 
restricting this chapter to the application of the defence to the crime of murder, the study 
focuses on the admissibility of defences to the most serious crime at a domestic level and 
allows the findings to be applied meaningfully in the context of serious violations of 
international criminal law at a later stage in the development of the thesis. 
 
As discussed in chapter four, the Rome Statute unifies the concepts of duress and 
necessity.
349
 In some domestic systems, duress and necessity are concepts with different 
theoretical roots and thus remain separate defences. This will be discussed in the context of 
each country later but, as a general introduction where this distinction applies, the following 
differences can be observed. Duress as a defence can be defined as where an individual acts 
as a result of internal pressure, such as that created by another individual threatening the 
first, and commits a criminal offence as a result. Necessity, on the other hand, can be 
deemed to relate to situations where an external pressure compels action, such as action 
required in the face of a natural disaster and the individual concerned commits a criminal 
offence. This distinction will be used, where relevant, in this study and both defences will be 
studied as a result of only one existing in some jurisdictions
350
 and no distinction being made 
between the two in the criminal law of other jurisdictions.
351
  
 
The jurisdictions which have been selected for analysis are England and Wales,
352
 the United 
States, France, Germany and South Africa. These jurisdictions have been chosen both for 
their prominence at the international level and the effect which their legal systems have had 
on the development of law in other countries, in some cases as a result of colonisation
353
 and 
in others as a result of influence.
354
 For example, the European countries cited above have 
influenced the development of domestic criminal law in Asia and Latin America, and  the 
focus of the selection was rather to ensure that both civil and common law systems were 
represented, as opposed to specific geographical areas. A brief sketch of each legal system, 
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outlining its sources and operation, will precede the main discussion of necessity and duress 
in each, avoiding presumed knowledge of each individual system. The sources highlighted 
will then be used to analyse the existence of an analogous concept to duress and necessity, 
highlighting the distinction, if any, between the two concepts at domestic law and the 
availability of either, both or the defence where unified to a charge of murder. 
 
5.1 England 
 
The English jurisdiction is based on common law, within which statute and legal precedent 
set by previous cases constitutes the body of the law. Thus there is no neat legal definition set 
within a code for what may comprise a defence of duress or necessity and the existence of 
the defences can be seen through discussion in legal literature and case law. English law 
recognises three defences which relate to the discussion at hand: necessity and two forms of 
duress: duress of circumstances and duress by threats.
355
 Wilson thus notes that there is a 
clear distinction between necessity and the two types of duress, although holds that necessity 
has ‘crept into English law via backdoor of duress.’’356  However, this view may not be entirely 
correct, as English criminal law acknowledged the existence of a defence known as necessity 
long before either subdivision of duress was discussed, despite there being no specific 
definition of what it may constitute.
357
 Necessity and duress remain distinct in modern texts
358
 
but traditionally, the courts have rejected all three defences as applicable to a charge of 
murder.
359
 
 
The roots of the concepts can be found in the writings of James Stephen
360
 who referred to 
situations of duress and necessity as ‘compulsion’ to commit an unlawful act, of which 
compulsion bears the greatest relation to duress.
361
 Stephen’s initial identification of the 
concept in English law,
362
 progressively referring to it as an excuse, but one which made no 
distinction between internal and external forms of compulsion, was published one year prior 
to the oft-cited case of R v Dudley.
363
 In this case, the court analysed Stephen’s writings and 
declared the question before the court to be that of necessity, given that no threats from 
                                                          
355
 J.W. Herring, Criminal law: text, cases and materials, Oxford University Press, 2012, 664 and N. Padfield, 
Criminal law, Oxford University Press 2008, 111. 
356
 W. Wilson, Criminal law: Doctrine and theory, Longman, 1998 at 280. 
357
 J. Stephen, History of the criminal law of England, 1883, vol. 2 at 108. 
358
 J.W. Herring, Criminal law: text, cases and materials, Oxford University Press, 2012, 656-664; 665-668 and 
N. Padfield, Criminal law, Oxford University Press 2008, 103 and 107. 
359
 R v Dudley and Stephens [1884] 14 QBD 273. 
360
 J. Stephen, Digest of the criminal law, 1887. 
361
 J. Stephen, History of the criminal law of England, 1883, 108. 
362
 J. Stephen, History of the criminal law of England, 1883, 108. 
363
 R v Dudley and Stephens [1884] 14 QBD 273. 
88 
 
another individual were involved. The court held in this instance that it had not been, under 
the circumstances, any more necessary to kill the weaker boy than any of the other occupants 
of the boat,
364
 and from this perspective the issue appears to be that taking the path of least 
resistance, namely killing the weakest member of the group, denied the defendants the 
opportunity of claiming necessity as their defence. The court went on further to hold that the 
admission of such a defence in balancing one life against another would create an ‘awful 
danger,’ given the difficulty of judging what might be necessary to whom in which 
circumstances.
365
 Stephen’s366 view that the defence should be decided upon at the present 
moment was followed in this case and the issue was not that necessity was unavailable, but 
rather did not apply in those circumstances. The statement that English law demands 
heroism in a situation of necessity is inaccurate,
367
 precisely because the killing in this case 
was not any more necessary than the killing of any of the other men. Each life was of equal 
value and accordingly no one life had a greater right to subsist than the other where the issue 
of self-defence against an aggressor did not arise.  
 
The concept of necessity was also used to justify a member of the court’s ruling in favour of 
the separation of conjoined twins in the Re A (Children)
368
 case. In this case, Brooke LJ 
based its reasoning on the elements of Stephen’s formulation of necessity, in which he 
identified a ‘doctrine’369 of necessity, in which instance an individual may be acquitted of a 
crime on the grounds that he or she acted as the result of pressure. Brooke LJ concludes 
that the three requirements of Stephen’s doctrine of necessity were met in this instance and 
thus that the separation of the twins was justified in law. This demonstrates that the defence 
of necessity may be available as a defence to murder in ‘circumstances like these.’ Brooke LJ 
concluded that  
‘there need be no room for the concern felt by Sir James Stephen that people would be too 
ready to avail themselves of exceptions to the law which they might suppose to apply to their 
cases, at the risk of other people’s lives.  Such an operation is, and is always likely to be, an 
exceptionally rare event.’370 
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Thus the unfortunate and inevitable death that would result following the operation did not 
require the use of a defence by the surgeons, and rather ought to have been carried out on 
the grounds of necessity for the preservation of the life of the healthier twin. This line of 
argument was further supported by the later case of Nicklinson.
371
 In this case, it was held by 
the court that a defence of necessity would not be available to anyone who helped Mr 
Nicklinson to commit suicide, where he was unable to do so independently as a 
consequence of the degenerative condition from which he suffered. The court affirmed that 
there was no common law or codified defence of necessity or duress to murder,
372
  and thus 
neither would apply where the charge was of actively assisting a person to commit suicide.  
 
The existence of the doctrine of necessity in English law, where there is a risk of 
‘consequences’ which could lead to an ‘irreparable and inevitable’ evil is therefore 
unchallenged; the consequences of creating any rule must always be considered before the 
rule is applied. Because of this, its applicability to a charge of murder is something which 
must be declared by Parliament, as the current common law defence does not extend to 
cover such situations.  
 
Thus, the notion of necessity in English law is separate from that of duress. Stephen’s 
concept of compulsion bears the greatest relation to the modern concepts of duress of 
circumstances and duress by threats, and his unified version of the defences has much in 
common with the Rome Statute’s definition of duress in that there is no distinction made on 
the basis of the source of the threat which requires the individual in question to commit the 
unlawful act. However, he notes that the defence is only available to those who were 
supporting the principal to carry out the act by aiding and abetting.
373
 The courts have applied 
Stephen’s ideas, refining the concepts into separate ideas which are distinguished by the 
source of the threat. Most recently, duress by circumstances has been acknowledged as a 
form of necessity
374
 and there is much to suggest that the modern law holds that necessity is 
only available where duress of circumstances can be proved,
375
 demonstrating a lack of clear 
distinction between the concept of necessity and the idea of duress of circumstances. Neither 
would be available at present for a charge of murder and the above cases generally relate to 
driving offences, where the defence may be used. 
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The defence of duress by threats is much more distinct and far more contentious than that 
above. The definition of duress has not been dealt with extensively by the courts and more 
serious cases tend to focus on its applicability, rather than the extent to which the individual 
has been threatened. The judgment in Howe
376
 relies on the definition written in Hale’s pleas 
of the Crown,
377
 which holds that there has to be a ‘fear of death’ threatened by another 
individual compelling the accused to act. The case of Hudson
378
 holds that the question is 
really one of whether the will of the accused was ‘overborne’, which is an issue of proof to be 
decided by the jury.
379
  
 
The defence was raised again in the case of Lynch
380
 where it was held that it could be 
available to an individual aiding and abetting the commission of a murder, on the basis that 
‘a man who is attacked is allowed within reason to take necessary steps to defend himself. 
The law would be censorious and inhumane which did not recognise the appalling plight of a 
person who perhaps suddenly finds his life in jeopardy unless he submits and obeys.’381 The 
subsequent case of Abbott
382
 rejected outright the defence on the grounds that the accused 
had been a principal actor in the murder, in which it was argued that accepting the defence 
would have constituted creating a new defence to the crime of murder.
383
 
 
The notable case of Howe
384
 discussed extensively the idea of the defence of duress to a 
charge of murder for both the principal and any who had aided and abetted his or her 
action. Howe formally overturned the judgment in Lynch, removing the possibility that 
duress by threats could ever be used as a defence to murder. Lord Hailsham held: 
 
“In general, I must say that I do not at all accept in relation to the defence of murder it is 
either good morals, good policy or good law to suggest, as did the majority in Lynch and the 
minority in Abbott that the ordinary man of reasonable fortitude is not to be supposed to be 
capable of heroism if he is asked to take an innocent life rather than sacrifice his own. 
Doubtless in actual practice many will succumb to temptation, as they did in Dudley and 
Stephens. But many will not, and I do not believe that as a "concession to human frailty" the 
                                                          
376
 R v Howe [1987] A.C. 417, 453. 
377
 R v Howe [1987] A.C. 417, Opinion of Lord Hailshaw, 427. 
378
 [1971] 2 Q.B. 202. 
379
 [1971] 2 Q.B. 202, 206. 
380
 [1975] A.C. 653. 
381
 Ibid., Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest, 671. 
382
 [1977] A.C. 755. 
383
 R v Abbott [1977] A.C. 755, 767. 
384
 [1987] A.C. 417. 
91 
 
former should be exempt from liability to criminal sanctions if they do. I have known in my 
own lifetime of too many acts of heroism by ordinary human beings of no more than 
ordinary fortitude to regard a law as either "just or humane" which withdraws the protection 
of the criminal law from the innocent victim.”385 
 
Following these cases, the English Law commission published a study of select defences, 
including duress.
386
 This recommended that a statutory formulation of duress be passed and 
that it apply to murder as well as other offences.
387
 An attempt was made to formulate a 
definition, which was contained in a draft Bill to the report, as follows: 
‘A person shall be regarded for the purposes of this section as having taken any action under 
duress if he was induced to take it by any threat of harm to himself or another at the time 
when he took it he believed (whether or not on reasonable grounds) – 
(a) That the harm threatened was death or serious personal injury (physical or mental); 
(b) That the threat would be carried out immediately if he did not take the action in 
question or, if not immediately, before he could have any real opportunity of seeking 
official protection; and 
(c) That there was no other way of avoiding or preventing the harm threatened; 
Provided, however, that in all circumstances of the case (including what he believed with 
respect to the matters mentioned in paragraphs (a) to (c) above and any of his personal 
circumstances which are relevant) he could not reasonably have been expected to resist 
the threat.’ 388 
 
However as of 2014, there has been no attempt to define duress within a statute.
389
 
 
The definition created by the Law Commission report was considered and applied by later 
authority, although it was regarded as a narrow construction of the concept of duress.
390
 The 
authority in question, Howe
391
 ruled that the test for duress ought to be ‘objective in part and 
subjective in part,’392 reflecting part (c) of the definition above. The definition was generally 
met with approval by the bench in this case, but ultimately it was rejected where the 
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individual had taken part in the murder of an innocent to protect his own life. The lack of 
statutory force behind the definition meant that the recommendation that Parliament ought 
to take steps to codify the defence, which is further supported by the judgment of Lord 
Mackay, which held that the decision was bound to leave inconsistencies in the law.
393
  
 
This judgment creates further smoke around the concept by referring to another jurisdiction 
to determine the limits of the defence of duress to a charge of murder.
394
 The unusual factor 
here is that the jurisdiction in question, South Africa, has a very different conception of 
duress and necessity from that of England. The criminal law of South Africa formulates 
duress and necessity as compulsion, and makes no differentiation between compulsion 
emanating from threats from an individual or from certain circumstances. The application of 
such a concept to the areas of duress and necessity would amalgamate previously separate 
conceptions of the defence. Interestingly, this draws the idea of necessity full circle, to its 
original definition as elucidated by Stephen. 
 
5.2 United States 
 
The United States is the second common law jurisdiction to be examined by this study. The 
sources of law are found in similar places, through statute and case precedent. Ultimate legal 
power is vested in the Supreme Court by the Constitution.
395
 Federal law is therefore 
supreme over State law, but crimes are usually only prosecuted at the federal level where 
these have affected an interest which ought to be protected by the United States as a whole.
396
  
All fifty two States have their own criminal code, within which there can be a great deal of 
variation in approach to the same problems.
397
 However all States ought to give due 
recognition and respect to the laws and precedents set in other States when making 
decisions,
398
 despite the disparity between the codified laws of different States. Practice does 
not thus reflect this principle.  
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A study of each State’s approach to duress and necessity therefore would not necessarily 
yield the representative theoretical picture of the jurisdiction that this chapter has as its aim. 
Therefore the focus of the discussion here will be on the US Model Penal Code,
399
 analyses 
of legal theory provided by Anglo-American legal literature and cases which discuss duress 
and necessity at the Federal level. The Model Penal Code does not represent a statement of 
positive law, but marks an attempt by American legal scholars at understanding the bounds 
of the criminal law in the United States. It also prompted a certain volume of reform during 
the sixties and seventies of State criminal codes.
400
 It should be noted, however, that both are 
considered to be common law defences
401  and that a certain ‘legislative resistance’402  exists to 
codifying the conception of necessity in US law. The limitations of such an approach to 
studying these concepts are acknowledged, but the influence of the Code on academic 
literature is evident.
403
 The influence of other areas of criminal theory, such as the Anglo-
American theoretical division of defences into justifications and excuses, is visible in the 
practice of law in the United States,
404
 and so the influence of the Model Penal Code in 
academic literature may well have a greater relevance than such lawyers anticipate. 
 
As with English law, the United States as a jurisdiction appears to distinguish between duress 
and necessity. The applicability of the defence of necessity to serious crimes has been tested 
in the US v Holmes,
405
 which preceded the English Dudley case by four decades. This case 
centred on the prosecution of the sailor in charge of a sinking ship in which he threw 
passengers overboard at sea in a bid to lighten the load and save the rest. There followed an 
interesting discussion on the ‘law of necessity’406 and the difficulty of the situation was 
acknowledged as being rooted in its rarity, ‘for law is made to meet but the ordinary 
exigencies of life.’407 The concept of self-defence was also referenced408 as a defence which 
might justify the taking of life.
409
 Despite such deliberations, the court held ultimately that the 
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sailor was guilty and that there was no application of the law of necessity in such 
circumstances, as it is for such circumstances that a non-derogable prohibition on the taking 
of life exists. 
 
The post-war case of Flick et al.
410
 also raised the issue of the defence of necessity, specifically 
in relation to war crimes. Here the charges were of forced labour and slavery during the Nazi 
regime by companies, but the defence of necessity was held not to be precluded by the 
explicit rejection of a defence of superior orders within the Nuremberg statute.
411
 However 
the charges here are not argued to be tantamount to murder, but simply that the case 
demonstrates the perception, discussed further in chapter three, that the defence of necessity 
may be available in respect of charges of war crimes.
412
 It is of further value to note that 
duress was briefly mentioned, and the lack of further elaboration suggests support for a 
distinction between the concepts in the United States. 
 
The defence of duress is available at the federal level,
413
 and has not yet been ruled out as a 
defense to murder. There are two particular states which permit the use of duress as a 
defence to all charges of murder
414
 and it does exist as a defence without explicitly set limits 
as to its application to a murder charge in American criminal legal theory.
415
 It is 
characterised as an excuse in US law, in which the individual, if the criteria of the defence 
are satisfied, may be excused from criminal responsibility.
416
 Duress has a closer connection 
to necessity in US law as they appear to be two sides of the same coin: both involve pressure, 
and where one excuses the conduct, the other defence justifies it. The Flick case would tend 
to demonstrate that tendency, with an open discussion of duress being rather obviously 
avoided in favour of distinguishing necessity as separate from any form of superior orders. 
Instead, a defence of being compelled to act in American law then becomes a question of 
whether the individual’s actions were justified or excused. Thus the distinction is made 
between duress and necessity through the theoretical lens of justification and excuse. This 
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will be discussed in more detail following an analysis of the relevant provisions of the Model 
Penal Code. 
 
The inception of the Model Penal Code in 1962 appears to mark a scholarly embrace of the 
theoretical distinction between duress and necessity as being that of justification and excuse, 
rather than a formal separation. Duress is set apart within its own section of the Code,
417
 but 
necessity is not explicitly referred to within the Code. The concept of defending an otherwise 
unlawful act as necessary is encapsulated within the justification defence, phrased as the 
‘choice of evils’ defence.418 Duress is characterised as an ‘affirmative’419 defence in which the 
individual argues he acted because  
‘he was coerced to do so by the use of, or a threat to use, unlawful force against his person or 
the person of another, that a person of reasonable firmness would have been unable to 
resist.’ 420 
 
Here is it clear that the origin of the threat, emanating from the pressure of another 
individual rather than circumstance, identifies the defence as duress and not necessity. 
However this line of argument is confused when the choice of evils defence is examined. 
The defence is phrased thus: 
‘Conduct that the actor believes to be necessary to avoid a harm or evil to himself or to 
another is justifiable, provided that: 
(a) The harm or evil sought to be avoided by such conduct is greater than that sought to be 
prevented by the law defining the offense charged; and 
(b) Neither the Code nor other law defining the offense provides exceptions or defences 
dealing with the specific situation involved; and 
(c) A legislative purpose to exclude the justification claimed does not otherwise plainly 
appear.’421 
 
Both defences specify that situations which have been created by the individual pleading the 
defence are excluded from their mutual reach
 422
 and a closer look at each reveals further 
similarities.  Arguably the ‘conduct that the actor believes to be necessary’ could be such as a 
result of a threat stemming from another individual. The two defences are not mutually 
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exclusive but rather duress appears to be a specific case of necessity, which could simply be a 
development from English legal theory rather than a differentiation. There does appear to 
be a degree of overlap between to the two defences and, interestingly, both defences can be 
raised at once.
423
  
 
The distinction between the two remains that of one defence which functions as either a 
justification or an excuse, depending on the circumstances.  The theme of justifications and 
excuses is prominent in US academic literature,
424
 in which academic criminal law theorists 
have divided defences into justifications and excuses. Although there are many subtle 
variations within the academic arguments, justifications appear to link to relieving the act of 
criminality, whereas excuses absolve the individual of criminal responsibility in those specific 
circumstances. Milhizer characterises an excuse defence as ‘one which focuses on the actor 
and not the act. A defendant is excused when he is judged not blameworthy for his 
conduct’425  despite where the conduct in question is harmful to others. His definition of a 
justification is then the converse, in that the act is deemed to be appropriate in the 
circumstances and thereby not a criminal offence.
426
 This is further developed by Milhizer in 
identifying the otherwise criminal conduct in question as being good – ‘of benefit to 
society.’427 It is this aspect of providing a justification of necessity which is most concerning in 
the context of homicide, particularly where the Model Penal Code’s variant of necessity 
requires the legislature to specify that there ought to be no justification for homicide. The 
common law crime of murder has not yet been excluded from the application of a defence 
in this way. 
 
 In the context of duress and necessity, duress is an excuse which frees the actor of 
responsibility, whereas necessity is a justification. The latter applies to a moral choice made 
which was ‘infinitely the right thing to do,’428 and therefore is acceptable conduct in the 
circumstances.  The distinction is invariably rejected by ‘pragmatists’ within the field, who 
note that both ‘types’ of defence require an acquittal. However, the argument which 
concerns this thesis is the consequences of justifying or excusing a criminal act. This is 
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because although both defences may acquit the accused, the consequences for the 
criminality of the act are very different.  
 
5.3 France 
 
France is a civil law jurisdiction with a criminal code. The current version in force is the 
Criminal Code of 1994, but the French Parliament can make amendments as it sees fit, and 
periodically does so.
429
 This is the main source of criminal law, as decisions from French 
courts do not constitute a binding source of law, and therefore the focus of this part of the 
chapter will largely be on the Code. The legal theory underpinning French criminal law will 
also be of value when determining the application of these defences to serious crimes and 
the relevance of the Declaration of the Rights of Man
430
 will also be discussed as a restraint on 
the power of freeing individuals from criminal liability which may otherwise be imposed by 
provisions of the Code. The use of the Declaration as a source of constitutional principle 
through which the State’s power is limited is affirmed by the Constitution of the Fifth 
Republic.
431
  
 
The revised French criminal code has its own versions of duress and necessity, the former 
being termed ‘constraint.’432 As to the wording of the defence, the Code states: 
‘N'est pas pénalement responsable la personne qui a agi sous l'empire d'une force ou 
d'une contrainte à laquelle elle n'a pu résister.’433  
 
There is no further exclusion of circumstances in which this defence would not be permitted 
nor further elaboration as to what a constraint or force might amount. The generally 
understood principle is that the defence of constraint refers to a ‘psychological’ constraint, 
such as that which relates to threats made by another individual.
434
 The defence of necessity is 
then stated by the Code as follows: 
‘N'est pas pénalement responsable la personne qui, face à un danger actuel ou 
imminent qui menace elle-même, autrui ou un bien, accomplit un acte nécessaire à la 
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sauvegarde de la personne ou du bien, sauf s'il y a disproportion entre les moyens employés 
et la gravité de la menace.’435 
 
The only restraint here on the method employed is therefore the potential lack of 
proportionality between the threats suffered by the individual and the means he or she uses 
to avert it. In this context, the means used would be the intentional killing of an innocent 
individual, and from a cursory reading of the text, it is ambiguous as to whether either 
defence would be available to answer such a charge. However it should be noted that the 
Code has been amended in part by additions to the criminal procedure code and these state 
that the power is divulged to the juge d’instruction436 to determine the applicability of the 
defence in the particular circumstances of a case. This line of discourse is arguably self-
defeating, as the Code is the main source of law and, in the absence of any restraining 
principles contained therein, the defence would be applicable to all charges, regardless of the 
seriousness. 
 
A critical point to be made in relation to both defences is that the defence of necessity has 
never been admitted in respect of charge of serious crime against the person,
437
 despite there 
being no explicit constitutional principle which prevents a balancing exercise being made in 
respect of one person’s right to life against another. The French Constitution, and its 
corollary human rights principles, does not extend to such a prohibition. It is thus solely a 
principle of criminal law which prevents the application of such a defence to a serious crime 
against the person of an individual. 
 
The subtle differences between the defences can be seen, as the commentary in this area 
suggests,
438
 through the categorisation of such defences as ‘subjective’ and ‘objective.’ This 
distinction is, as with the Anglo-American distinction between justifications and excuses, a 
theoretical one as an admissible defence from either category would still exclude the 
imposition of criminal liability. Constraint would fall under the heading of a ‘subjective’ 
defence,
439
 as the test for determining whether an individual could rely on constraint would 
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have to be determined on an individual basis. Such defences reflect an inability on an 
individual basis to comply with the law, as a uniform conception of constraint, or what 
constitutes pressure, would be too difficult a standard to create in law. The wording of the 
provision reflects this, in that the pressure was something which ‘he or she could not 
withstand,’440 rather than an objective standard of what ought to be tolerable to individuals in 
general.  
 
Necessity, as codified in French law, breaks away at this point from duress and would 
thereby be categorised as an objective defence.
441
 This, again, relates to the way in which the 
defence is phrased within the Code. The defence of necessity relates more to a positive 
action which is consciously and deliberately committed in support of an aim which is 
considered to outweigh in importance the law which the individual violates. The objectivity 
of the standard is greater than that which would be applied in order to determine the 
availability of the defence of constraint as the concept of ‘an immediate or actual danger’442 is 
clearly not thought to have the same variance between individuals as what may constitute 
psychological pressure. Accordingly the defences are separated in terms of how they may be 
applied, rather than the Anglo-American distinction of their effect on criminality. However a 
closer examination of the way in which French crimes are formulated within the law leads to 
similar conclusions as the effect of defences which justify and those which excuse. 
 
In French law, the components of an offence are threefold, those being legal, moral and 
material.
443
 The legal part to the crime refers to the law which prohibits or restrains such 
conduct, preventing such acts from being legal. The moral aspect to the crime is the 
intention to commit the act, and the material aspect to the criminal act links the two, in that 
the individual who intended to commit the crime through his act must have caused the harm 
libelled as a result of his act. The first two parts to such a crime can be likened to actus reus 
and mens rea respectively in English and US law,
444
 with the last part broadly reflecting the 
concept of causation. Separating the act into two distinct parts in such a way allows defences 
to be applied in a different way than in the two previous jurisdictions discussed. Similarly to 
both, the Code reflects that the admission of a defence nullifies the existence of any 
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offence,
445
 but it is the position of the defence within the analysis of an offence which leads to 
different consequences for the criminality of an offence. It should be noted that the lack of 
mens rea for an offence in English / US law would constitute a defence in itself, whereas the 
admissibility of a defence would be argued on the grounds that there was an alternative 
explanation, or a further answer to a criminal charge. In French law, intention is always 
required for the commission of an offence.
446
 
 
This demonstrates in which criminality is affected by the positioning of defences. French 
criminal law would arguably apply an objective defence to ‘block’ or remove the material 
element of the crime, which would then decriminalise the act.
447
  This allows the defence to 
function as a justification and is claimed to be separate from a defence in this sense,
448
 as the 
act is fully decriminalised and therefore would not require any defence to be pled. It thereby 
follows from this that the act was correct and appropriate behaviour in the circumstances 
without having to argue or defend the conduct in question following this. The concept of a 
subjective defence, it is then argued, relates to the moral element of the offence.
449
 Subjective 
defences relate rather to removing the criminal liability from the individual
450
 and thereby 
make the act in question the right choice in the circumstances. The individual is then not 
criminally liable for the act libelled at that point in time.  
 
Although the net effect of subjective and objective defences is the same as justifications and 
excuses, there is a clearer indication, possibility as a result of the codified form of the French 
system, that the justified conduct is correct in the circumstances. This clarifies why the 
defence of necessity, functioning as a justification and removing the criminality of the act, has 
not been admitted as a defence for crimes against the person. Such clarity can assist when 
deciding as to how these defences ought to be applied and whether their application is 
appropriate for charges of serious crimes. In the case of France, it is clear that as a 
justification or excuse, and whether necessity or duress as such defences may be termed, are 
not acceptable grounds for denying the existence of the legal or moral elements of a crime. 
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5.4 Germany 
 
The German legal system is, similarly, a civil law system in which the German Criminal 
Code forms the basis of the criminal law. As with the US, Germany is a federal state but 
criminal law remains a federal issue and therefore the Criminal Code has binding force 
throughout the jurisdiction. The propellant for development in the criminal law within the 
German system is doctrine
451
 and the approach to defences in particularly demonstrates a 
degree of clarity which has been absent from the positive law within the jurisdictions 
heretofore examined. German law also must comply with constitutional principles, 
specifically those enumerated within the Basic Law.
452
 This Law sets out the Constitution of 
the German Federal Republic and places certain restraints on the legislative function of the 
Government, as well as limits on the interpretation of the law. The constitutional principle 
pertinent to this study is ultimately the inviolability of human dignity,
453
 which must be upheld 
by all State authorities. The corollary to this is that the State cannot legislate in a way which 
would impugn the dignity of the individual and State organs such as courts are prohibited 
from interpreting a law which would equally have such an effect. This restriction will be 
examined in the context of the codified defences of justified
454
 and excused necessity
455
 within 
German criminal law. Although precedent does not form a source of German law, cases can 
demonstrate the court’s approach to the interpretation of the Code, through the application 
of defences in relation to serious crimes against the person, specifically where the argued 
admissibility of the defences to such crimes
456
 conflicts with the rulings of the court. 
 
German law does not distinguish between duress and necessity per se, but rather has 
developed a fundamental theoretical distinction between two forms of necessity.
457
  The 
component parts of a German criminal offence allow for the accused to raise a justification 
before guilt is determined
458
 and so necessity is divided in two categories: justified and 
excused. The first form, justified necessity, is phrased thus: 
‘Wer in einer gegenwärtigen, nicht anders abwendbaren Gefahr für Leben, Leib, 
Freiheit, Ehre, Eigentum oder ein anderes Rechtsgut eine Tat begeht, um die Gefahr von 
sich oder einem anderen abzuwenden, handelt nicht rechtswidrig, wenn bei Abwägung der 
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widerstreitenden Interessen, namentlich der betroffenen Rechtsgüter und des Grades der 
ihnen drohenden Gefahren, das geschützte Interesse das beeinträchtigte wesentlich 
überwiegt. Dies gilt jedoch nur, soweit die Tat ein angemessenes Mittel ist, die Gefahr 
abzuwenden.’459 
 
The central part of this defence is that, first, the individual has to commit a positive act and 
second, the act is nominally unlawful. In the circumstances, however, the individual’s action 
is wholly appropriate provided it is proportionate to the harm avoided.  The analogy here 
between justification and excuse theory and this form of categorising the defences is evident, 
but the difference here is that this distinction is represented by positive law. Another unique 
feature of this form of the defence is that an exercise in balancing competing interests must 
be undertaken, in which the interest protected by the otherwise unlawful act must be prior in 
importance to the one affected by the act. This standard is slightly higher than the other 
incarnations of the defence, and is more difficult to accept theoretically when used to answer 
a charge of a crime against the person. 
 
The second form of necessity within the Code is that of excused necessity, which is worded 
as follows: 
‘Wer in einer gegenwärtigen, nicht anders abwendbaren Gefahr für Leben, Leib 
oder Freiheit eine rechtswidrige Tat begeht, um die Gefahr von sich, einem Angehörigen 
oder einer anderen ihm nahestehenden Person abzuwenden, handelt ohne Schuld. Dies gilt 
nicht, soweit dem Täter nach den Umständen, namentlich weil er die Gefahr selbst 
verursacht hat oder weil er in einem besonderen Rechtsverhältnis stand, zugemutet werden 
konnte, die Gefahr hinzunehmen; jedoch kann die Strafe nach § 49 Abs. 1 gemildert 
werden, wenn der Täter nicht mit Rücksicht auf ein besonderes Rechtsverhältnis die Gefahr 
hinzunehmen hatte.’460 
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Again the individual in question must commit a positive act, but this time the act remains 
unlawful and instead the person is not to be considered guilty. The difference here, 
therefore, is to distinguish between the lawfulness of the act and the guilt of the individual. In 
German law, it is held that the individual ought to suffer less of a punishment
461
 where he or 
she is less guilty, as the individual’s guilt ought to be the ‘basis for measuring his 
punishment.’ Therefore the distinction between justified and excused necessity centres on 
whether the law removes criminality from the act or from the actor. Removing criminality 
from a serious offence effectively permits its commission in certain circumstances, and the 
effect of this on serious crimes against the person is not to be underestimated, particularly 
where a balancing exercise of one person’s rights against another’s has to be undertaken. 
 
One fundamental tenet which may restrict the possible use of this balancing exercise is a 
principle contained within the German Basic Law. The Basic Law forms the foundation of 
German law and is especially relevant to criminal law as a restraint on the legislative power of 
the State. The article in question
462
 speaks in unqualified terms: ‘Human dignity shall be 
inviolable.’463 This inviolability cannot be restricted by any State provision, as the wording is 
absolute. Similarly to the French and American Constitutions, the Basic Law represents the 
source of power from which the law derives its authority. Therefore it is not possible for 
codified law to override this provision as there is no qualification or limitation which would 
permit the restriction of individual dignity. The silence of the Basic Law as to the kind of 
dignity referred implies that both physical and psychological integrity ought to be absolutely 
respected and consequently, the application of either version of the necessity defence in 
respect of crimes against the person is not possible. German law prevents one person’s 
physical or mental integrity being subjugated to the ends of necessity. It is also relevant to 
note that this line of argument, concerning the Basic Law, ought to apply to the duties of the 
State through its own agents and also its duties in protecting society as a whole. Therefore it 
is submitted that the State could neither act through its own agents whom may use the 
defence of necessity, nor permit the defence of necessity to be used in the criminal law by 
individuals accused of crimes against the person. 
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Here, it is also relevant to note the importance of the principle promulgated by Gustav 
Radbruch,
464
 which applies in circumstances where statutory law conflicts with the ends of 
justice. It holds that if the written law does not match the requirements of justice ‘to an 
intolerable degree’ then it ought to be disregarded.465 It is in cases of serious crimes against 
the person that it is arguable that this principle, espoused by subsequent decisions delivered 
by German courts, would equally require the court to disregard the applicability of either 
version of the necessity defence. 
 
A case which demonstrates the German courts reluctance, even in compelling circumstances, 
to allow the necessity defence to operate in respect of crimes against the person is that of 
Wolfgang Daschner.
466
 The Daschner case concerned a police chief who authorised the 
threat of torture to an individual under interrogation. The individual in question was 
suspected of abducting a child and the aim of the threat was to uncover the child’s 
whereabouts. Upon being threatened, he confessed to killing the child and disclosed the 
location of the body. The police chief was then charged and convicted of threatening to 
torture the individual and the judgment discussed at length the application of the defence of 
necessity, particular in the form of a justification.
467
 It was held by the court that there could 
be no justification of such a threat and particularly that the dignity of the individual could not 
be balanced against a protected interest as required by the defence of necessity, and also 
denied the application of the excused form of the necessity defence. This indicates that the 
application of the defences, theoretically available to charges of serious crimes against the 
person, is restricted where serious injury is likely to result, even if the likelihood of death is 
severely restricted by the presence of medical personnel. The legal foundation of the Basic 
Law is that which is considered to be prior to the interests and demands of the codified 
criminal law. 
 
Interestingly the Court favoured a ‘guilty, but not to be punished’468 verdict which 
incorporated the grounds for mitigation that the Court saw in Daschner’s actions. It is this 
aspect that is most intriguing about the German approach. The codified law reflects a 
progressive and straightforward view of the defences of excused and justified necessity, yet 
the application of the defences indicates a stronger inclination towards respecting the dignity 
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of the individual. The deep-rooted pragmatism of this approach is evident in the judgment 
delivered by this case. 
 
5.5 South Africa 
 
The South African system is a mixed legal system, with elements of other jurisdictions 
incorporated in a system with its own unique approaches in certain areas.
469
 A common law 
approach is favoured for the criminal law aspect to the system and civil law principles apply 
in most areas of private law.
470
 Case law is therefore an important source of law for the 
criminal law, all of which ought to be decided in compliance with the provisions of the Bill of 
Rights.
471
 The enduring influence of English law, particularly in the area of defences, is not to 
be underestimated,
472
 although the precedent on compulsion set by the South African courts 
has replaced English authority in this area.
473
 The legal theory of justifications and excuses, in 
terms of the categorising defences, is also evident even in early cases relating to the defence 
of necessity, characterised in South African law as compulsion.
474
   
 
The domestic criminal law in this jurisdiction is lead by the courts, which have recognised 
the existence of a defence of compulsion which covers both duress and necessity, with the 
theory applied in case law that the defence may be a justification or excuse depending on the 
circumstances in which it is raised.
475
 The argument presented by noted authors has been 
raised that there is much in common with German law in this area.
476
 Compulsion, rather 
than necessity, can emanate from both internal and external pressures and no legal 
distinction is made between the two.
477
 The definition of the defence of compulsion in South 
African criminal law is: 
‘the endangering of a legal interested of the accused by a threat which has already 
commenced or is imminent, which threat is not caused by the accused fault making it 
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necessary for the accused to avert the danger (using means which) are reasonable in the 
circumstances.’478 
 
It is clear, therefore, that the conception of a threat may relate to circumstances which 
threaten or to an individual who applies psychological pressure to another, with the only two 
caveats being that the individual cannot rely on the defence if he or she has placed him or 
herself in the threatened position and that the means used must be reasonable in the 
circumstances. The threat, however, must be of a physical nature and the threat of losing 
money is held to be insufficient to allow for the defence to be admitted.
479
 Similarly to 
German Law, the required promotion of the values of the Constitution
480
 would create a 
prohibition on balancing one innocent life against another. However the wording of the 
South African Constitution is not as strong as the German Basic Law, as it simply states that 
the individual has the right to respect for their dignity.
481
 The more flexible conception of 
‘respect for’ rather than ‘inviolability of’ human dignity makes for a difference in the 
application of the defence within the case law. South Africa’s approach, particularly where 
the charge is that of a serious crime against the person, is the most distinct, and extensive, of 
all the legal systems examined thus far.  
 
One of the first cases which discussed the idea of compulsion in South African law 
concerned German soldiers who were held in a prisoner-of-war camp in South Africa.
482
 The 
case did not discuss any specific formulation of the concept of compulsion and instead 
referred broadly to the idea of necessity under English law. Compulsion was raised as a 
defence to a charge of murder, of which a German soldier had been accused following the 
‘execution’ of another prisoner who was deemed to be an informer to the camp authorities. 
Using the English concept of necessity as the basis of the South African idea of compulsion, 
the court held that the accused was attempting to stretch the limits of the defence of necessity 
in this case to cover the crime of murder, and additionally that there was limited evidence of 
any compulsion under which the accused might have acted. The Court held that ‘the killing 
of an innocent person is never legally justifiable by compulsion or necessity’483and would not 
be drawn on the extent to which such a defence might excuse the accused.
484
 The case also 
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referred to earlier authorities
485
 which concurred with the perspective that South African law 
did not accept that compulsion could justify the commission of a murder. 
 
The law was further developed in this area to reject the defence of compulsion where the 
individual had placed themselves in danger,
486
 the case in question concerning a gang 
member who was compelled to kill. The aim of the defence in this case, however, was not to 
justify the act but rather to escape the death penalty, which was mandatory at that time for 
murder. As an extenuating circumstance, rather than a defence, compulsion was accepted 
and the sentence commuted.  
 
The real change to South African criminal law, which distinguishes it from all other legal 
systems discussed in this study, emanates from the Goliath
487
 judgment which was handed 
down in 1972. In this case, the court held that compulsion was acceptable grounds on which 
to defend a charge of murder, when the individual in question had assisted the principal in 
his commission of the crime. The court held that the previous rejection of the defence was 
based on ‘emotive rather than legal grounds’ and this approach ought to be replaced by a 
more pragmatic acceptance that individuals can be justified in committing murder in certain 
circumstances as a result of the pressures that they may face. The main reason given for the 
court’s decision was that the law as it stood set an unreasonable standard of conduct in which 
individuals were expected to sacrifice their most dearly-held interest, that of their own life, 
for the life of another individual. The court considered it unacceptable to set such a standard 
as a principle of criminal law, as it claimed that the ordinary man would be required, in 
order to comply with the law, to become a hero and conduct which did not amount to this 
standard would be rendered criminal activity. 
 
Indeed this was welcomed as rejecting the English-derived ‘blueprint for saintliness’488 and 
embraced as approaching the issue of compulsion in a more reasonable fashion. In 
particular, the decision in the English case of Dudley was held to have been made on such 
emotional grounds and, from this perspective, on a flawed basis. The potential of the 
criminal law to send out ‘clear moral messages’ has been recognised by the literature489 which 
makes the justification for killing as held within the domestic law of this jurisdiction difficult 
to reconcile with the concept of murder as a very serious breach of the criminal law, and 
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particularly as the most serious assault possible on the dignity of the individual. One voice 
within the literature argues that the idea of punishment may be the answer to such an 
incongruity,
490
 whereby sentencing may be diminished on account of the lack of guilt of the 
individual who acts under duress. However the law as determined by South African judicial 
precedent at present demonstrates that the importance of a reasonable standard, to which 
individuals can be held in difficult circumstances, is more critical than a rigid adherence to 
the concept of the dignity of the individual. 
 
Despite the settled authority, an examination of some of the literature in this area 
demonstrates an understanding of the conflict between setting reasonable standards against 
the contention that an innocent life ought to be balanced against another in certain 
circumstances. Particularly difficult is the assertion that, effectively, that killing can be 
justified in the context of an innocent life, as opposed to an aggressor. One author writes: 
‘It is not morally, or legally, defensible (or possible) to weight human lives in the balance and 
conclude that one life is more important than another. All lives are equal in the eyes of God 
and should also be equal under the law.’491 
 
Despite this strongly-worded rejection of the priority of any one innocent life over another, 
he continues to state that if the compulsion is ‘of a sufficient degree’492 then the individual’s 
act ought to be justified. This indicates the judicial applicability, but philosophical 
incongruity, in deciding whether to prioritise dignity or an act deemed to be that which a 
reasonable individual would commit under extreme circumstances, even when the law in the 
area of necessity, duress or compulsion, however termed, appears to be settled within the 
jurisdiction. The priority of international obligations, as contained within the Constitution,
493
 
only serves to further complicate this area, and an investigation of international standards, 
which prioritise the application of international human rights law, leads to the conclusion 
that the standards espoused by the South African jurisdiction may not be as robust 
internationally as they are binding domestically. 
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5.6 Common threads between the jurisdictions 
 
The jurisdictions outlined above may appear to take disparate approaches to the notions of 
duress and necessity, and it could be surmised that there is indeed no customary rule on the 
concepts of duress and necessity, as discussed in chapters three and five. However, some 
common or general principles may be deduced. One is that the defence unquestionably 
exists in customary international law: all of the jurisdictions outlined above contained some 
form of the defence and note that unreasonable demands should not be made of individuals 
where they are compelled to act. Some systems may make reference to duress as a separate 
defence and there appears to be a lack of consistency in respect of this. The Rome Statute’s 
approach of unifying the defences of duress and necessity appears more logical in this light. 
 
Resistance to the defence is evident, however, where the action is that of depriving an 
individual of their life: the English and American systems reject outright the availability of the 
defence even where the accused was not the principal actor in the case. The German system 
appears to have a very clear view on the availability of the defence, unlike the French system 
which is more nebulous in its approach to the concepts. However both systems discreetly 
reject the availability of the defence where the charge involves murder: French law by non-
application and German law through recourse to constitutional principles. In a manner 
similar to the Rome Statute, the legal provisions do not appear to be used much in practice. 
The South African jurisdiction remains the only one analysed above which allows for 
compulsion to be raised as a justification for acting where the act involved committing 
murder. However, the case precedent here appears to chime discordantly with the principles 
of the South African Constitution and the consistency of the law with its own domestic 
principles is at issue. 
 
The difficulty with the defence effectively appears to be sanctioning murder of an innocent 
individual in order to preserve the compelled person’s life. There appears to be 
considerable tension between the defence of duress and the State’s responsibility to protect 
human dignity. It is perhaps for this reason that the concept of necessity is more commonly 
seen in the jurisdictions above than duress, where circumstances outwith an individual’s 
control are more easily reconcilable with the concept of dignity than the idea than an 
individual chose to act in order to protect themselves. 
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The study above demonstrates the problematic nature of the defence of duress and the 
related concept of necessity, and that the failure to create nuances in the defence can lead to 
further problems. The issues highlighted by South Africa’s approach foretell the problems 
which may have been created for the Rome Statute through drafting the defence of defence 
as such. The above comparative work indicates that there are customary provisions 
determining the availability of the defence in international law, and this is further supported 
by the work conducted in chapters three and five. However, the applicability of such a 
defence to war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide is questionable. The reluctance 
to apply the defence at the national level to a charge of murder demonstrates a general 
uneasiness with its use in respect of serious crimes against the person, particularly when 
viewed as something which may undermine the dignity of the individual. The Rome Statute’s 
recognition of victim the defence all the more inconceivable when viewed in this light. 
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6. Framing duress in the Rome Statute 
6.1 Duress in the Rome Statute 
6.2 The purpose of its inclusion: Erdemovic at the ICTY 
6.3 The application of duress to charges of serious crimes against the person 
6.4 Complete exoneration on the basis of duress for serious crimes against the 
person 
 
As demonstrated in the immediately preceding chapter, it is clear that there are greater issues 
with some defences in the Rome Statute than others. In particular, the defences of duress 
and necessity appear to have been melded together; a development which does not ring true 
with the ideas found in customary international law and the general principles of law. In 
chapter five, a comparative analysis of the defences of duress and necessity at the national 
level was undertaken to evidence this. Following this, the problem of duress in the Rome 
Statute shall be examined in more detail. 
 
Duress is the most contentious of the grounds excluding criminal responsibility in the Rome 
Statute primarily because of the lack of agreement on how these ought to be applied in 
national law. These defences are not even available in a uniform fashion to the most serious 
crime against the person at the domestic level, murder, and yet the decision has been taken 
to include these in a Statute which regulates the prosecution of ‘the most serious crimes of 
concern to humanity as a whole.’494 In order to illustrate best the haphazard fashion in which 
defences have been placed in the Statute, the problem of duress will be examined in this 
chapter. The problem, as framed, is that the situations of duress tend to be good examples 
of circumstances in which the availability of defences should be questioned for serious 
crimes committed against the person. The feature common to both duress and necessity is 
that of pressure, where an individual was compelled to act. It is that compulsion which 
cannot, in general, be subjected to external scrutiny. Even in situations of natural disaster, the 
compulsion to act is not uniform and represents an individualised response. As such, both 
defences represent a highly subjective view of the circumstances, which may sanction 
criminal acts and the underpinning reasoning for their inclusion or even their application is 
not clear. In this way, the grounds excluding criminal responsibility effectively permit the 
commission of a criminal act under certain circumstances.  
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In this chapter and throughout the thesis, the focus of duress is as a defence to serious 
crimes against the person. The principle of duress is thus examined in its availability for 
serious crimes against the person and, in the domestic context, murder, to examine the 
reasoning for making the defence available for defendants before the International Criminal 
Court. It is recognised that not all crimes within the scope of the ICC are crimes against the 
person, but the focus is on the availability of duress for such crimes, as the availability of 
duress for a property crime is not at issue in this work. The restriction of the defence of 
duress to property crimes is something which is discussed in chapter 7, as part of a wider 
discussion on the judicial interpretation of the treaty provisions. 
 
Following this, it is not contested that a system of international criminal justice ought to make 
provision for grounds upon which an individual may be relieved of criminal responsibility 
otherwise imposed for the same acts committed in different circumstances or in a different 
state of mind. However, the defences within the Rome Statute are problematic because of 
the way in which they have been drafted, particularly as there is no restriction on how these 
are to be applied or used. The defences and the wording thereof allows duress in particular 
to have a wider application than perhaps they would have in other jurisdictions, with no 
caveats placed on their application for even the crime of genocide. The only restriction is the 
Court’s ability to determine the admissibility of a defence before it.495 At the heart of the issue 
is the idea that the making of a difficult decision can result in the removal of criminal 
responsibility, despite the Rome Statute targeting those who are likely to be leading the 
operations rather than foot soldiers. As such, it appears that the inclusion of duress in the 
Rome Statute has an undermining effect on the purpose of the Court. 
  
This chapter will focus on the way in which the defence of duress has been framed in the 
Rome Statute, with a particular examination of the wording which has been used and the 
effect that this will have on the availability of such a defence, as well as the work conducted 
by the Preparatory Committee to draft the Statute. The reasons for including duress will also 
be examined, including an analysis of the work of noted jurists in this area and jurisprudence 
from previous international criminal tribunals. Turning to the application and operation of 
the defence, a look at the limits which may be placed on its application by the Statute itself 
and by customary international law is of interest, particularly where the use of defences is 
barred in respect of certain crimes. There is potential for customary international law to be 
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preferred over treaty law in this area, as put forward by Akande,
496
 and this idea will be given 
further treatment. The consequences of complete exoneration on the grounds of duress for 
serious crimes against the person in international law also form part of the discussion, as it is 
not clear that the drafters of the Rome Statute have given this due consideration. The 
reasoning for such exoneration and an analysis the impact of it on the purported aim of the 
International Criminal Court, the defeat of impunity, will also be discussed. 
 
6.1 The defence of duress in the Rome Statute 
 
The Rome Statute’s drafting of the defence of duress does not reflect the customary position 
or the general principles of law, primarily because of the way in which the Statute unifies two 
defences. Duress and necessity are typically separate defences in domestic jurisdictions
497
 and 
some jurisdictions permit one defence but not the other.
498
 The conceptual distinction 
between the two is generally the source of the threat: duress is pressure applied by the threat 
made by another individual to cause serious harm to the person suffering it, whereas 
necessity is an act borne out of circumstances which compel the individual to act, such as a 
natural disaster. The decision by the Rome Statute to make both available and to unify them 
in this manner is curious. To explore this further, the wording of the defence of duress shall 
be examined. This will be supplemented by an analysis of the work of the Preparatory 
Committee for the Rome Statute in relation to the drafting of the grounds within the Statute. 
 
Under article 31(1)(d), duress will constitute grounds on which criminal responsibility can be 
excluded where: 
“The conduct which is alleged to constitute a crime within the jurisdiction of the 
Court has been caused by duress resulting from a threat of imminent death or of continuing 
or imminent serious bodily harm against that person or another person, and the person acts 
necessarily and reasonably to avoid this threat, provided that the person does not intend to 
cause a greater harm than the one sought to be avoided. Such a threat may either be: (i) 
Made by other persons; or (ii) Constituted by circumstances beyond that person’s control.” 
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The framing of the defence in this way, with the two specific ‘types’ of duress at the end 
indicates a ‘conflation’499, according to Taulbee and evident following a brief analysis, of two 
separate defences: duress and necessity. It rejects the supposition that the defences are 
separate in character or application and that they are simply two different expressions of the 
same basic reasoning: those who are compelled to act, for whatever reason, ought to have a 
full defence. Colvin rejects the conflation of any type of defence, noting the importance of 
separating such defences which relate to ‘contextual permission and defences of 
impairment.’500 He further discusses the difficulties inherent in the application of duress and 
necessity, noting the more consistent application of the principles underlying self-defence
501
 
and the general failure to clearly identify duress and necessity as justifications, excuses or 
respectively as an excuse or a justification. Colvin’s conception would be to identify both as 
defences of contextual permission and then to develop a framework of principles around 
this notion. This would appear to tie in with the model favoured by the Rome Statute. 
  
Bassiouni uses the American Model Penal Code
502
 in his draft international criminal code 
and draft Statute for an international criminal tribunal
503
 as the basis for his proposed 
inclusion of duress and necessity, despite the fact that the Model Penal Code recognises a 
rather confused version of duress and restricts its application, in that it should only be 
admissible for harm which was unlikely to result in death.
504
 The Rome Statute goes directly 
against the theoretical points made by both Colvin and Bassiouni, without much explanation 
for such in the works of the Preparatory Committee.
505
 
 
The wording is however similar to both duress and necessity in that there is, in general, 
reference made to a reasonable response in respect of an imminent danger which follows a 
proportionate logic.
506
 This wording represents a blend of the features of duress and necessity 
in that there is only a latent reference to the source of the threat being from pressure applied 
by an individual or pressure arising from circumstances. It is in this respect that the 
distinction between duress and necessity truly comes to light: duress as a result of 
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circumstances can be scrutinised more than duress arising from a threat made by an 
individual. The ‘reasonable firmness’ test in such cases may fall down where there is no 
general standard or degree of reasonableness in terms of human bravery when faced with 
threatening behaviour, and represents something of an unnecessary hurdle where the threat 
is generated by external circumstances, such as a natural disaster. 
 
Further to this, it is difficult to understand the kind of war crime or crime against humanity 
which may constitute the sort of behaviour described by the defence. It refers to an 
individual who ‘acts necessarily and reasonably to avoid th(e) threat’ which has been made or 
arises and would respond by committing an act tantamount to a war crime or a crime against 
humanity. Even when considering the situations which arose in the former Yugoslavia, one 
of the worst examples of creative barbarity in recent history, and noting Cassese’s caution 
that no situation in the context of potential atrocities should be rejected as ‘fanciful or far-
fetched’507 it is difficult to see how an individual would have a justification in this manner for 
committing torture, genocide, slavery or similar crimes. The context of the crimes indicate a 
position of power: duress indicates precisely the opposite position. It is for this reason, rather 
than the idea that the use of a defence for any of the crimes under the Rome Statute may be 
distasteful or a dishonour to those who have suffered, that the defence as worded remains 
problematic. 
 
There is a further restriction placed on the use of the defence in that the Court may decide 
whether any of the defences may be admissible for the crime in question.
508
 This provision 
effectively allows the Court to disregard any of the defences put forward, presumably where 
the conduct is considered too grave for a defence to be admitted. This is, however, 
undermined by the preceding paragraph which notes that other defences, not listed within 
the Statute but which emanate from other sources of applicable law
509
 may be used by an 
accused before the Court.
510
 The drafting of this part of the Statute, as Scaliotti
511
 agreed with 
Triffterer,
512
 was not completed particularly well and the inconsistencies such as these point 
to a general misunderstanding about the concept of defences and how these might be used. 
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Drawing on other sources of law in such a contentious area is not necessarily something 
which ought to form part of the Statute, given the lack of domestic consensus on the issue of 
defences for serious crimes. In a way most contrary, it appears that the Court would be free 
to draw in other defences as it sees fit, disregard any defences under the Statute and yet still 
be bound to apply the law under the Statute first and foremost as a source of international 
criminal law.
513
 
 
The work of the Preparatory Committee for the Rome Statute and the discussions had by 
the members of the group ought to shed some light on why such contradictory provisions 
were included in the Statute. However, its work in relation to grounds excluding criminal 
responsibility has not been discussed extensively,
514
 reflecting the lack of focus on defences by 
the Committee. Saland’s chapter indicates that the work was the most contentious of all 
discussions on the general principles of law, given the distinctions between the domestic legal 
systems on the topic of defences
515
 and that the Canadian delegation initially proposed the 
defences as being part of the general principles of public international law. It is noted by 
Saland that a proposal put forward by the Argentinian delegation and ten other legal systems 
represents the current formulation in the Rome Statute.
516
 Indeed, the report on the work of 
the Preparatory Committee
517
 appears to adopt the articles wholesale and there is no 
substantive discussion on why these defences have been selected, or why defences ought to 
be included in the first instance. Rather, the debate focuses on how the defences ought to be 
framed, and does refer to duress as being limited to situations where the death of an 
individual was not likely, as desired by Bassiouni. However this proposal was not accepted 
and did not appear in the final draft. As noted by Saland, it was desirable to have a 
proportionality test,
518
 but the extent to which this has been included in the final treaty is 
limited. In this way, it is clear that there was no extensive discussion of the reasoning for the 
defence or the applicability of duress to situations which involve the most serious kind of 
harm possible to an individual which would be, in the case of crimes against humanity, on a 
large scale.  
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The limited discussions on the inclusion of duress in the Statute and defences more broadly 
indicate that the noting of defences in the Rome Statute was perceived by those participating 
in the Conference and the work of the Preparatory Committee to be a natural development, 
despite there being no such inclusion in previous statutes or treaties, nor in the draft Statute 
put forward by the International Law Commission. Indeed, there are a number of jurists 
who identify that the defence of duress ought to be recognised, particularly following Judge 
Cassese’s dissent in Erdemovic.519 As such, it would be useful to examine the perceived 
purpose of including such a defence in the Rome Statute by those drafting and those who 
comment on the law, including the underlying reasoning and justification for its or their 
inclusion.  
 
6.2 The purpose of its inclusion: Erdemovic at the ICTY 
 
The Amnesty International report
520
 on principles of international criminal law which was 
submitted to the Preparatory Committee during the Rome Statute negotiations quoted 
Morris and Scharf’s521 work regarding the International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, 
where they noted that care ought to be taken when establishing defences for those accused of 
such serious crimes. Indeed, ‘it is one thing to reduce the sentence to be imposed; it is quite 
another to negate the existence of any crime.’522 The defence of duress represents well the 
contentious nature of the inclusion of defences and reflects well the misinterpretation of 
national law in formulating the defences, given the dissent on the concept of duress in 
domestic legal systems. Indeed, as shown above and in chapter six, it is clear there is a strong 
degree of variation in terms of how duress is recognised across a number of jurisdictions. Its 
inclusion must serve a purpose and this part of the work will seek to identify and analyse the 
purpose of including duress in the Rome Statute. This part to the work will look at the way 
in which duress has been perceived by jurists as a defence to serious crimes, including the 
discussion on the defence which was brought about by the Erdemovic
523
 case and the way in 
which this case has failed to clarify the customary position on the defence of duress. 
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The case of Drazen Erdemovic
524
 was particularly important for the ICTY because, firstly, he 
was the first individual to be sentenced by the tribunal
525
 and secondly, because of the way in 
which it offered to shed light on the complex issue of defences for the Tribunal. It was also 
important for international criminal law more broadly because of the way in which 
Erdemovic dealt with his guilty plea and the discussion which took place thereafter. The case 
is often thought of as representing the first foray by an accused into the area of defences, but 
Erdemovic did not lodge a defence with the Tribunal. Rather, he made a statement with his 
guilty plea which amounted to a plea in mitigation, of which the court discussed the potential 
to become a full defence. Erdemovic was an ordinary soldier, rather than an individual in 
any position of command responsibility, who had acted under orders and contributed to the 
Srebrenica massacre by the Bosnian Serb Army. Erdemovic was initially charged with 
murder as a crime against humanity
526
 and, in the alternative, violations of the laws and 
customs of war.
527
 He pleaded guilty to the first charge, which was accepted, but was held not 
to have understood what this meant and the nature of his guilty plea,
528
 with the caveat that he 
had no choice but to take part in the massacre, was the subject of much discussion. Before 
remitting the case to a new trial chamber following this confusion, the appeals chamber 
discussed the defence of duress for war crimes and crimes against humanity extensively, 
despite neither Erdemovic nor his defence counsel having requested that a defence be 
submitted. 
 
The rights of the defence before the court of the International Military Tribunal at 
Nuremberg included a right to explain one’s actions529 as libelled by the Court, this being the 
only reference made to any form of defence made by the accused during the proceedings, 
possibly to supplement any plea in mitigation that may be put forward. Although the Statute 
of the ICTY included no such provision, focusing more on ‘fair trial’ rights similar to those 
under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
530
 there is reference elsewhere 
to the notion of defences. It can be found in the rules of procedure and evidence for the 
Tribunal
531
 in relation to disclosure by the defence, noting that the Prosecutor must be 
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informed if the accused intends to submit a defence of alibi
532
 or ‘any special defence’533 with 
the examples of diminished or lack of mental responsibility offered. No mention of any 
other defences is made, although the list is not exhaustive by virtue of the way in which it has 
been drafted. There is no direct mention of duress, although the position at that time was 
greatly informed by the previous international criminal tribunals, wherein the defence of 
superior orders was limited to a plea in mitigation. 
 
The case of Erdemovic was both complex and unusual: Erdemovic submitted to the 
Tribunal’s authority and co-operated, even going so far as to submit a guilty plea. He stated 
along with his guilty plea that his circumstance were such that there was no choice for him 
other than to follow orders and, had he not follow instructions at Srebenica, he would have 
been killed. Thus he argued that he had acted under duress.
534
 The first Trial Chamber 
noted that in cases in the previous international criminal tribunals had taken the concept of 
duress on a ‘case-by-case basis’535 and that the idea of duress, ‘depending on the probative 
value and force’ which may be attributed to the circumstances, could be considered a plea in 
mitigation or a defence.
536
 Interestingly, the defence was not rejected on conceptual grounds, 
but rather on the basis of a lack of evidence.
537
 This demonstrates a common problem with 
defences at the international level and demonstrates cogently the need for clarity in the area 
of defences. This was overturned by the Appeals Chamber,
538
 the judgment of which noted 
that the Trial Chamber had ‘occasioned a miscarriage of justice’539 by accepting his 
participation but not the fact that he had done so on the basis of superior orders. 
 
 
However, it rejected the idea that duress could ever be a complete defence to a crime against 
humanity or a war crime where innocent lives were lost.
540
 The reasons for this were set out 
in the Joint Opinion of Judges Vorah and McDonald, from which Judges Cassese and 
Stephen dissented. The Joint Opinion held that Erdemovic did not understand what was 
meant by his guilty plea, because of the caveat that he acted under duress to which it was 
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attached, and that such a plea should usually be unequivocal.
541
 As such, his statement was 
taken as an intention to plead duress as a defence and the Chamber explored whether duress 
may constitute a full defence to a charge of crimes against humanity.
542
 The Trial Chamber 
directed that Erdemovic should be allowed to plead again in full knowledge of the 
consequences of his plea and he plead guilty to a charge of violating the laws and customs of 
war before a new trial chamber, which was accepted by the Prosecutor.
543
 
 
The Joint Opinion undertook a survey of a number of legal jurisdictions and concluded that 
there was no single rule reflecting customary international law on the subject of duress.
544
 
This reflects well the contentious nature of duress and the extensive survey of jurisdictions 
and international criminal tribunals
545
 indicates that it is not possible to formulate a rule from 
such a disparate set of principles. The point is put well by van Sliedregt, who noted that the 
context of war crimes and crimes against humanity does not affect the idea of duress and that 
the issue hinges on the same problem which exists at the national level: ‘the concept of 
proportionality…(and) the weighing of human lives’546 which van Sliedregt holds to be 
incompatible. 
 
Judge Li disagreed the idea that duress was to be put forward as a defence and noted that the 
consistent repetition of the appellant’s circumstances was more akin to a plea in mitigation, 
stating that the guilty plea was thus unequivocal.
547
 This approach resonates more with the 
way in which the defendant conducted himself and put forward his circumstances, and also is 
more consonant with the approach in international criminal law in general. It is sought to 
demonstrate that this was a missed opportunity to draw in the idea of pleas in mitigation 
more formally, through the jurisprudence of the ICTY, into international criminal law. This 
is further supported by Cryer et al., who wonder why the defences in the Rome Statute have 
been codified if the defence in Erdemovic could never be admitted in relation to the ‘killing 
of innocents.’548 
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The dissenting opinion of Antonio Cassese is the most notable aspect of the whole case, as 
Cassese disagreed fundamentally with the idea that an individual should be deprived of the 
defence of duress, even where crimes against humanity and war crimes were concerned. His 
position focused on that of the accused in the first instance, and can be summarised with 
reference to the oft-cited quote that the law ‘should not set intractable standards of behaviour 
which require mankind to perform acts of martyrdom.’549 He rejected the idea that duress 
would never be available to such a charge, but rather that its application should be ‘realistic 
and flexible’550 accepting that duress may be available ‘when the killing would be in any case 
perpetrated by persons other than the one acting under duress (since then it is not a question 
of saving your own life by killing another person, but of simply saving your own life when the 
other person will inevitably die, which may not be ‘disproportionate’ as a remedy)’.551 The 
foregoing, however, does not address the idea of balancing one life against another, which 
this invariably does. International criminal law rests on the concept of individual criminal 
responsibility, in that the State machine cannot operate if its wheels and cogs do not turn. 
Ascribing the responsibility to the individuals who operate as the ‘wheels and cogs’ of the 
State machine means that it is in precisely this kind of situation that defences ought to be 
unavailable. This is further reflected in the most unusual of sources: the statements of 
Erdemovic himself. He did not seek to defend his actions; rather he sought to explain them 
as an individual. In the foregoing, it was only Judge Li who noted this. The purpose of the 
defence as a means of removing guilt from the individual is not an acceptable stretch of 
international criminal law; the discussion above demonstrates the importance of permitting 
pleas in mitigation, but not the decriminalisation of conduct committed under duress where 
the conduct involves participation in a massacre. 
 
 
 
6.3 The application of duress 
 
The preceding discussion on the Erdemovic case demonstrates the difficulty of defences at 
the international level and the intractable nature of the defence of duress in particular. The 
application of duress in respect of crimes against humanity was rejected in the case of 
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Erdemovic but, less than a decade later, was made available for future defendants before the 
International Criminal Court by the Rome Statute. Cassese’s caveat,552 that the applicability of 
the defence be determined by the Court, has been incorporated.
553
 The aim herein is to 
examine the application of the defence, exploring Cassese’s formulation of duress, and the 
way in which customary and treaty law may operate in this area. Akande’s contention that 
customary law may supersede treaty law in this area will be explored and the possibility of a 
different outcome of the Erdemovic case, had it been heard before the International 
Criminal Court today, will also be discussed. 
 
In his dissenting opinion for Erdemovic, Antonio Cassese provided a formulation of duress 
which he noted was unanimously supported by the case law from international criminal 
tribunals where discussed.
554
 He noted that there were four main criteria for the defence to 
apply: 
“(i) the act charged was done under an immediate threat of severe and irreparable 
harm to life or limb;  
(ii) there was no adequate means of averting such evil;  
(iii) the crime committed was not disproportionate to the evil threatened (this would, for 
example, occur in case of killing in order to avert an assault). In other words, in order not to 
be disproportionate, the crime committed under duress must be, on balance, the lesser of 
two evils;  
(iv) the situation leading to duress must not have been voluntarily brought about by the 
person coerced.”555 
 
The threat of death where the threatening individual was able to carry out his violent 
promise immediately, evidenced by bearing arms or similar, would satisfy the first criterion. 
The second simply underlines the first, in identifying the situation as coercive and not one in 
which the individual pleading the defence consents to be. The fourth requirement is again 
one which would deny the defence to those who are in support of the aims of the group. In 
other words, it rejects the availability of the defence for those who display an element of 
agency in respect of their current predicament. The third criterion is the most difficult to 
square with the idea of killing innocent individuals: when is the killing of another to be 
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deemed a proportionate response? Drawing on German
556
 and Israeli constitutional law,
557
 as 
well as the common law approach to duress,
558
 it is clear that one life cannot be balanced 
against another. To be clear, the argument put forward by Cassese is to remove the 
criminality of these acts in circumstances which meet these four criteria. It is difficult to argue 
this position, much more so than the idea that those who act under duress and select their 
own life over the life of another should not be punished as harshly. To say that an individual 
in such circumstances did not act criminally, be their actions justified or excused, appears a 
step too far where the ‘most serious crimes of international concern’559 are at issue. It should 
also be noted that the above formulation does not create any real separation between duress 
and necessity, unless the reference to ‘evil’ were construed to mean a man-made threat (a 
construction for which there is little evidence to support) thus conflating the defences at an 
earlier stage than the Rome Statute and rendering any discussion of justifications and excuses 
void. 
 
Be that as it may, the decision taken by the drafters of the Rome Statute was to include a 
defence similar to Cassese’s in the final version of the treaty. The version in article 31(1)(d) 
retains the features of a threat and a proportional response, augmenting the former to that 
which is ‘resulting from a threat of imminent death or of continuing of imminent serious 
bodily harm’. The harm may be directed at the actor or someone whom she is seeking to 
protect. The proportional response requirement is revised to remove the reference to 
‘choice of evils’ situations and replaces this with a situation where an individual acts 
‘necessarily and reasonably’ to avoid the threat in question. It goes on to specify that the 
threat may be made by ‘other persons’560 or created by ‘circumstances beyond that person’s 
control.’561 The other features of Cassese’s formulation are removed. The current form of the 
defence in the Rome Statute is arguably broader than Cassese’s, applying to both natural 
disasters and threats made by other individuals.  
 
It is conceptually tortured, seeking to apply to only the most difficult of circumstances and at 
the same time, to represent a measured response to an impossible situation. The difficulty of 
reaching the thresholds and arguing that any crime within the Rome Statute constituted a 
‘reasonabl(e) and necessar(y) response is not something which appears to have been 
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properly considered. It is in such circumstances that it may be beneficial to look to custom 
when interpreting the defences and where the use and value of customary international law 
may be particularly apparent. This is an unusual situation, in which a treaty does not 
represent the positive rule but may be overtaken by existing law, not least of all because the 
section permits the Court to look around and outwith the Statute to supplement the rule 
propounded by its reasoning.
562
 
 
Akande, in writing about the sources of international criminal law,
563
 proposed that it was 
common for previous war crimes tribunals to ‘incorporate by reference’564 customary 
international law into the their founding treaties, permitting the judges presiding over them to 
apply customary international law in relation to the jurisdiction of their tribunal. In this way, 
he argues that customary international law could ‘overtake’ treaty law,565 particularly in the 
area of the definition of crimes and in relation to what may constitute a war crime or a crime 
against humanity. The tension in this area, between the customary position, the law of the 
ICTY and the Rome Statute, demonstrates the retrograde step made by the Rome Statute. If 
the impact on individual criminal responsibility could be demonstrated as sufficient, there is 
scope to argue that the Rome Statute’s primary position as the applicable law of the ICC is 
misguided. The defences of duress in the Rome Statute have not been as thoughtfully 
considered as they ought to have been. 
 
In light of this, it is worth considering how a case similar to Erdemovic would run at the 
International Criminal Court. In the first instance, it should be noted that it is the policy of 
the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court
566
 to ensure that ‘low-hanging fruit’567 and 
lower-ranking soldiers become the focus of national prosecutions rather than those initiated 
by the International Criminal Court. Thus it is likely that a case such as Erdemovic would 
not have been prosecuted by the ICC, which may have focused its prosecutorial efforts on 
those who gave orders to carry out the massacre rather than those who fired the shots. 
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However, if the scale of the disaster
568
 had meant that Erdemovic became a legitimate object 
of the Court’s attention, it is possible that such a case could be tried. The issues before the 
ICTY were twofold: firstly, whether a guilty plea must have been unequivocal in order to 
have been accepted and secondly, whether duress was available in this instance. For the first 
issue, the Trial Chamber of the ICC is tasked with ensuring that the accused understands the 
charges,
569
 the nature and consequences of a guilty plea
570
 and ensuring that the plea is 
voluntary.
571
 The latter requirement is evidenced through ‘sufficient consultation with defence 
counsel’ but otherwise no further evidence need be produced. Therefore, Erdemovic’s plea 
of guilty and his accompanying statements could be accepted by the ICC without any further 
discussion. 
 
However, given that defences are now codified within the Statute, he may have wished to 
plead duress under the Statute. Erdemovic’s circumstances would satisfy the criteria of a 
threat of imminent death and of that threat being made by a person. However it is difficult to 
see, in the clear light of codification, how his actions at Srebrenica could ever be 
characterised as a necessary and reasonable response. The whole purpose of international 
criminal law is to ensure that individuals are held to account for their participation in serious 
violations of international criminal law, echoing the maxim that ‘crimes against international 
law are committed by men, not by abstract entities’572 and following the logic that each 
participant makes a contribution to the atrocity. Erdemovic’s situation, where he participated 
in the genocide in Srebrenica where over 7,000 individuals died,
573
 albeit against his will, may 
exclude the possibility of arguing duress in this instance. It supports the idea that to include 
duress as a plea in mitigation, or to clarify it as a partial defence, wherein individuals who 
participate in such horrendous crimes under extreme duress may benefit from a clearly 
outlined reduction in punishment without undermining the criminality of their actions, may 
be more desirable. 
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6.4 Complete exoneration on the basis of duress 
 
It is under the banner of proportionality that makes defences in general, and duress in 
particular, so difficult to comprehend in the context of the Rome Statute. The notion of 
complete exoneration in the case of duress is difficult to fathom, particularly given the 
jurisdiction that the Court has over serious crimes.
574
 The underlying idea of the Court’s 
creation was to end impunity and arguably, such a flexible defence would undermine this 
aim. In light of this, it is necessary to examine the consequences of complete exoneration 
where a plea of duress is accepted by the Court. In particular, the tension between such 
exoneration and the aim of ending the commission of serious crimes against the person with 
impunity will be explored. 
 
In the Rome Statute, the defence of duress as defined
575
 is placed under the heading of 
grounds excluding criminal responsibility. The heading as such makes no reference to 
defences and the only reference to defences elsewhere in the Statute relates to the rights of 
the accused to a fair hearing
576
 and the duties of disclosure
577
 he or she may bear. Knoops’ 
idea that the right to plead a defence is part of the right to a fair trial
578
 appears as an 
unsupported assertion and the link instead is made from the trial to the removal of criminal 
responsibility, rather than the defensible nature of the conduct. The removal of criminal 
responsibility by pleading duress is interesting because of the way in which it affects the idea 
of ending impunity. The reduction of superior orders to a plea in mitigation by previous 
international criminal tribunals
579
 indicates the way in which excuses and justifications have a 
far more limited scope at the international level, where the transgression will invariably be 
more serious than at the national level, and it is for this reason that the admission of duress 
as a full defence appears counterintuitive. On the idea of a distinction between complete 
exoneration and a reduction of penalty, Gross notes that ‘our response to crime must take its 
full circumstances into consideration and then decide how great a defection from a punitive 
response is possible without exciting the demons of impunity.’580 He further notes that the 
imposition of punishment on an individual must be justified and, in the case of serious 
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violations of international criminal law, it would appear that a contribution to violence on a 
grand scale ought to be sufficient to justify this. Indeed, at the national level, sentencing and 
retributive policy in general would usually impose a punishment for crimes against the 
person, unless a defence could be sufficiently proved. The uncertainty of the application of 
duress at the national level for crimes against the person, particularly murder, ought to sound 
a warning to the continuation of duress as a fully exonerating defence within the Rome 
Statute. 
 
The discussion above relating to the Erdemovic case demonstrates the difficulty of explicitly 
permitting the defence of duress in the Rome Statute. The case has been extensively 
discussed by jurists and it is clear that it represented a classical ‘hard case’ in which a 
punishment would be imposed on an unwilling perpetrator. In some ways it represented the 
classic idea of duress and one might argue that a humane and progressive international 
criminal court ought to prevent such a case occurring in the future. As Knoops notes, it 
relates more to the accused
581
 than to the idea of proportionality. However progressive this 
perspective may appear, it does not take into account a key aspect of international criminal 
justice: restoration of the rule of law and justice for the victims. The system exists in order to 
offer justice at the international level, and it seems incongruous to hinge that justice on the 
context of the position of the aggressor, particularly when the crimes are so heinous. 
 
In this way, the progressive element of the Court’s development could benefit from the 
lessons taught in the Erdemovic judgment through providing pleas in mitigation set out 
clearly. The full exoneration which exists at present creates a degree of impunity, in that 
duress is too flexible a concept to be permitted as a response to a charge of a serious 
violation of international law, and potentially a degree of unfairness, where it is not 
guaranteed that an individual will have a reduced punishment if they have acted under 
extreme duress and contributed to an atrocity.  
 
Duress in the Rome Statute at present undermines the doctrine of individual criminal 
responsibility because of the way in which behaviour falling under the headings of the crimes 
within the jurisdiction of the Statute would be permitted in certain areas. This is not a 
development that the work of Bassiouni
582
 predicated when the international criminal code 
was drafted as a law project, given that his version of duress was not available where deadly 
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force was likely. Even with this caveat the following two reactive international criminal 
tribunals, created in the aftermath of the massacres in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, 
did not see fit to introduce the concept of duress in this way. It is clear that a drafting process 
which begins in peacetime may consider defences an integral part of a modern and 
developed international criminal justice system, but the way in which this may impact on the 
doctrine of individual criminal responsibility has not been fully considered. The humanity of 
the accused, the humanity of the victim and the endurance and legitimacy of the system are 
all important parts of this system: a balance ought to be struck to avoid the further 
denigration of any individual before the Court. 
 
The idea of duress in the Rome Statute was clearly heavily influenced by the dicta of 
Antonio Cassese in the Erdemovic case, as well as the work of Bassiouni
583
 in drafting an 
international criminal code. Their work in both instances has reinvigorated a necessary 
discussion on the place of defences in international criminal law and the way in which we 
may be able to demand certain standards of behaviour from each other in society, even 
during armed conflict. The concept of duress within the Rome Statute is interesting because 
of the way in which it disregards the traditional separation of duress of circumstances and 
duress created by a threat from another individual. Although some jurisdictions have unified 
the defence, there remains incoherence in situations of serious crimes against the person, as 
the subjective nature of duress appears sharper where an individual has been killed. This 
discord at the national level is not silenced at the international level and it appears curious 
that such a radical idea, that those who act under duress should be freed of any kind of 
criminal responsibility, has gained traction where the most serious crimes against the person 
are concerned. It is even more curious when it is noted that prosecutorial policy is that of 
prosecuting those who are in positions of responsibility for the crimes.
584
  
 
There is a lack of consistency in these ideas which the above research has highlighted, 
concluding that there is a need for significant reform in the area of defences. The wording of 
the defence has equally been narrowed and broadened by the Statute: it may now apply to 
those who are protecting others, yet only where the response was reasonable and necessary. 
It seems difficult to understand which of the crimes against the person within the jurisdiction 
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of the Statute might ever be considered a reasonable or necessary response to an action and, 
as such, the threshold of the defence appears to be set far above its potential utility. 
 
The Erdemovic case at the ICTY demonstrated a particularly ‘hard case’ for the tribunal and 
despite the painful circumstances which were related by Erdemovic to the Court, it was held 
that his contribution to a disaster of the magnitude of Srebrenica could not be overlooked. 
Despite the fact that he was a footsoldier at the time of commission, with little authority and 
even less power, it is clear that the Court still struggled to apply duress in this instance. The 
idea of a different decision in the case of Erdemovic demonstrates that the defence as 
drafted in the Rome Statute is problematic: no crime against humanity or war crime 
involving a crime against the person is ever likely to be a reasonable or necessary response, 
and as such the defence would fail each time. Even where it may be of use, the thresholds set 
are too high and the defence is shown as one which is difficult to apply. If available, it 
represents an undesirable degree of exoneration for the worst acts against other individuals 
that it is possible to commit. There appears to be no middle ground with the defences as 
codified by the Rome Statute, and it is this failure which creates issues for the foundational 
doctrine of individual criminal responsibility in international criminal law. It is more 
important to protect this doctrine that to ascribe features of a ‘developed’ system to 
international criminal justice. 
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7. Remedying the problem of defences in the Rome Statute 
7.1 The issues with the drafting of defences at present 
7.2  The value of distinction: justifications, excuses and pleas in mitigation 
7.3 The proposal 
7.4 Judicial interpretation of the Rome Statute 
 
Thus far, this thesis has looked at the issue of defences in the Rome Statute and the 
problems which arise from the Rome Statute’s concept of defences.. Earlier parts of this 
work have demonstrated the significant contribution made by national law to the 
development of international criminal law, which makes the way in which defences are 
codified in the Rome Statute more perplexing. If the aim of the Rome Statute is to prevent 
impunity, restore the rule of law, provide justice for victims and engender legitimacy in the 
system of international criminal justice, then the theory underpinning it must be consistent 
with this aim. The current structure of defences in the Statute, duress in particular, indicates 
that the drafters of the Rome Statute have elected a ‘third way’ to conceptualise and draft 
defences, one which does not rely on customary international law or on general principles. 
Building on the previous discussion, and to better understand the problems this creates, this 
chapter looks to identify the problems inherent in the defence of duress, in particular, in the 
Rome Statute and discusses the ways in which these issues could be remedied, through 
judicial interpretation, within the existing Statute. There is also a discussion of the ways in 
which the Rome Statute could be reformed in order to remedy the issues in a more 
structured manner, in order to restore consistency to the Statute. 
 
At present the grounds for excluding criminal responsibility available to an accused before 
the ICC are grouped together in the same section.
585
 Each defence demands the same 
response from the Court, in the event of an acceptance: full criminal responsibility is 
removed from the individual and, consequently, the criminality of the act is negated. No 
distinction is made between the defences and no difference is made of their differing effect 
on the criminality of the act in question before the Court. This blunt approach demonstrates 
the lack of full discussion during the negotiations; the selection of defences can be traced 
back to a single proposal
586
  during the negotiations and lack a connection with general 
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principles and customary international law.
587
 The reasoning behind this is unclear and the 
purpose of their inclusion, a significant part of the Rome Statute due to the removal of 
criminality from serious violations of international criminal law, is not discussed extensively 
in the reports of the Rome Conference
588
 or in any of the literature which examines the 
Rome Statute.
589
 At the international level, the inclusion of defences is particularly important 
because of the effect they have on the criminal act and thus on individual criminal 
responsibility. Defences and their application to war crimes and crimes against humanity 
ought to be carefully considered, particularly given the lack of coherence generated by 
national legal systems in this area, and this does not appear to have happened in the present 
case of the Rome Statute. 
 
This final chapter, prior to concluding, proposes that the lack of coherence at the domestic 
level should be interpreted as a caution for the international system, and the lack of a clear 
customary rule in this area ought to have demonstrated that careful consideration was 
required if there was a desire to create a new rule in this area. Following on from previous 
argumentation, there appears to be good reason for including defences in the Rome Statute. 
The precise issue at present is the way in which this has been done, with the unification and 
availability of duress being a prime example of a defence which should not be available for 
serious crimes against the person. This part of the thesis looks to examine the potential to 
reform the Rome Statute by differentiating between the defences, and to explore the 
potential for reforming the Rome Statute by restructuring defences. It also looks at the 
potential for judicial interpretation of the defences, in order to create a degree of coherence 
between the concept of defences and the object and purpose of the Statute, as well as 
considering the necessity of the defences in order to create a balance between the fight 
against impunity and the rights of the accused. 
 
The structure of the defences in the Rome Statute at present will be the initial focus of the 
present discussion, which seeks to identify any distinctions which may have been created by 
their wording. Issues with the structure, as well as their contents and consequent effect will 
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then be discussed, along with a demonstration of the value of distinction between the 
defences. This will involve identifying those which are full and partial defences together, as 
well as those which ought to be considered pleas in mitigation and exploring the potential for 
the use of justification and excuse theory in the Statute. The final part to this last substantive 
chapter proposes such a distinction and examines how it may be incorporated into the 
Statute to protect and serve the doctrine of individual criminal responsibility. The aim of this 
is to provide a bridge between customary international law and general principles and the 
Rome Statute’s approach to defences. 
 
7.1 The issues with the structure at present 
 
As discussed in chapter four, the defences in the Rome Statute are grouped together in three 
consecutive sections under the heading of ‘general principles of criminal law.’590 There are 
four grounds in article 31 which, prima facie, have not been distinguished from one another: 
mental defect or disease, intoxication, self-defence and duress, the latter of which 
incorporates the concept of necessity with duress in order to create one unified defence. 
There are a further two grounds of mistake, of law or of fact,
591
 and superior orders
592
 in the 
subsequent two articles. The defences all refer to the exclusion of criminal responsibility, 
with the exception of superior orders which speaks of ‘relieving’ criminal responsibility. 
Thus the defences appear to be placed on an equal footing with one another, meaning that 
self-defence has the same effect on criminal responsibility as duress. Given the arguments 
outlined in chapters five and six, it is clear that most national systems distinguish between 
duress and necessity, and there is little to suggest that both would be consistently considered 
as justifications for acting,
593
 particularly in relation to a crime against the person. When 
contrasted with self-defence, the unique feature of duress is that the crime is not perpetrated 
against the aggressor but rather an innocent victim. In this light, it is difficult to countenance 
the reasoning which argues that it should be placed on an equal footing with the idea of the 
justification of self-defence. These similarities and distinctions between some of the 
defences, in structure and content, and these shall be discussed below. 
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The six defences in articles 31-33 represent the grounds for excluding criminal responsibility 
as decided by the drafters of the Rome Statute. As discussed previously, the initial 
proposition for defences was put forward by the Canadian delegation
594
  to the Preparatory 
Commission for the Rome Statute by dint of the fact that they represented general principles 
of criminal law. The precise reasoning for the inclusion of each defence is not explicitly 
discussed, although the idea that some defences represent general principles of law is well-
founded.
595
 Self-defence is one such example: it is a commonly accepted defence across 
jurisdictions to crimes against the person. It is also, in a slightly different context, a defence 
for States in public international law and it rests on the widely-accepted proposition that no 
individual (or State, for that matter) need willingly submit to his, her or its own demise.
596
 
The inclusion of the defence demonstrates the principle of understanding in international 
law that an individual has the right to preserve their own existence when confronted with an 
aggressor, subject to certain limitations. Such limitations, of proportionality, an imminent 
threat and the seriousness of the threat to the individual or country, are commonly found in 
most incarnations of the concept.  
 
The first two defences in article 31, mental defect or disease and intoxication, speak of the 
individual failing to understand the unlawfulness of the action which he or she has 
committed. Both mental disease or defect and intoxication must affect the individual to the 
extent that it ‘destroys that person’s capacity to appreciate the unlawfulness or nature of his 
or her conduct, or capacity to control his or her conduct’597 to abide by the law. There is a 
caveat attaching to intoxication that it may not be voluntary where the individual 
‘disregarded’598 the risk that he or she may commit a crime within the jurisdiction of the 
Court. Bassiouni
599
 notes that the defence of intoxication here is approached similarly to the 
American defence and rejects the German approach,
600
 indicating that perhaps that the rules 
of some systems have been preferred over others – an approach which does not reflect the 
comparative studies which are supposed to underpin the determination of general principles 
of law. Schabas further notes that the inclusion and final draft of the intoxication defence 
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‘had the benefit of satisfying no-one’,601 as well as creating an inconsistent approach which 
permits those who were organising or planning the commission of such crimes to plead 
intoxication in order to remove responsibility. More interesting that this however, is the 
similarity between the concepts placed in the Statute, in that either must affect the individual 
until they cannot control their conduct or cannot appreciate the unlawfulness inherent in 
their actions. This wording would indicate an attempt to create excuses of these defences, 
maintaining the criminality of the action without placing full responsibility on the shoulders 
of the accused. The action remains unlawful, but the accused should not be condemned for 
it. This idea is interesting, not least of all because the defence of intoxication is sometimes 
accepted as a mitigating factor and sometimes as an aggravating factor. It is not generally 
recognised as a full defence, for which reason an individual may be exonerated from 
criminal responsibility. It has been augmented to a full defence in the Rome Statute, 
alongside the idea of mental disease or defect, which would generally qualify as an excuse in 
domestic law. As Schabas demonstrates, the defence of mental disease is generally 
‘uncontroversial’602 and the wording of the defences in this fashion indicates that the same 
underlying principle applies.  
 
When viewed in this light, the idea of including intoxication, with the same underlying 
restriction on its application as a mental defect, appears to undermine the purportedly 
compassionate approach of the Rome Statute to defences. The idea of intoxication and 
mental incapacity stemming from the same root and having the same underlying reasoning is 
incongruent with the idea of both defences. It is accepted that in cases such as that of 
François Minani,
603
 intoxicating agents may play a role. However they were used to overcome 
his resistance, rather than destroying his understanding of morality and, more significantly, 
criminality. Equally, he was also tortured and thus his ability to resist the orders given was 
removed. This type of situation bears more relation to that of duress and of a plea in 
mitigation, conceptually, rather than to the idea of mental defect, wherein the individual 
would remain incapable of understanding the ‘wrongness’ or criminality of their actions 
beyond the commission of the crime. Applying the same type of reasoning to both concepts 
blurs the distinction between pleas in mitigation and excusatory defences, as well as ignoring 
the purpose of not punishing those who cannot be expected to perceive the distinction 
between criminal and non-criminal conduct. Equally, it disregards the usual provision for 
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those suffering from a mental defect in domestic law: Scotland as a jurisdiction, for example, 
may acquit someone on the grounds of mental defect but will not release them. Most 
jurisdictions would follow the same logic, as the threat to the public and to the peace would 
remain. There is no provision for this difference of approach within the Statute.   
  
The remaining two defences, self-defence and duress, are drafted quite differently from the 
other defences in article 31. The idea of self-defence has the usual restrictions of ‘reasonable’ 
action, and includes defence of property, where that property may be essential for the 
survival of one or a group of individuals.
604
 The action must be undertaken with 
proportionate means and the threat must stem from an ‘imminent and unlawful use of 
force.’ In a similar way, duress is phrased as that which originates from a ‘threat of imminent 
death or imminent serious bodily harm’605 and may relate to the person seeking the defence 
or another. A further qualification rests on the action being ‘reasonabl(e) and necessar(y)’ in 
that situation and proportionality makes another appearance in Article 31 as part of the 
drafting of this defence. The unique aspect to this defence is that the threat can stem from 
other persons
606
 and from circumstances, so long as these are ‘beyond that person’s 
control’.607 The imminence requirement is present in both, in a similar fashion to 
Bassiouni’s608 draft of both defences, both of which are predicated on an instinctive response 
to an immediate threat. Thus, the defences have been woven together on the basis that the 
defence is available where a threat has been made, regardless of the source of the threat. 
 
As stated above, the inclusion of self-defence is the recognition of a concept which has some 
traction already in international law as a general principle. However, David has taken 
particularly issue with the inclusion of self-defence stating that it is ‘vain, useless and 
dangerous.’609 The same could be said about any of the defences, although Schabas refutes 
this criticism in respect of self-defence by highlighting examples where an individual may 
require recourse to self-defence in the context of war.
610
 Neither of these critical points relates 
to the conceptual underpinning of the defence nor reflects on its similarity with necessity as 
drafted in the Rome Statute. Generally speaking, self-defence would be considered a 
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justification for action in criminal law, as well as a full defence. Where recognised, necessity 
can be termed a justification, particularly in French and German law, whereas duress (again, 
where recognised) would normally fall within the parameters of an excuse, particularly in 
Canadian and U.S. law. The only jurisdiction which unifies the concepts of duress and 
necessity, South Africa, does not make any attempt to cloak the concept as a justification. 
Another reason for identifying both self-defence and duress in the Rome Statute as 
justifications is because of the higher threshold which justifications often require individuals 
to reach, in order to successfully plead the defence. It is a more desirable type of defence, 
because of its vindicating power, but it is also harder to access. Reflecting on the Rome 
Statute, it would appear that the intention behind the similar wording is to place the same 
thresholds on both defences. It cannot escape notice that the wording used and the 
thresholds applied appear to aim at the characterisation of both as justifications. 
 
The concept of mistake, of both fact and law, can be found in article 32 as further grounds 
for excluding criminal responsibility. Mistakes of fact or law must, in the first instance, 
‘negate the mental element’611 in respect of the crime. Mistake of law may also be available in 
relation to the defence of superior orders, where there is a mistaken belief in relation to an 
unlawful order. Both forms of the defence appear to be adequately covered by other 
grounds within the Statute: there is reference in article 30 to the mental element required for 
the crime and article 33 clearly outlines the test for superior orders. This reflects entirely the 
formulation put forward by Bassiouni in his draft code
612
 in a rather uncritical fashion: if 
provisions exist to deal with a lack of mens rea then it makes little sense to replicate 
analogous provisions elsewhere in the Statute. Schabas makes this very point, but argues that 
the purpose of outlining the defences in this way is to restrict their application and to avoid 
leaving such situations to the discretion of judges, thus limiting the general rule of mens rea, 
or intention.
613
 A similar approach can be found in other jurisdictions as well where the 
defence of mistake is provided alongside rules which require criminal conduct to be 
intentional.
614
 However, the cross-reference of the article on mistake to the notion of 
intention makes this defence unique and links the idea of a failure to possess sufficient 
intention with the idea of making a mistake of fact.
615
Instead of a more precise approach, as 
described by Schabas, the reliance placed on article 30 creates a degree of redundancy in 
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respect of article 32. Scaliotti equally notes that the existence of a mistaken belief correctly 
relates to the facts of the case,
616
 rather than a legal principle. In this way, it bears greater 
relation to the concept of a plea in mitigation which speaks to a more flexible approach, 
depending on the context in which the crime was committed, than that of a defence, an 
accepted reason for committing the crime. 
 
The inclusion of mistake as a full defence, it is submitted, should be reconsidered. Its 
wording indicates that it should be considered a full defence, yet it does not stand alone 
conceptually and requires reference to other articles in order to clarify its application. It is 
also highly flexible depending on the circumstances and there is little legal principle to guide 
its application, offering the judges a great deal of discretion in determining whether the 
action taken was based on a mistaken belief. In this way, it would appear to have far more in 
common with the idea of a plea in mitigation, relating to a situation in which an individual 
acted, but for which he or she ought not to be fully punished. In this way, an individual is not 
harshly punished for a mistake made but there is recognition of the seriousness of the 
offence. No justification in this instance is appropriate, nor is a full defence with an 
excusatory character given the gravity of the crime and the reason for the transgression. 
 
The concept of superior orders, the final reference to a defence in the Rome Statute, can be 
found in article 33. Much was made of the ‘reintroduction’ of superior orders into 
international criminal law by the Rome Statute and yet the defence is the most restrictive of 
any of those incorporated into the treaty. The article begins by excluding the defence in a 
general sense, in the tradition of international criminal tribunals, and then goes on to discuss 
the criteria for pleading the defence. Interestingly, the language of defence changes from 
‘excluding’ criminal responsibility to the ‘relie(f)’617 thereof. There is a direct exclusion for 
superior orders where the crime committed is genocide or a crime against humanity,
618
 
leaving the defence admissible only, in a realistic sense which would thus exclude aggression, 
to charges of war crimes. There are three requirements for those who wish to plead the 
defence: one, there was a legal duty on the part of the individual to follow orders,
619
 two, the 
person did not know the order issued was unlawful
620
 and three, further to the latter point, 
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that the order was not manifestly unlawful.
621
 Firstly, the change in language here is 
interesting: the defence is not expressly codified, but has been excluded with qualifications in 
respect of when it may apply. The reference to grounds excluding criminal responsibility has 
also been removed, in favour of relieving responsibility. Although this may seem a small 
issue, it makes no sense to draft each of the defences in one manner and then change in 
respect of another. Taken in hand with the exclusion of the defence, in the first instance, it 
appears that superior orders as a defence has been set apart from the others. The historical 
reasons for this are obvious, in that it would not be desirable to permit those guilty of such 
serious offences to remit responsibility to their superiors purely on the grounds that orders 
were followed. However, the three-pronged test would purportedly prevent any such 
situation arising. It again tallies with Bassiouni’s understanding of defences in his draft 
criminal code, where superior orders were expressly included.
622
  
 
The more interesting question than the debate on its inclusion relates to how it ought to 
affect the criminality of the act. Speaking of the ‘relief’ of criminality responsibility tends 
towards the idea of an excuse, rather than a justification. This links in with Schabas’ idea that 
a justification to a charge of genocide appears ‘unthinkable’623 given the exclusion of genocide 
and crimes against humanity from the application of this defence. However, even scholars 
more inclined towards the idea of defences in international law, such as Knoops,
624
 note that 
it is difficult to maintain the existence of superior orders as a defence independent from 
other concepts such as duress. Indeed, the only pressure that need be applied to an 
individual seeking to utilise the defence is the duty to follow a legal obligation. The language 
of the defence as it is placed in the Rome Statute would indicate that it ought to be 
considered an excusatory full defence, given the release of the individual from criminal 
responsibility, but the lack of exclusion of such responsibility from the action which was 
committed. This is in conflict with the previous understanding of the defence as a plea in 
mitigation, although links with jurisprudence prior to Nuremberg and Tokyo which supports 
the use of the defence for low-ranking soldiers, as stated by Best.
625
 As a full system of 
international criminal justice, it is possible that the International Criminal Court could indict 
those who do not occupy a high level position in an organisation accused of committing 
serious violations of international criminal law, however the prosecutorial policy of the 
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International Criminal Court means that it is unlikely that the ‘underlings’ to which Best 
refers would require the protection of the defence of superior orders. The current cases 
before the International Criminal Court all concern political and rebel leaders and 
commanders apart from two cases concerning perverting the course of justice.
626
  As a 
consequence, the use of the defence as a ground for exoneration, in whichever language may 
define it, appears to undermine the focus by the Statute on the most serious crimes. The 
conflict in the wording appears to demonstrate that even the drafters of the Rome Statute 
were discordant in their acceptance of the concept as a full defence. Its partial exclusion 
demonstrates that it would be conceptually more comfortable as a plea in mitigation, rather 
than a full defence. 
 
As noted previous, there is little available discussion on the defences from the work done by 
the Preparatory Committee. Most of the issues which were contentious did not appear in the 
final draft and indeed the final version represented ‘sensitive compromises’.627 The defences 
as drafted have been left to rather broadly remove criminal responsibility from the act 
committed, without a great deal of differentiation between them. The effect of this is the 
broad equality between the defences and a lack of distinction in terms of how they affect the 
criminal behaviour. The distinctions in wording shown above can be seen to demonstrate an 
attempt to distinguish the defences from each other, but it is far from clear and remains 
concealed in the precise wording, with similarities being demonstrated upon analysis. As a 
consequence, it could be argued that all of the defences represent justifications and thereby 
permit, and acknowledge the compulsion to commit, crimes against humanity, war crimes, 
genocide and even acts of aggression on the part of a State under certain circumstances. The 
more likely conclusion, however, is that duress and self-defence are to be regarded as 
justifications, while intoxication and mental disease may be grounds for excusing the 
conduct. Mistake appears to be a restatement of the idea of failing to prove mens rea 
contained elsewhere in the Statute and a restrictive formulation of superior orders is 
available, possibly demonstrating its application as an excusatory defence. 
 
However, this characterisation of the defences blurs a number of generally accepted and 
important distinctions for the defences themselves. Firstly, duress is rarely considered a 
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justification for action and this elevation creates an uncomfortable balance between pressure 
placed on an individual to act and the protection of another individual from the crimes 
enumerated in the Statute. Secondly, ideas such as superior orders and intoxication are more 
conceptually at ease as pleas in mitigation, where a lesser punishment would be imposed to 
restore the fairness of the system while acknowledging the damage done to the victim. In this 
way, there appears to be a failure to distinguish between pleas in mitigation and excuses, as 
well as placing duress in the bracket of defences which justify. The next part to this work will 
examine the value of these distinctions and why they ought to be respected at the 
international level. 
 
7.2 The value of distinction 
 
As demonstrated above, there is a significant value to acknowledging the theoretical and 
practical distinctions between the defences enumerated in the Rome Statute. The 
characterisation of a defence as a full defence, wherein it may be an excuse or a justification, 
a partial defence or a plea in mitigation has a differing effect on the guilt of the individual, the 
criminality of the act and even the imposition of punishment. It is useful to examine why we 
divide defences in this manner and how theories such as justifications and excuses may be of 
value and relevance to the Rome Statute. The theoretical distinctions will be discussed as a 
potential solution which may circumvent the problem identified by this thesis: the 
undermining of individual criminal responsibility by the unprecedented provision of broad 
defences for war crimes and crimes against humanity. 
 
In the first instance, the value of the idea of a justification will be explored and its roots in 
Anglo-American theory. In the second, the potential to identify certain defences as excuses 
will be examined and the benefits which this will give the Rome Statute will be outlined. 
Classifying existing defences under the Rome Statute as pleas in mitigation and partial 
defences will also be considered, with a view to improving the drafting and structure of the 
Rome Statute.  
 
The concept of a justification has its roots in Anglo-American legal theory, as discussed in 
chapter five. The idea which underpins a justification is of a defence which permits and 
legitimises the conduct which would otherwise be considered criminal. Indeed, ‘the law’s 
view (is that the act is) not unlawful.’628 As Austin noted, a justification is a denial of 
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wrongdoing.
629
 The application of a justification to the crimes under the Rome Statute is of 
particular interest because of the significance of doing so: effectively it would permit the 
commission of acts of aggression, genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes under 
certain circumstances. If each of the defences under the Rome Statute were considered, as 
could be argued presently, justifications then the grounds excluding criminal responsibility 
would outline circumstances and tests which allowed these crimes to be committed. 
Moreover it would determine that international society approves of the action taken in those 
circumstances. This sanctioning effect on the conduct is something which has not been 
adequately considered by the drafters of the Rome Statute, which makes no reference to the 
concept of justifications and excuses. This is particularly interesting when it is considered that 
Bassiouni’s version of a draft international criminal code, which was so influential in other 
ways, included the heading ‘exoneration, justification and excusability’630 when including 
defences.  
 
In the context of international criminal law, it may be possible to refer to a defence as a 
justification, the most likely defence for this classification being self-defence. Indeed, it was 
the only defence Cassese considered as being fit for such a grouping at the international 
level.
631
 The concept of self-defence as a justification is fairly uncontroversial and genuinely 
represents a general principle of law, as most jurisdictions accept that individuals are 
permitted to commit even murder in pursuit of self-defence, with the usual restrictions to the 
circumstances applying. Clarifying self-defence as a justification would acknowledge the 
acceptance that individuals may commit crimes in order to defend themselves and would 
realistically permit those who commit acts of self-defence during war to utilise the defence 
and to be fully exonerated. It would also compel a distinction between defending a person’s 
bodily integrity and defending property, which rightly should not be considered a 
justification. This would clarify the application of the defence further and explain its purpose 
more explicitly in the Statute. This proposition does not receive support in all quarters and 
there are some jurists
632
 who reject the idea that any defence could ever be put forward as a 
justification for the crimes within the jurisdiction of the Rome Statute. Admittedly, it can be a 
difficult concept to deal with, as the crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC are so serious 
that the concept of justifying them may seem antithetical. However, as the threshold tests 
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exist for self-defence, it would be illogical to suggest that a State can defend itself using force, 
collective or otherwise in the international context and with all the destruction and violence 
that it potentially could entail, but that an individual could not. 
 
Identifying a defence as an excuse is a fundamental acknowledgement that the act for which 
the defence was raised is regrettable. The effect of the defence is that the individual ought to 
be acquitted, because of some problem relating to their circumstances, for example in 
relation to a mental disease or defect. It does not, however, create any degree of acceptability 
for the act in question: society acknowledges that it ought not to have happened, but that the 
criminal conduct was unavoidable. In terms of the Rome Statute, the defence which would 
generally be considered an excuse is that of mental disease or defect. Mental disease or 
defect typifies the concept of an excuse, because the individual in question could not avoid 
the behaviour as a result of their circumstances and as such ought not to be blamed. The 
criminal act remains wrong and its criminality persists, but the individual should not be 
punished for its commission. This category of defence would be particularly powerful in the 
Rome Statute because of the way in which it maintains the border of criminality between 
acceptable and criminal behaviour. This focus on the offender is particularly important as it 
also takes a compassionate and restorative approach to justice, in that individuals who are 
incapable of distinguishing between right and wrong are not punished and a reason is given 
for their acquittal. 
 
Duress may also be referred to as an excuse, although there is some evidence to suggest that 
it fits into neither category, conforming to the idea that it has ‘traditionally been very difficult 
to classify as either a justification or an excuse, and so it should remain because it is neither… 
(it) represents a subset… (which ought to result in) purely vindicating convictions.’633 However 
the version of duress in the Rome Statute is different because it also refers to ‘circumstances 
beyond the person’s control’ indicating a component of the defence of necessity. Necessity 
has often been considered a justification, even in jurisdictions where duress is not 
recognised,
634
 in that an individual is entitled to act in order to prevent devastation by a 
natural disaster. However, as Bassiouni notes, this element of the defence would be difficult 
to countenance in the face of a charge of genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes
635
 
as it is difficult to imagine a situation where, for example, genocide or enslavement took 
place in response to a natural disaster. Aggression is equally that which would be committed 
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by a State, rather than a typhoon or tsunami which would be caused by natural forces. It is 
thus difficult to see where duress as enunciated by the Rome Statute may fit into the 
categorisation. Reflecting on the foregoing, it is clear that it may be more appropriate to note 
duress as a partial defence, where the harm committed has been particularly grievous. A 
number of jurisdictions, including Germany, Israel and France, deny the availability of the 
defence where significant harm against the person has been caused. The characterisation of 
duress in the Rome Statute would be more in keeping with the general principles of criminal 
law should it be reduced to a partial defence. 
 
The current thresholds for intoxication and superior orders in the Rome Statute are notably 
high, indicating that their inclusion was not without consideration. In the case of intoxication, 
it is a notable absence in most domestic jurisdictions and there are some states such as South 
Africa, which would identify intoxication as an aggravating factor
636
 rather than as that which 
ought to mitigate. Many jurisdictions take the position that drunkenness should be 
considered neither a mitigating nor an aggravating factor and this proposition finds support 
in the work of Ashworth.
637
 A further difficulty is presented by the way in which the defence 
of intoxication appears linked to that of mental disease or defect. By phrasing intoxication in 
the same manner as mental disease or defect, as outlined above, the Rome Statute disregards 
the more commonly accepted concept that intoxication should not be treated as a form of 
temporary ‘insanity.’638 The lack of consensus in this manner would indicate that perhaps 
involuntary intoxication could be viewed as a formal plea in mitigation, which would allow 
situations like that of François Minani to mitigate the punishment without extended 
argument by his lawyers and permit the Rome Statute to reflect its history properly. There is 
no contention that many young individuals had been involuntarily intoxicated in order to 
give them ‘Dutch courage’ to carry out acts of violence and crimes against humanity. 
Formalising involuntary intoxication as a plea in mitigation would respect this tragic history 
without denying justice to the international community and victims of serious violations of 
international criminal law. 
 
The defence of superior orders appears to continue thematically with the tradition of 
excluding the defence in the first instance. The wording is misleading, however, as it permits 
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a full defence of superior orders under the Rome Statute. Given the targets of the Rome 
Statute and the history of the defence, it would sit more comfortably as a plea in mitigation 
rather than as a full defence. Phrasing the defence as that which relieves responsibility rather 
than to exclude it reflects the conceptual incongruity and general unease that including 
superior orders as a full defence would create. Its previous incarnation of a plea in 
mitigation, without the requirement that the order be manifestly unlawful, was a more 
accurate representation of situations in which military personnel are likely to find themselves. 
The military hierarchy dictates that orders will often be followed in highly stressful and 
constrained circumstances, in which time no individual has time to consult a lawyer on the 
manifest illegality test. If the aim of providing defences in the Rome Statute is to create a 
more modern and compassionate system, then this would permit it to become so. 
 
Mistake sits apart from the rest of the defences because of its strong link to the mental intent 
of the crime. As such, it does not relate in particular to either a justification or excuse: it is 
already provided for elsewhere in the Statute and would not represent any direct threat to the 
criminality of the crimes within the jurisdiction of the Rome Statute nor to the doctrine of 
individual criminal responsibility. Any spurious claim of ignorance of the law is also guarded 
against by the wording and thus there is no pressing need to recruit mistake into the 
categories of justification, excuse or pleas in mitigation. 
 
7.3 The proposal 
 
It is proposed that the distinctions of full and partial defences, and pleas in mitigation, 
should be applied to the defences in the Rome Statute, in order to protect and support the 
doctrine of individual criminal responsibility. It would also create a greater degree of 
congruence with customary international law and general principles of domestic legal 
systems. It is acknowledged that the incorporation of defences in the Rome Statute has been 
influenced by previous cases and the experience of international law at the previous 
international criminal tribunals during the last decade of the twentieth century, as well as a 
desire to build a system of international criminal justice. This desire has fuelled a developed 
and comprehensive treaty, dealing with a more precise, enunciated version of the doctrine of 
individual criminal responsibility
639
 than had been seen previously and specifically defining 
the crimes within its jurisdiction.  
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To clarify the purpose of defences, retaining the compassionate and modern quality inherent 
in their inclusion, it is proposed that the defences ought to be classified as full defences, 
partial defences and pleas in mitigation. Although the latter category is arguably based on 
factual circumstances which a lawyer may put before the Court on behalf of his or her client, 
the acknowledgment of certain formal pleas in mitigation indicates the acceptance by the 
Court, and by international criminal law in general, that it serves no purpose to impose a 
harsher punishment on someone who had a limited range of choices in a given situation. 
This final part to this thesis will explore the way in which the defences ought to be 
categorised, why this is of benefit and how the Statute could be amended to highlight these 
distinctions. 
 
The categories of distinction between the defences which were outlined in chapter three are 
the most useful for the purposes of the Rome Statute because they go beyond the oft-cited 
justification and excuse theory distinction. Furthermore, they directly undermine a common 
criticism of such a distinction, that it is theoretical and lacks any practical effect because of 
the further category of partial defences. In this way, the application of the theory of 
justifications and excuses indicate a sliding scale of the deemed acceptability of the response 
to a threat. The distinction between justifications and excuses, although criticised, is of 
particular import to the Rome Statute because of the types of crimes within its jurisdiction. 
To permit the commission of these crimes in certain circumstances would be to directly 
undermine the serious nature of the conduct. It is for this reason that only one of the 
defences could be considered a justification, and even then with limited application given the 
thresholds created by the formulation of self-defence in the Statute.  
 
Self-defence, as noted above and throughout this thesis, demonstrates the ‘ultimate’ 
justification for action: one is entitled to defend one’s own life, or the life of another 
individual and, within the bounds of the Rome Statute, property required for survival, against 
an aggressive threat. Any action committed in pursuance of this aim, fulfilling the criteria of 
article 31(1)(c) will fall within the ambit of this defence. The only other full defence, based 
on the preceding argumentation and analysis, would be that of mental disease or defect, 
which qualifies as an excuse. This would allow individuals who suffer from a disease which 
destroys their capacity to understand their actions to be relieved of punishment, and 
hopefully referred to the proper authorities for treatment, while acknowledging the damage 
done to victims by their actions. The excusatory nature of the defence would mean that the 
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individual ought not to be punished, as their conduct was the result of illness, but that the 
acts committed remain criminal and socially unacceptable, to say the least. 
 
Duress could then properly be characterised as a partial defence for crimes against the 
person.
640
 This would represent a true compromise on the part of national jurisdictions and a 
genuine general principle. As some jurisdictions recognised necessity, but not duress and 
where other jurisdictions reject the idea of either as a defence to murder, with a third variant 
of a unified defence of compulsion in the case of South Africa, the ‘general principle’ is one 
which is difficult to discern. In this way, a third way could be achieved. The defence of 
duress would be recognised at the international level, but it would not have the effect of 
removing full responsibility from the shoulders of the convicted person. Rather, it would 
reduce the amount of liability in law which ought to be attributed to him or her and 
accordingly, mitigate the punishment imposed. The concept of partial responsibility would 
be distinguished from the idea of a plea in mitigation because of the return of a specific 
verdict which denotes partial responsibility; a notion available to the court at present because 
of the judicial discretion offered by the provisions on applicable law
641
 referring to such an 
idea as a general principle of law and under the provisions of grounds for excluding criminal 
responsibility.
642
 This is distinct from the idea of partial responsibility in common law 
jurisdictions, wherein a partial defence would reduce the gravity of the charge and instead a 
charge of, for example, genocide would remain. The ICC could then deliver a verdict of 
partial responsibility for this crime, acknowledging that the individual committed the offence 
but that he or she should not be held fully responsible in law. Work on both the contentious 
notions of partial justifications
643
 and partial excuses
644
 demonstrates the theoretical possibility 
of such a conclusion. Although this may have a similar effect on sentencing as a plea in 
mitigation, it would require the acknowledgment that the individual committed the crime as 
libelled. In a system as symbolic as international criminal justice, the effect of such an 
acknowledgment should not be underestimated. The distinction would thus be theoretical. 
 
The theoretical distinction differs from a plea in mitigation because the latter concept does 
not reduce any responsibility on the part of the individual; it simply imposes less of a 
punishment on compassionate grounds, indicating that society has no interest in fully 
punishing the individual because of the circumstances in which they committed the offence. 
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This would also sit well with previous perspectives of the defence, including Erdemovic and 
those from the international criminal military tribunals following the Second World War. It 
also dismisses the idea that an individual can plead duress or necessity in situations where 
such stress in the norm, in order to escape liability from an international crime, as the 
commission of war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide. These crimes are unlikely 
to take place in cool-headed moments and duress as a full defence does not take account of 
this. The proposition that it should become a partial defence allows it recognition without 
denying the inherent wrongness in the act, whatever the circumstances in which it was 
committed may be. 
 
It is worth highlighting that the above could be rejected on the grounds that the distinction 
between full and partial responsibility, subdividing the former into justifications and excuses, 
has no real impact on the outcome of the case: both justifications and excuses would result in 
an acquittal, while the practical consequences of a partial defence are mirrored by the 
consequences of a plea in mitigation. However, Greenawalt notes that the sole purpose of 
criminal law is not to mete out a certain amount of punishment. Rather, ‘because it reflects 
and reinforces moral judgments, criminal law should illuminate the moral status of various 
courses of action.’645 This is an even greater consideration in the context of international 
criminal law, and a stronger reasoning for such distinctions in the operation of the Rome 
Statute. 
 
There should be a further category of formal pleas in mitigation, into which intoxication and 
superior orders ought to fall. Intoxication is a complex factor affecting criminal responsibility 
given that certain jurisdictions consider it a defence, whereas others may consider it an 
aggravating factor. Similarly to the idea of duress, no general principle could be drawn from 
this but acknowledgement of the role intoxication has played in past conflicts is required. In 
this manner, it would be advisable to identify intoxication as a plea in mitigation rather than a 
defence. In the case of Minani outlined above, intoxication as a single factor did not play a 
role and therefore its use in conjunction with other defences ought to be anticipated. 
However the use of intoxicants in war time situations or cases of genocide does not give 
sufficient justification for its place as a full defence. Rather it should be used as a way of 
reducing the punishment imposed on the individual, given their lack of agency in the matter. 
This approach acknowledges the role of intoxication in previous situations of war, genocide 
                                                          
645
 K. Greenawalt, Distinguishing justifications from excuses, Law and Contemporary Problems 1986 49(3) 89-
108, 90. 
148 
 
and crimes against humanity, but maintains a barrier to impunity which may otherwise 
persist if it were to be considered a full defence. 
 
As highlighted above, mistake need not fit into any of the above categories because of its 
close connection with the mental element
646
 of the offence. In this way, it is simply a 
restatement of a general principle and does not truly relate to a separate defence. Thus it 
would not present a good conceptual fit into any of the above categories and need not be 
featured in any such amendment. 
 
Superior orders, similarly, presents a number of challenges as a result of its inclusion. It is 
proposed here that it should be returned to a plea in mitigation, as was the previous position 
in international criminal law, and that the manifest illegality test ought to be removed. The 
current defence has high thresholds attached to it, which would bar its application from 
those who have acted in the heat of battle or while following orders in a military hierarchy 
which requires obedience in order to function. The inclusion of superior orders is clearly 
uncomfortable, as it is excluded in the first instance and permitted under strict conditions 
and it does not appear likely that these conditions could ever be met. Rather than to require 
such an onerous proof, it may be more constructive and compassionate to acknowledge the 
difficulty of refusing, particularly during a violent or socially destructive period, any orders 
given and instead reducing the punishment which should be imposed. A formal plea in 
mitigation of superior orders would satisfy the requirement that the concept ought to be 
included while respecting the history of international criminal law and honouring those who 
have suffered as a result of the crimes committed. 
 
The purpose of the above categorisation would be to permit the inclusion of the defences 
without affecting the doctrine of individual criminal responsibility and creating a more 
reasoned expression of international criminal law. The codification of defences in the Rome 
Statute was an interesting and, in many ways, a bold move given the history of international 
criminal law. Defences are circumstances in which an individual can commit a criminal act 
without punishment or consequences, which can be attributed to, in the main, exceptional 
circumstances. The above distinctions help to balance the requirement that defences be 
included as part of a humane system of international criminal law with the understanding 
that these are the most serious crimes which can be committed by individuals, in the context 
of crimes against the person, while ensuring fairness for the rights of the accused. The 
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distinctions also affirm the idea that the defences do not exonerate those pleading them in 
the same way and highlight their conceptual differences, making them true general principles 
of international criminal law which do not defer to any one jurisdiction or system of criminal 
law. In this way, it can be seen that the system of international criminal justice is a mature 
and properly considered arrangement under which individuals can be tried for the most 
serious crimes of concern to humanity as a whole. 
 
7.4 Judicial interpretation of the Statute 
 
An alternative means of adopting the above proposal without formal amendment or relying 
on interpretation of responsibility by the Court could be through the sentencing provisions 
of article 76. These provisions state that the Trial Chamber may first, take into account the 
‘evidence presented and submissions made during the trial that are relevant to the 
sentence.’647 This would allow the defences to be interpreted by the judges as partial defences 
or pleas in mitigation. The previous discussions have highlighted the difficulty of pleading 
certain defences for any accused; self-defence is an excellent example of a defence in the 
Rome Statute which is difficult to place in the context of a serious crime against the person 
requiring specific intent such as genocide. Duress, similarly, creates a rather high threshold 
for the accused to meet and, particularly if the accused is a high-ranking individual, it may be 
difficult to ever successfully plead duress in respect of a crime against the person under the 
Statute. However, viewing the content of article 31 through the prism of article 76 would 
allow the judges to consider the evidence which may fall short of duress, for example, to 
allow for the partial removal of responsibility. It could then be considered a partial defence, 
as highlighted above, or even as a plea in mitigation, without any formal amendment. 
 
Article 76 further allows additional evidence and hearings to take into account anything 
‘relevant to the sentence.’648 In the Lubanga649 sentencing judgment, reference was made to 
the sentencing provisions in the Statute, in which it was held that the Court “must” take into 
account any aggravating or mitigating factors.
650
 Similarly, this compels the bench to take 
account of situations of duress and self-defence should these arise. The Rules of Procedure 
and Evidence
651
 indicate a number of aggravating factors, including where the victim was 
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“particularly defenceless”652 and offer discretion to the judges where the aggravating factor is 
not listed in the Rules, but is of a “similar nature”653 to those enumerated. Mitigating factors 
are then noted as being any circumstances “falling short of grounds for exclusion of criminal 
responsibility”654 and any efforts the person has made to make amends for the crimes, 
including cooperating with the court.
655
 These provisions could in fact afford the judges 
greater flexibility in deciding the extent to which defences should apply, if they should relieve 
responsibility fully or partially, and even if they should be considered pleas in mitigation. 
Despite the main aim of codification being the avoidance of ‘excessive judicial activism’, as 
was the case at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia,
656
 it appears 
that the judiciary has greater power to interpret the provisions as it sees fit. 
 
The aim of this chapter was to explore the structure of the defences within the Rome Statute 
and to attempt to understand the way in which they have been drafted. In doing so, it was 
discerned that the present structure of the defences conveys the idea that each defence, in 
articles 31-33 of the Rome Statute, has the same effect on criminal responsibility as the next 
and that each is of equal value to the next. This was explored in the context of domestic 
categorisation of the defences, namely justification and excuse theory, as well as the useful 
concept of pleas in mitigation, as discussed in chapter three. This chapter aimed to argue 
that the defences in the Rome Statute should not be replaced or removed, but refined. The 
refinement proposed is to distinguish between the defences in a manner which respects their 
conceptual differences and offers more detail on the way in which they would affect 
international criminal responsibility. 
 
The structure of defences within the Rome Statute at present is to place them in three 
consecutive articles under the heading of general principles. The four main grounds in 
article 31 could be further subdivided into two groupings, based on the similarity of language 
between them. This grouping is highly unsatisfactory, however, given that it highlights 
parallels which exist in the wording between concepts as different as self-defence and duress, 
mental disease or defect and intoxication. The reference to mistake appears to be a 
restatement of the mental element in article 30 and superior orders is firstly excluded and 
then included in a highly restrictive way, purporting to ‘relieve’ criminal responsibility. This 
division at present is undesirable because it rejects the idea of general principles of law and 
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instead favours its own constructions. A more refined approach would involve distinctions 
based on the concepts of a defence outlined in chapter three: full defences, partial defences 
and pleas in mitigation. 
 
Full defences can include those which justify and those which excuse the conduct and it has 
been argued that the only justification for the crimes within the jurisdiction of the Rome 
Statute could be self-defence, where an individual was threatened and adduced evidence to 
pass the tests outlined in its formulation. Mental defect or disease would best be 
characterised as an excuse, while duress could be classified as a partial defence, removing 
part of the responsibility from the accused for his conduct. Superior orders and involuntary 
intoxication could then be characterised as formal pleas in mitigation, recognising the 
requirement of their inclusion without affecting the criminality of the acts committed. 
 
In this way, the need to include defences in order to support the development of 
international criminal justice as a system is acknowledged. The maturity of a system which 
deals with particularly heinous crimes but understands that there are certain situations in 
which an individual may act and ought not to be fully punished would be proved. However, 
the distinctions would remove the current impunity which rests within the Statute in articles 
31-33. There is no law common or customary to all States which demonstrates agreement on 
all of the defences and in particular, for these defences to serious crimes. Depending on the 
perspective and system of the State, the current formulations and articles may look unduly 
harsh or comparatively lenient. It is desirable to try to achieve harmony insofar as may be 
possible and particularly so where the crimes are so grievous. A system of distinguishing the 
defences from one another would provide a rational explanation for their inclusion and a 
better understanding of why defences exist for such crimes in the first place. It may also 
provide reassurance to victims and the families of victims of those indicted before the Court 
of the justice that it can, and ought, to deliver. It would also reassure the international 
community that the system applies general principles of international criminal law, rather 
than principles selected to suit the mission of the court.  
 
The time it has taken to create the ICC, coupled with the problems associated with achieving 
agreement on modified provisions mean that it is necessary to explore how the same 
distinction may be appreciated without any formal amendment to the statute. Thus, it may 
be possible to deal with the proposal through existing provisions of the Statute in two ways: 
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through judicial interpretation of the defences
657
 or through the sentencing provisions which 
exist at present in the Rome Statute.
658
 
 
Under article 31(2), judges who adjudicate on cases before the ICC may “determine the 
applicability of the grounds for excluding criminal responsibility provided for in this Statute 
to the case before it.” As Schabas notes, this provision is rather difficult to understand given 
that the defences have been codified, but ultimately places the responsibility for deciding if 
the defences in article 31(1) should apply in the hands of the Court.
659
 Since the hierarchy 
above proposes a mainly theoretical distinction, there is no reason why this could not be 
interpreted as such by the Court. If the judges are able to make decisions on whether the 
defences should apply, it is arguably a lesser power than this to be able to determine the 
extent to which such defences should apply. The hierarchy could be considered and 
enforced by the Court without the requirements for any formal amendments. An issue 
central to this approach would be the enhanced flexibility this offers the judges, and the 
possibility of a differentiated approach among cases, which would be ameliorated by a 
formal amendment. However, arguably this is already permitted by article 31(2) and limited 
by the establishment of the doctrine of judicial precedent created by the Statute.
660
 
 
These provisions could be utilised by the Court to permit the distinction between the 
defences to be made. Thus, duress could be considered a partial defence in terms of its 
effect on the sentence imposed because of the mitigating factor noted above. However, even 
where duress was present (although the legal criteria in article 31 not satisfied fully to permit 
its application), if the victim was particularly defenceless, the victim’s state could be 
considered an aggravating factor in the commission of the crime. There is much judicial 
discretion in this area to determine not only the applicability of the defences, but also their 
impact on sentencing. The provisions under article 76 support this view. 
 
The effect of the defences in the Statute can thus be applied or disapplied at the discretion 
of the judges, which also allows them to consider circumstances akin to defences which were 
not met in law to be taken into consideration when imposing punishment. In this way, it may 
be possible to respect the hierarchy detailed above through the exercise of judicial discretion, 
                                                          
657
 Article 31(2), Rome Statute.  
658
 Article 76, Rome Statute. 
659
 W. Schabas, The International Criminal Court: A commentary on the Rome Statute, Oxford University 
Press, 2010, 491-2. 
660
 Article 21(2), Rome Statute. 
153 
 
wherein the judges may apportion partial responsibility and accept pleas in mitigation 
through the provisions of article 76 and the rules of procedure and evidence. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8. Conclusion 
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8.1 Defences in the Rome Statute: The place of duress 
8.2 Drawing together the threads of defending the indefensible 
8.3 Developing this research 
 
The foregoing work has dealt directly with the idea of defences, discussing extensively the 
place of defences in the Rome Statute and highlighting the lack of consideration which led to 
the codification of the concept in the Statute of the ICC. To conclude, this final part will 
declare the research statement and the way in which it has been explored. This concludes 
the examination on the place of duress as a defence, finding its roots in domestic law and its 
current codification in the Rome Statute as part of a wider acceptance of defences for serious 
crimes. However, this wider acceptance does not seem to have been fully considered and 
some of the defences in the Rome Statute do not appear to have a firm theoretical basis in 
either domestic or international law. 
 
It will then aim to deliver the results of the research: through the principles elucidated by 
domestic law and international sources, such as customary law and the general principles, the 
broad finding is that duress does not fit neatly as a defence for war crimes, crimes against 
humanity and genocide. The contribution to knowledge by this thesis is primarily that there 
is a particular difficulty with including duress as a defence to such serious crimes against the 
person. This demonstrates the general issue with including the defence at the international 
level, duress being the most problematic of the six defences outlined by the Rome Statute, 
and that the idea of defences ought to have been more carefully considered by the drafters. 
The theoretical implications of this analysis are that the inclusions of defences may affect the 
robustness of the doctrine of individual criminal responsibility. However, for reasons of 
time, space and coherence, this issue was not dealt with. From this point on, it is clear that 
proper exploration of a theory of international criminal law is required. At present the Rome 
Statute has sought to create a system of law, the by-product of which is the inclusion of 
concepts such as defences which are commonly found in established domestic systems. It 
makes little sense, however, that a system is created without properly considering its 
foundations. For this reason, it would be worthwhile to undertake future research which 
deals with the idea of a theory of international criminal law. The area of defences 
demonstrates incoherence in international criminal law with the idea of fairness: the promise 
of justice may be undermined by overly broad concepts or those which are overly narrow in 
defining criminal jurisdiction. The drafting of defences may be by no means the only 
concept which demonstrates this incoherence and thus further research may demonstrate 
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other incongruities in the Rome Statute – incongruities which must be addressed sooner 
rather than later, before the issues come before the ICC as problems in live cases. 
Prosecution remains difficult enough without the ICC being undermined by what may be 
perceived as an obvious lack of fairness in its operation. 
 
8.1 Defences in the Rome Statute: The place of duress 
 
The central ideas in the thesis relate to the ability to plead defences where serious crimes 
have been committed, justifying conduct which would otherwise be considered criminal. 
Ultimately, this thesis has explored the potential application of defences to a serious violation 
of international criminal law. In order to determine the applicability of such defences, 
domestic law has been used extensively. To justify the use of domestic law throughout the 
thesis, the sources of international criminal law were explored in the first instance, 
concluding that the importance of customary international law and general principles of law 
determined that domestic law had influenced, and continues to influence, the path of 
international criminal law. At this early stage, it is evident that domestic law has influenced 
the development of international criminal law in the past to great effect. Tentatively, one can 
see that any departure from the principles of domestic law ought to be carefully considered 
at the international level, particularly where principles of established systems are being 
disregarded.  
 
The argument then looked at the use of defences before international and internationalised 
tribunals in order to examine where the defences had been used at the international level. 
This part also considered the work conducted on a draft statute for an international criminal 
court by Bassiouni. The work of the domestic, internationalised and international criminal 
tribunals, as well as the statutes and charters of the latter group of courts, was found to have 
demonstrated a general reluctance to apply such defences: the principle was clearly 
enunciated that defences established at the national level, such as self-defence, could be used 
in response to a charge of war crimes or crimes against humanity. The difficulty in these 
situations was applying the defence, where limitations such as proportionality and the context 
of self-defence made it difficult to imagine a situation in which it could be an acceptable 
answer to such a criminal charge. This was reinforced by Bassiouni’s drafting, which codified 
a number of defences based on those included in the United States’ Model Penal Code and 
placed familiar limitations on their application to serious crimes. The draft statute identified 
a number of issues with defences and saw fit to note that duress would not be available to 
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serious crimes against the person: a violent action against another outwith the context of self-
defence would have difficulty meeting the test of proportionality. 
 
The later international criminal tribunals equally saw issues with the application of defences 
and even where the case was difficult, such as in Erdemovic before the ICTY, it was held 
that the defence could not apply to such a serious charge. Erdemovic lays the groundwork 
for this thesis because of the influence that the dissenting opinion of Antonio Cassese has 
had on the drafting of the Rome Statute, which, for the first time in the history of 
international criminal law statutes and charters, includes a defence of duress. Turning to the 
Rome Statute, the issue broadens from self-defence and duress to the inclusion of six 
defences. These defences echo those which were included in Bassiouni’s code, but their 
definitions do not necessarily conform to the same limitations he prescribed for each in the 
draft statute. The exploration of each defence in turn uncovered particular issues arising in 
relation to the defence of duress. This defence appear to be highly contentious: unlike self-
defence, it is not a well-established customary principle in law and unlike intoxication, its 
threshold for application is not so high so as to limit its application to only the most serious 
and clear-cut of cases. Rather its inclusion in the Rome Statute demonstrates a gap in the 
understanding of how defences ought to be used at the international level, for such serious 
crimes on the typically widespread scale on which they tend to be committed. Thus it 
remained difficult to understand why duress had been included, without inferring a great 
deal of influence from Cassese’s dissent in Erdemovic. The influence of this dissent, 
however, did not reach the drafted form of the defence in the Rome Statute, which some 
domestic jurisdictions would divide into the concepts of necessity and duress. In this way, a 
reversion to domestic law was required to highlight the specific problems with this defence. 
 
The next rung in the ladder of the argument was a comparative study of the closely linked 
defences of duress and necessity at the national level. In domestic systems, the idea of duress 
often refers to a threat made by another whereas necessity relates to a situation created by a 
natural disaster or some other force beyond the control of the person acting. More often 
than not, it relates to circumstances beyond not only the person’s control, but anyone’s 
control thus the decision taken can be viewed in a more objective light. The Rome Statute 
unifies both concepts into the one defence of duress and so both concepts were examined, 
where separate, at the national level. It was clear from the comparative work conducted that 
there are some common threads between the nations in relation to duress and necessity: all 
of the jurisdictions studied recognised at least one of the defences in their system. The main 
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issue was the application of the defence to a serious crime, the one surveyed being murder. 
There was very little, if any consensus on this point: the application of either defence was 
rejected on a number of occasions by English courts, even where the individual did not carry 
out the murder, whereas the unified South African defence of compulsion was made 
available to a charge of murder where the individual considered his life to be in peril. The 
other jurisdictions consider the issue on a spectrum, with Germany and France including at 
least a variant of duress in their criminal codes but rejecting its application in practice for 
cases concerning murder and, in the German case, for even threatening torture. The binding 
nature of the constitutional principle in both Germany and South Africa gives rise to further 
issues with the defence of duress: if human life is sacred and dignity inviolable, how can it be 
proportionate to kill another who does not represent a direct threat to your own existence? 
These issues remain unresolved at the domestic level, demonstrating an abject lack of 
consensus on the concept of duress in these established and influential national jurisdictions. 
 
Following on from the comparative work, attention then turned to the idea of duress in the 
Rome Statute and the effect that the defence would have on the guilt of one who pleads it. 
The main point here is that duress at the national level may or may not be considered a full 
defence, but affords the full removal of criminal responsibility at the international level. This 
is problematic because of the reasoning underpinning the reluctance to apply duress as a full 
defence at the national level: human dignity is inviolable and cannot be balanced against 
anything other than a direct threat to another life. Killing an innocent person cannot be 
justified because it was a necessary action under the circumstances or because one was 
threatened by a third party, an issue that causes problems with national constitutional 
principles even where the defence has been accepted in criminal law. It would further create 
issues with international human rights and customary norms to which the States studied have 
acceded. This part further considers the case of Erdemovic in the light of the Rome Statute: 
the influence of the case on the Rome Statute has been discussed extensively and it is 
determine, at this stage, that the outcome of the case would not have been any different had 
it been heard before the ICC. The standards set by the defence of duress in the Rome 
Statute still require the application of the test of proportionality, which the participation of 
Erdemovic in the Srebrenica massacre would surely not meet. If it were to meet this test, 
there is a clear impunity gap in the Rome Statute: one can simply argue that any crime, 
regardless of its gravity, was carried out under the banner of duress. In this way, the inclusion 
of duress in the Rome Statute for crimes against the person does not serve the purpose for 
which it was intended. It may not reduce the punishment of truly reluctant soldiers, those 
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who do act out under duress, and for them it may not even be available because of the 
character of the crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC. Where available, it undermines 
the seriousness of such crimes by deeming a crime against humanity concerning violence 
against the person a proportionate action in certain circumstances. This does not appear to 
be a progressive development, and thus reform or reinterpretation of the provisions is 
required. 
 
The final chapter to the thesis concludes that the provision of defences in the Rome Statute 
requires a new approach, focusing on the defence of duress as the prime example and the 
problems created by the inclusion of defences in this ill-considered manner. It also highlights 
the wider issues of creating a system of international criminal justice without first considering 
its theoretical foundations; the ad hoc nature of the system has led to rapid development 
without due consideration, which has created inconsistencies such as those evident in the 
Rome Statute’s provision of defences. These consequences should be properly considered 
before a case involving defences comes before the Rome Statute, which may diminish the 
reputation of the ICC in the eyes of the international community. The proposals note that 
there is an acknowledged, but undiscussed, hierarchy of defences at the national level, with 
some defences such as self-defence rising to the level of customary international law to reflect 
the desirability of the principle it espouses. In this way, the priority of such a defence at the 
national level should be mirrored in the Rome Statute: it can be referred to as a full, 
exonerating defence because of its accepted, principled basis at both the international and 
national level. The defences of intoxication and superior orders would be more appropriate 
as formal pleas in mitigation, allowing for less stringent conceptions of these defences to be 
applied and reduce the punishment to avoid harsh penalties being imposed on those who 
have found themselves in intolerable situations, without ignoring the harm caused to the 
victims and the disregard during such conflicts for the rule of law. Duress then represents a 
midpoint between the two ideas: to allow it to fully exonerate an individual would be to reject 
the concerns raised by the investigation into domestic principles, but to reject its inclusion as 
any form of defence would be to disregard the lessons taught by Erdemovic. A happy 
medium can be found between the two concepts in the idea of a partial defence for crimes 
against the person, which would reflect the difficulty of duress as a defence, retaining the 
criminality of the action but allowing for a lesser form of guilt to be applied to those who find 
themselves in the typical situation of a ‘hard case’. 
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In this way, the thesis centres on the idea that there is a problem with the broad inclusion of 
defences in the Rome Statute. Duress, as the most problematic of the defences, 
demonstrates this amply: there appears to have been little recourse to national law principles 
other than in the type of defences adopted and the problems the defences face at national 
level have not been investigated. The Rome Statute appears to require one of two things in 
order to address this problem: reform, or reinterpretation within the existing framework. 
 
8.2 Drawing together the threads of defending the indefensible 
 
The idea elucidated above demonstrated the complexity of the question: the notion of 
defending the indefensible may seem immediately apparent when looking at the crimes 
within the jurisdiction of the Rome Statute and yet it is not the case that such action could 
never been defended under any circumstance. The conclusion that self-defence remains a 
customary and general principle of international law, in addition to being a well-established 
defence at the national and State level, clearly demonstrates the potential for defences to be 
applied to such crimes. The conclusions of this thesis do not preclude such a judgment; 
rather they support it as an example of why defences are not equal in theory or in application 
to one another. Comparative work has been a major part of this thesis, demonstrating the 
way in which international law can learn from the workings and principles of domestic 
systems. There is no greater need for this than in the area of international criminal law, 
around which a system has been constructed and which frequently suffers from crises of 
legitimacy. It is in the interests of the international community to make the system as robust 
as possible in order to support its legitimacy and one way of doing so is to address the 
problem of defences, as a step in the direction of building a theory of international criminal 
law which supports its consistent and coherent development. 
 
The thesis concludes that the defences in the Rome Statute should not be considered equal 
to one another: the defence of duress demonstrates this idea clearly, using principles of 
domestic law to illustrate the lack of consensus on the principle of duress, necessity and even 
the unified concept of compulsion. International criminal law has traditionally turned to 
domestic law for inspiration to determine what conduct may or may not be criminal at the 
international level, and this source should not be disregarded at a critical point in the 
development of international criminal law. Where there is such little agreement on the 
defence for even one murder at the domestic level, it is difficult to foresee its application for 
the murder of many in the context of war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide.  
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Taking the examples of soldiers at Srebrenica who contributed to a massacre of thousands 
and situations of camp guards at the Nazi concentration camps who tortured and contributed 
to the death of so many, it is difficult to argue that such individuals were acting under duress 
and that their crimes should be nullified as a result. This argument is particularly strong 
where the application of domestic law would reject or disallow such a defence where used to 
exonerate an individual of the guilt for the murder of one person. For these reasons, the 
characterisation of duress as a full defence in the Rome Statute appears incongruous with the 
development of international criminal law to this point in time. It does not seem fair, 
appropriate or consistent with general principles of law to allow such a defence to be 
included, and to create equality among the defences in this way. The inclusion of the 
defences is based on the experience of international criminal law: situations of duress and 
involuntary intoxication are numerous in the history of armed conflict. This does not mean, 
however, that the heinous crimes which may be committed in such circumstances did not 
occur, or that the damage caused by the commission of them could be repaired by acquitting 
the actor responsible because he acted under duress. The aim of the court to afford justice 
must be met, and ought not to be derided through the application of a defence which fully 
exonerates the actor for such conduct. The history of international criminal law 
demonstrates the need for justice, not only for victims but for the international community as 
a whole; justice which may be impeded by a hastily constructed system with little theoretical 
grounding. The idea of a theory of international criminal law which would then distinguish 
between the defences indicates that the problems at present cannot be resolved without 
reform, or a specific reinterpretation of the provisions to ensure a consistently fair approach. 
The cogency of this theory is clear: the system must be fit for purpose. Furthermore, it is 
difficult enough to prosecute and for the system of international criminal justice to function 
effectively and well. It is not clear that the codification of defences in the way of the Statute in 
its current form has satisfied this requirement, or contributed to the efficacy and justice 
sought through the operation of the ICC. 
 
The proposals of this thesis indicate that the first step in addressing the wider theoretical 
problems of the Rome Statute would be to differentiate between the defences which have 
been codified therein. The distinction between the defences would then allow for a more just 
approach generally and a fairer approach for those pleading the defences, by lessening the 
punishment for those who successfully pleaded duress, intoxication or superior orders. This 
acknowledges that a reason for acting does not mitigate the effect of the crime, but ought to 
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be reflected in the punishment handed down. The theoretical implications of this would 
then mean that the defences could be recast, which would reduce the current high thresholds 
and allow cases like Erdemovic to successfully plead duress in mitigation, without 
compromising on justice. This proposal is the main contribution to knowledge made by this 
thesis: it demonstrates the potential for reform in the Rome Statute in respect of defences, by 
proving that the defences which have been codified in the Statute are not equal in force or 
effect to one another. It goes further than simply highlighting the problem by additionally 
providing a reasoned means by a more effective and fairer method of distinction may be 
achieved. This would also create a degree of consistency with national law, which has 
contributed so much to the development of international criminal law. The failure to refer to 
domestic principles when determining the bounds of these defences or when identifying if 
they should be considered full defences represents evidence of a problem in the Rome 
Statute. The problem is not limited to defences, as there is general lack of theory in 
international criminal law but it is the most visible representation of it in the Rome Statute, a 
treaty which needs to deal with the wider theoretical problems it creates through the 
instigation of a system of international criminal justice. 
 
This research has dealt with one aspect of the problem of a lack of theory of international 
criminal law, but there are other limitations in respect of the research. This thesis has 
uncovered the problem of a lack of differentiation between the defences in the Rome Statute 
with a focus on the defence of duress. However, there are other issues which relate to each 
individual defence that could be further explored in research which is not limited by the 
strictures of a PhD thesis. If the premise of differentiated defences is accepted, each defence 
ought to be explored in turn in order to redefines its bounds as a plea in mitigation or 
similar. There is the potential, when re-categorising the defences, to make their scope more 
expansive so as to allow the cases highlighted in chapter four to receive lesser punishments 
for war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide, where the acts were committed in 
difficult situations: the clichéd ‘hard cases’. A fuller study of all the defences is outwith the 
scope of this particular study, which focuses on the most contentious defence instead. The 
research also does not examine more broadly the concept of the defence of duress from a 
number of domestic jurisdictions, which could be incorporated as part of a separate and 
wider study focused purely on that defence. The comparative aspect of this work is restricted 
for reasons of time and space, but there is definitely opportunity to expand upon the 
groundwork conducted here. 
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8.3 Developing this research 
 
The wider aim of this research is to encourage development in this area of international 
criminal law in order to stimulate reform of the Rome Statute. At present, the ICC is 
struggling to make its mark as the propellant of international criminal justice and many 
obstacles lie in its way. These obstacles do not yet relate directly to the Statute and tend to be 
connected to practical problems: apprehending the accused, gathering evidence and ensuring 
that the indictments are properly framed, so as to avoid the release of those accused of 
horrendous crimes on the grounds of a technicality. While these pragmatic issues are ironed 
out, it is of value to deal with the more theoretical issues underpinning the Rome Statute. 
The impetus existed in the late 1990s to convene and agree upon a Statute in a short period 
of time. The reflection and discussion which was stimulated by this development will have, 
over the past thirteen years, resulted in a number of issues being raised by academics and 
other commentators. The window of opportunity presented by the operational problems 
means that these theoretical issues can be dealt with and reform can be instigated before the 
court begins to prosecute and hear cases on a wider scale than at present. The issue of 
defences is not one which may or may not arise before the Court; the question is rather one 
of when it arises, how it shall be dealt with.  Cries of unfairness if a defence were to be 
rejected on the grounds of the seriousness of the crime given the accused another means by 
which to attempt to undermine the Court’s authority. These are better dealt with in 
anticipation rather than when they are heard during what tend to be difficult, emotive and 
protracted cases. 
 
While this window of opportunity remains open, it leaves room for development in two 
areas: firstly, in respect of defences and secondly, in relation to a theory of international 
criminal law. The issue of defences for crimes at the international level is an interesting and 
fruitful area for discussion: at the domestic level, it concerns the moral standards we are 
prepared to accept from one another and at the international level, it takes the idea of an 
expectation of behaviour which is then applied to the worst and more barbaric crimes which 
are committed by individuals against, generally, populations of people. In this way, our 
acceptance that these crimes can be committed in certain circumstances requests a further 
exploration of how we consider the effect of these crimes. The defences included in the 
Rome Statute are not universally accepted at the domestic level, inviting again an exploration 
of why these defences in particular have been selected. Certain defences such as self-defence 
and mental defect or disease are recognisable in most domestic systems. The defences of 
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intoxication and duress tend to be less familiar; intoxication is considered an aggravating 
factor in some countries which operate according to systems of religious law. The seemingly 
incoherent selection of defences warrants further study in this area to uncover why these 
particular defences have been selected to remove responsibility at the international level, 
which could develop the points raised in an earlier part to this thesis. There is also further 
scope to determine the application of justification and excuse theory to the defences in the 
Rome Statute, using Anglo-American theory to identify differences between the defences. 
This could possibly also present an alternative to the theory of a hierarchy of defences, 
following on from the point developed here that all defences are not created equal. 
 
The main area of development identified by this thesis is that of the opportunity to debate a 
theory of international criminal law. Theories of international law have been discussed ever 
more frequently over the past decade and the international system, created in the aftermath 
of the Second World War, does not always present a coherent system that can be relied 
upon to present predictable results. In the broad area of international relations, this can be 
of use but in the area of international criminal law it is undesirable. The very nature of 
criminal law of any kind necessitates its predictable and reliable application for both those 
accused of crimes and those who are harmed by the commission of those criminal acts. In 
this way, a theory of international criminal law is required in order to create a sound 
theoretical basis for its future development. The various sources of international criminal law 
demonstrated here prove the point that reliance on treaties alone is neither desirable nor 
possible: international criminal law cases often put forward situations which could not have 
been considered at a peaceful, peacetime conference. A flexible theory of how international 
criminal law ought to be operate would bridge the gap between the creation of the law at 
international conferences, which should continue as a means of uncovering international 
consensus on how such serious events should be dealt with and remedied by the 
international community, and the requirements of ensuring justice. It would also ensure that 
the decisions which are taken are properly rooted in the spirit in which international criminal 
law was created, to further the aim of ending impunity without compromising on the rights of 
those who find themselves accused of the worst crimes of concern to the international 
community as a whole. 
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